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SUPPLY CHAIN CONTEXT
by
STEPHEN RONALD SPULICK
(Under the direction of Steve Rutner)
ABSTRACT
This dissertation attempts to determine the effect of managerial Executive on healthcare supply
chain risk management maturity. The healthcare industry is faced with constant risk to its supply
chain and operates under the expectation that healthcare will continue to be delivered even under
the most severe and disruptive of conditions. The effect of a manager, who operationalizes firm
strategy, may impact the maturity level of a hospital’s risk management efforts. Through multimethod research, this study seeks to understand the effects of management on healthcare risk
management maturity. Survey and interview methods were used to understand the relationship
between healthcare supply chain managers and the effect they have on a firm’s risk management
efforts in their supply chain. The study’s value lies in the identification of a unique measurement
of healthcare supply chain risk management maturity clusters and initial support based on
qualitative findings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Every manager possesses and employs personal attributes at work as they execute their
daily tasks and responsibilities (Fiedler, 1965; Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Håkonsson et al.,
2012). Among these responsibilities is the management of risk, which has depended on a
subjective (March and Shapira, 1987) and complex (Christopher and Lee, 2001; Juttner et al.,
2003; Christopher, 2012) approach often rooted in behavioral and psychological contexts
(Gephart, 1993). Not simply a personal attribute, this style, referred to as either leadership style
(Crowe et al., 1972; Bass and Yammarino, 1991) or Executive Style as termed by Håkonsson et
al., (2012), is a multifaceted set of traits that provides a foundation on which managers build
their actions and interactions (Bolman and Deal, 1991; Burton and Obel, 1998; Håkonsson et al.,
2008).
Important relationships
Previous research indicates there are relationships between managerial attributes, such as
Executive Style, and effective managerial performance (Crowe et al., 1972; Dahl et al., 2012)
and firm performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Håkonsson et al., 2012). Simchi-Levi et al.,
(2013) note that the strategic choices involved in supply chain risk management maturity can
lead to improved post-disruption resilience and firm performance as the maturity level increases.
Coupled with calls for understanding managerial style in decision-making (March and Shapira,
1987; Stewart and Roth, 2001; Khan and Burns, 2007) and the assertion by Nutt (1986) that
“style may explain why managers make different strategic decisions when faced with
similar choices” (p. 39), additional investigation into the effect and impact of managers and their
Executive Style on supply chain risk management maturity appears necessary as often it is the
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supply chain manager who will interpret the environment and deploy resources to support the
firm’s goals.
Supply chain risk management maturity
Recent research by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) of 209 international firms with global
supply chains found that companies with more mature supply chain risk management capabilities
performed better both operationally and financially following a disruption than firms with less
mature capabilities. Supply chain risk management maturity is a framework that “assesses the
degree to which companies are applying the most effective enablers of supply chain risk
reduction and their associated processes” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p. 2). There is no settled
definition of risk management, however, Al Mannai (2008) suggests it is “the process of
understanding risk and deciding upon and implementing action to achieve an acceptable level of
risk at an acceptable cost” (p.12). Given the complexity of supply chains and the presence of
multiple risks, a manager, who possesses a certain Executive Style, may decide to address these
risks. Of firms surveyed by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013), managers in 59% of the companies had
immature processes in place to face potential supply chain disruptions. Their choices made an
impact on preparedness and their style impacted their choices.
The impact of style and the manager
Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012) is an extension of Burton and
Obel’s (2004) broad based examination of contingency fit within organizations. This managerial
attribute, Executive Style, influences decisions that a manager makes daily, whether incorporated
knowingly or unknowingly (Heller and Yukl, 1969; Lok and Crawford, 2003) in the process. Its’
importance is recognized by Mangan and Christopher (2005) who note the growing awareness
that “people, knowledge and talent” (p. 179) are critical to a supply chain’s success. This builds
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on a concern expressed by Kirby (2003), following interviews with supply chain thought leaders,
that “supply chains, it seems, are really about talent, not technology, especially as the
marketplace grows ever more complex” (p. 65). This would begin to answer why, “despite years
of process breakthroughs and elegant technology solutions, an agile, adaptive supply chain
remains an elusive goal” (Kirby, 2003, p. 64). The leadership of a manager, within the context of
firm operations, can have either beneficial or detrimental effects on firm performance and
outcomes (Slater, 1989; Christopher, 2012). Early understanding of supply chains viewed the
environment as stable and linear, ideal for prescriptive and positivistic approaches, yet more
recent understanding notes the changing and transformative networks in use requiring leaders
capable “of coping with complexity and nonlinearity” (Christopher, 2012, p.5). The variations in
managers and styles, expressed through their Executive Style, therefore presents a key area to
examine to better understand the decisions made by key managers, particularly in the complex
environments of risk and supply chain management.
Style has an impact and has been the subject of research, variously described as
leadership styles or traits. Ultimately, these studies seek to define influential attributes of a
manager that were previously undefined or poorly defined. Styles have been seen in
examinations of successful naval officers’ performance and promotions, with managerial traits of
charisma, inspirational leadership, contingent promises and rewards, active and passive
management-by-exception as elements predictive of success (Bass and Yammarino, 1991). Dahl
et al., (2012) further found that male CEO values and behaviors changed upon transitioning to
fatherhood. Specifically, their research indicated that the manager’s attitudes toward stakeholders
changed in terms of reducing subordinate compensation and increasing their own (Dahl et al.,
2012). A leadership style that employed consideration, a less structured approach to
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management, was found to be an important antecedent to executive job satisfaction in western
firms (Lok and Crawford, 2004) but not in Asian firms, indicating differences exist in styles of
managers across cultures. Slater (1989) found support that certain aspects of style were related to
business performance. One aspect that was examined, a ‘thinking mode of decision making’,
improved performance regardless of the overall firm strategy and Slater (1989) noted the future
necessity to explore other relationships between managerial style and performance. Slater (1989)
found this information would be useful “for making selection, development and placement
decisions regarding current or potential” (p. 452) managers. Again, style matters and may be
context dependent.
Executive Style, as defined by Håkonsson et al., (2012), measures a manager’s style as a
two dimensional construct that consists of uncertainty avoidance and preference for delegation.
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the avoidance of “correctly anticipating events in the distant
future by using short-run reaction to short-run feedback, i.e. solve pressing problems rather than
developing long run strategies” and of “anticipating the environment by negotiating with it”
(Cyert and March, 1963, p. 119). Preference for delegation describes the range between which at
one end a manager prefers to make decisions alone and at the other end the manager involves
others in the decision-making process (Håkonsson et al., 2012). When Executive Style is aligned
with firm strategy, performance was found to improve, leading Håkonsson et al., (2012) to note
that “executives matter when implementing strategy” (p. 196). The results indicate a complex,
nuanced relationship between Executive Style and firm strategy leading Håkonsson et al., (2012)
to call for continued research in this area. As a CEO's Executive Style influences firm strategy
and structure, so a supply chain manager's Executive Style may influence the strategies and
structures within their purview (Burton and Obel, 1998), to include the supply chain risk
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management context. The Executive Style of a supply chain manager becomes more apparent
when planning for and addressing a supply chain disruption.
Disruption as a risk context
“Unplanned and unanticipated events that disrupt the normal flow of goods and materials
within a supply chain” is a recent definition of disruption (Craighead et al., 2007, p. 132). The
context of disruption and the attendant risk must be addressed by managers (March and Shapira,
1987; Gephart, 1993; Stewart and Roth, 2001; Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004;
Khan and Burns, 2007). Disruptions have a discernable pattern and a multi-phasic disruption
sequence has been identified by Turner and Pidgeon (1997) in their discussion of disaster
disruptions. A manager will be involved in all of the phases from “notionally normal starting
points” through the “precipitating event” to “full cultural readjustment” as part of their
responsibilities to the firm (March and Shapira, 1987). The scope of this research, however, will
be limited to the time period prior to the “precipitating event”. The scope is purposefully narrow
to isolate actions taken under routine operations regarding planning for a supply chain disruption
risk. The presence of a precipitating event introduces a separate stream of activities that are built
upon preparation but which are, in effect, validations of the preparation effectiveness, which is
outside the scope of this research as well and can be found in the stream of disruption
management literature (Drabek, 1986; Tierney et al., 2001; Handfield et al., 2007; Atwater et al.,
2010; MacDonald and Corsi, 2013).
The supply chain manager and disruption risk
The interface, therefore, between pre-disruption actions, supply disruption risk and the
firm is often the supply chain manager. These managers take varied approaches, interpret
environmental information and disruption data differently and control resources for deployment
in support of the firm’s mission, often in a subjective and complex manner, rooted in behavioral
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and psychological factors (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Therefore, not all managers are equal in
their Executive Style and approach to their work as Fiedler (1965) notes in a call to adjust or
“engineer the job to fit their leadership style” (p. 115). Barney (1991) notes the importance of
human resources, such as managers, as a resource to provide inimitable advantage, especially
when utilized in a socially complex context such as interpersonal relations, culture and firm
reputation to improve a firm’s efficiency and effectiveness. In discussion of the difference
between theory and practice in current risk management thought and driven by managerial
decision-making, choice and leadership, Stulz (1996) notes the need to adjust away from a
simple variation-minimization approach and perhaps use a strategy rooted more in probabilities.
Bertrand and Schoar (2003), to yield greater insight, introduce the managerial unit of analysis to
explore aspects of corporate practices that are unexplained when examined at the firm or industry
level of analysis, concluding that differences in mangers yield differences in corporate
performance (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003).
Managing supply chain disruption risks is challenging and complex, as risks may ripple
throughout increasingly complex systems. Recognizing this, Kleindorfer and Saad (2005) note
challenges for managers including visibility across the supply chain, partnerships to manage
disruptions and joint problem solving, all while balancing investment and insurance costs both
prior to and post disruption. While these are prescriptive suggestions, managers with various
styles must execute them. Manuj and Mentzer (2008) note that in relation to risk management
strategies, managers must “fully understand” the strategies, and “understand the advantages and
disadvantages” of managing “the myriad of global supply chain risks” (p. 216). Speier et al.,
(2011) found that firms with more mindful leaders, that is leaders creating a sense of culture,
were more likely to invest in risk mitigation strategies to include process management,
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information management and partner and service provider management initiatives” (p. 732). A
manager and their style, therefore, may bear on actual implementation of strategies (Håkonsson
et al., 2012), when other considerations are held constant.
The supply chain manager and firm strategy
Managers work for firms that have semi-fixed strategies and missions which the manager
is expected, by virtue of his or her position, to support, to champion and about which to make
decisions (Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Papke-Shields and Malhotra, 2001; Hamner and Tosi, 1974).
As businesses experience cycles of change through variation in internal or external
environments, in time the firm will face disruptions and face the attendant risk to their strategy.
The more extreme disruptions, magnifying the impact (Woo, 2011) beyond normal operational
variation, are where managers themselves may show their personal differentiation (Christopher,
2012) through their pre-disruption choices and activities with which they support firm strategy
and the continued success of the firm (Mangan and Christopher, 2005). Therefore, a manager’s
actions may support continuation of firm strategy through cycles of variation and threats from
multiple types of disruption, if the actions are timely and anticipate future events appropriately
(Burton and Obel, 2004).
Multi-faceted disruption risk
Disruption to firm operations, including pre-disruption actions, the focus of this research,
has been examined from multiple directions. These include understanding the financial, cash and
asset based influence of a disruption and, in the event of a previously unexperienced disruption,
managing through severe challenges due to bounded rationality issues (Altay and Ramirez, 2010;
Kahneman, 2003) for the manager who has little frame of reference based on prior knowledge or
experiences. Disruptions may impact transportation routes and in extreme situations such as
serious to catastrophic incidents, the social fabric of a firm or community (Wood et al., 2013)
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may feel the effect. These types of risks have been characterized as low-likelihood, high impact
risks (Oke and Gopalakrishnan, 2009). Disruptions can further impact insurance costs or the
availability of cutting edge products and customer retention (Tang, 2006). Several characteristics
have been identified as important to a reaction to a disruption. These aspects include the event
risk (of occurrence and/or failure), agility (of a firm’s reaction) and resilience (the return to the
previous or an improved state) (Christopher and Peck, 2004). Yet, actions may be taken prior to
the precipitating event as an effort to mitigate or eliminate the potential impact.
Pre-disruption action and performance
The scope of this research falls within the narrower frame of pre-disruption events. Faisel
et al., (2006) notes that risk mitigation enablers exist in the form of specific activities in a supply
chain. Having plans and structures in place may diminish business impact and may be vital as
Hendricks and Singhal (2005) found recovery to pre-disruption performance levels may take two
years or more. A complication, Tang (2006) notes, is the challenge a manager may encounter
justifying preparation costs to senior management for a disruption that may not occur. Yet,
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) note that, post-disruption, firms that plan and implement greater levels
of supply chain risk management maturity pre-disruption outperform those with lower levels of
maturity. To provide context within this research for managerial action, framing pre-disruption
research in the context of potential effects and risk is appropriate and a supply chain risk map
will be employed as part of this exploration. While managerial impact occurs post-disruption as
well, that is beyond the scope of this research.
Reasons for the research
This dissertation answers calls for supply chain management research that is multidisciplinary, multi-method and relevant (Sanders and Wagner, 2011; Fawcett and Waller, 2011a;
Ellram and Cooper, 2014), and examines assumptions and seeks to identify new characteristic
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interactions (Fawcett and Waller, 2011b). The research incorporates studies from supply chain
risk management (Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Wagner and Bode,
2006; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013), leadership and strategy fields
(Håkonsson et al., 2012) as well as the risk management field (Bernoulli trans. Summer, 1954;
Tah and Carr, 2001). A multi-disciplinary, multi-method approach enhances rigor and reliability
and provides greater insight into a phenomenon than a more focused and myopic examination
(Sanders and Wagner, 2011) and this research will incorporate both a survey and semi-structured
interview as multiple methodologies. The use of a qualitative interview portion will provide
depth and nuance (McGrath, 1982) that a survey instrument may not be able to capture, while the
survey instrument allows generalization to a larger population from the sample set and
investigation of behavior free of contextual bias (McGrath, 1982). Relevance is gained through
increased opportunities to explore linkages that a strictly quantitative approach may exclude
(Ellram and Cooper, 2014). While the quantitative exploration of supply chain risk management
is based upon Simchi-Levi et al., (2013), a semi-structured interview will allow exploration of
specific instances to understand if there are factors and interactions not captured by the survey
instrument (McCracken, 1988; Kvale, 1996; Fontana and Frey, 2000; Juttner and Ziegenbein,
2009).
The framework of Contingency theory
Contingency Theory (Fiedler, 1964, 1967, 1978; Hofer, 1975) provides a framework to
interpret the fit between Executive Style and supply chain risk management approach.
Contingency Theory has been characterized as providing an interpretation of fit as an interaction
effect (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985) between internal and external contexts of an organization
which are important for decision-making (Wagner and Bode, 2008) but in the context of an
individual firm. As such, the findings may lack a degree of generalizability, which is a known
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weakness (Trkman and MacCormack, 2009; Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985) yet is appropriate to
explain the observations. In the context of this research, Executive Style is an internal factor and
the supply chain risk may be a factor either internal or external in nature. Trkman and
McCormack (2009) note that “there is no single best way of organizing supply chains to manage
uncertainties and risks, firm-to-firm risk comparisons are therefore the result of environmental
demands and attributes that tend to be firm-specific” (p. 248). This echoes Fiedler’s (1964)
seminal work in Contingency Theory that stated there may be multiple best ways to organize and
lead a business, as well as the assertion that there is no leadership style or set of universal
decisions that will be best for all businesses. Yet Singhal and Singhal (2012) note that some
contingencies “can cover a set of industries” (p. 247) and there may be styles best for certain
contingencies (Fiedler, 1965). The unit of analysis will be the manager within a specific industry,
to both control for cross-industry bias and to determine if within a specific industry and context
Executive Style has an impact. Specifically the industry is healthcare and the context is supply
chain risk management maturity. As Håkonsson et al., (2012) noted, Executive Style that is
aligned with firm strategy can lead to improved performance. This research seeks to determine if
there is alignment between Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity as well
as understanding more nuanced aspects of supply chain risk management through interviews. To
gain an improved understanding, this research examined risk, risk management and Executive
Style within the context of healthcare supply chains.
Risk and Risk Management
Although supply chain risk management is a relatively new field, risk management has
been considered in business since at least 1738 when Bernoulli (trans. Summers, 1954) sought
first to understand the utility costs of risk choices and then shifted focus to the realm of
insurance. Ellis, Shockley and Henry (2011), in their literature review of supply risk
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management across seventy nine periodicals, to examine the seemingly fragmented nature of risk
management, found the research in this area disjointed. Risk management, they found, has been
used to mitigate operational contingencies, natural hazards or man-made events. Each of these
types of disruptions has generated research pertaining to severity, responsibility and a
broadening of the risk management field.
Risk and severity
Risk has been characterized by its severity (Tah and Carr, 2001; Norrman and Jansson,
2004; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Wagner and Bode, 2006; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011),
and Wagner and Bode (2008) further provide a dimensional illustration of risk that begins with
an exceptionally severe supply chain trigger event with subsequent negative consequences and
expands to include catastrophic impact which can threaten business continuity. This degree of
risk is characterized by an abnormal negative impact on a firm’s supply chain and may be
triggered by a natural “force majeure”, political instability, epidemic or other factor. The impact
may be additionally affected by time pressure or capabilities degradation and may further
develop to the point where operations cease altogether. These disruptions have a wide impact on
a supply chain and may extend beyond the local to include a global impact. As mentioned
previously, risk is the responsibility of a manager (March and Shapira, 1987; Gephart, 1993;
Stewart and Roth, 2001; Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Khan and Burns,
2007), who possesses traits termed style. The manager may choose to take action or not when
faced with a risk or potential risk. Yet, addressing risk in a supply chain presents certain
situational aspects a manager must understand and face. These complex aspects include lack of
ownership or responsibility, chaos and inertia from the organization (Christopher and Lee, 2001;
Juttner et al., 2003).
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Risk and responsibility
Risk has also been characterized by the level of responsible manager who must address
the risk, whether strategic risks addressed by senior managers or more tactical risks addressed by
more functionally focused managers. March and Shapira (1987) note however, that managers fail
to follow classic theoretically anticipated responses to risk, and rather respond according to
“individual taste” and “social norms and expectations” (p. 1415). Gephart (1993) notes that
assignment of this responsibility for addressing risk, imposed at a macro level by the
organization as part of the job description, can ultimately lead to positive outcomes (“credit”) or
negative outcomes (“blame”) (Gephart, 1993, p. 1506) and risk sensemaking may vary between
managers within an organization. Stewart and Roth (2001), in their examination of the
differences in risk propensity between entrepreneurs and managers, found entrepreneurs often
focused more on profit and growth, and possessed higher risk propensities, often to a greater
degree than subjects who were more income oriented. A possible source of confusion regarding
risk may be the managers themselves, who were found by Juttner et al., (2003) to consider risk to
be a multidimensional construct, making subsequent cross-respondent comparisons more
difficult, i.e. Manager A interprets a catastrophic risk impact differently than Manager n. In
general, Khan and Burns (2007) found an area of agreement in that risk among managers carries
a negative connotation, but is also seen as a topic to be confronted by either objective means,
such as risk management tools, or by subjective means, such as human judgment. In sum, risk
management approaches taken by managers are varied, subjective and complex, often rooted in
behavioral and psychological contexts while being influenced by organizational context (Manuj
and Mentzer, 2008). As such, the topic remains a prime area for continued academic exploration.
Risk in other fields
Risk has been characterized in other fields as a broad, enterprise-wide task or set of tasks
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which function to reduce negative impacts to the firm. Recent developments have seen risk
management conceptualization branch out to specific fields and a subsequent reevaluation of
field specific definitions. As such, overarching techniques have been developed to address risk in
the enterprise (COSO, 2004; Purdy, 2010) to enable firms to achieve their objectives, treat risks
and manage incidents, among other relevant tasks. This research seeks to understand the role of
Executive Style in supply chain risk management maturity decision-making, which is an ongoing
challenge for researchers. This research further answers calls for more specific managerial
behavior analysis (March and Shapira, 1987) in the risk management domain, seeks to develop
an understanding of how risk management maturity differs or corresponds between managerial
styles (Stewart and Roth, 2001) and the call for “broad and in-depth empirical research into how
risk is managed in supply chains” (Khan and Burns, 2007, p. 211).
Executive behavior and psychology
The understanding of a manager’s strengths and weaknesses, as measured by Executive
Style and as then understood by both manager and supervisor, provides insight into overall
managerial capabilities and can be related to a manager’s risk management practices. These
managers, as individuals, possess unique combinations of attributes that form the basis of their
intended behavior in a given context. Each manager has developed, through inherent
predisposition and experiences, their own personalized approach to how they function in their
supply chain role. Such discussions move research into a neighboring area of managerial
behavior and psychology (Tokar, 2012).
Behavioral psychology is an established field with early recognition of the need for
systematic examination of human experience (Skinner, 1938). Research of the human behavior
and the style of managers and executives has continued since Skinner's call for alignment of firm
strategy (Skinner, 1938). Top management practitioners have been studied through multiple
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lenses to include Executive Styles (Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012) and east-west cultural
and demographic differences (Lok and Crawford, 2003), role conflict and role ambiguity
(Hamner and Tosi, 1974), the universality and context dependence of some managerial
characteristics (Slater, 1989) and an examination of the relationship between managerial
characteristics, strategy and small business unit (SBU) performance (Gupta and Govindarajan,
1982).
Executive style and fit
Several authors (Fiedler, 1965; Heller and Yukl, 1969, Wofford, 1971; Covin and Slevin,
1988) suggested that success of a manager, which yields a positive influence in the firm, is based
upon the contingent factors of fit and context, where fit describes the conjunction of a manager
with a job and both are contained in an environment that is defined by the context of operations
and the benefits gained by both the manager and the firm. With fit, the firm benefits from
optimal use of the manager-as-resource it employs to achieve its objectives and the manager
benefits from a reduction in friction between their own goals and activities and those required by
the firm (Fiedler, 1965). The context defines the dimensions within which an executive operates
and may reflect organizational structure, firm culture or other exogenous characteristics (Covin
and Slevin, 1998). Porter (1996) lays a further foundation with his assertion that “more
sustainable” strategic fit is built on entire systems of activities whose strength is epitomized by
the strongest link in the chain. At the core lies the individual leaders in the firm. These individual
leaders will, of necessity, be located at different positions within each company, but all have
made decisions that “implemented” a strategy, “built” a system of activities or maintained or
avoided a strong linkage as part of their success or failure.
Earlier studies have also examined how managerial behavior is malleable. The effect of
subordinate behavior on managerial behavior was investigated by Crowe et al., (1972) and more
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recently even the effect of fatherhood on managerial style and subordinate compensation (Dahl et
al., 2012) has been explored in management literature. An approach focused on self-perception
by Bass and Yammarino (1991) discussed the differences between self-reported and subordinate
reported leadership style, finding a leader self-inflates their evaluation when compared to
subordinates. Understanding the current Executive Style in a given context is a first step to
understanding the possible impact of a manager and their choices. These become amplified in
contexts with great complexity and the manager becomes a critical crux and bridge between a
firm and management of risks to ensure continuous operations in support of the firm’s strategy
and goals. The healthcare context, with multiple suppliers, exposure to multiple and multifaceted risks and a goal of restoring health to those who arrive at a facility provides a suitable
setting for further exploration of how managers approach supply chain risk management.
The healthcare context – complexity and uniqueness
The complex relationship between overarching firm strategy, managerial characteristics
and performance has been empirically examined (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1982; Deverell and
Olsson, 2009; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Miles et al., 1978, Williamson, 1999) and a
determination offered that strategy can encompass many variables and in itself can be complex
and situation dependent. Porter (1991) stressed that improved empirical testing is desirable as
well as an understanding of the chain of causality when developing theory. While it is useful to
understand how executive strategy impacts risk management, there may also be causal forces
present through the impact presented by firm strategy.
The healthcare supply chain, with its exposure to disruption risk, coupled with an
expectation that firm strategy includes business continuity (Rodriguez et al., 2006) during a
disruption, is positioned as an ideal example from which to begin to explore these relationships.
Several authors have pointed out the unique nature of the healthcare supply chain (CSC
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Consulting, 1996; Burns, 2002; Schneller and Smeltzer, 2006; Chang And Wittemore, 2008;
McFadden et al, 2009; Dobrzykowski et al., 2014). The aspects of the healthcare supply chain
are well illustrated by Burns (2002), who draws on Porter’s value chain work, to characterize the
healthcare value chain as the unique flows of money, product and information in support of
product movement, and places this framework on the existing supply chain actors of the
manufacturer, group purchasing organizations (GPO), distributors and hospital systems or
hospitals. Burns (2002) notes that this occurs for eight distinct areas, including “pharmaceuticals,
medical-surgical supplies, (that is, disposables), radiology and laboratory supplies, medical
devices (for example stents or implants), critical equipment (durable and expendable), food and
dietary supplies and services, office forms and supplies, and cleaning supplies and services” (p.
43).
Pre-disruption managerial behavior
When the structure of a healthcare supply chain faces a disruption event of great
magnitude there is increased opportunity for failure (Nates, 2004; Prezant et al., 2005; Dolan and
Krug, 2006; Powell et al., 2008). This failure occurs simultaneously with a breakdown in part or
all of the environmental fabric in which a healthcare facility operates, adding additional pressure
to sustain performance. The risk management planning, conducted by firm executives and with
the influence of exogenous forces from the firm and environment, provides the underpinnings for
post-disruption activities. While many studies have examined disruption risk (Sheffi, 2001;
Blackhurst et al., 2005; Chopra and Sodhi, 2004; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005; Hendricks and
Singhal, 2005; Craighead et al., 2007; Handfield et al., 2007; Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009;
Zsidisin and Wagner, 2010; Ellis et al., 2011; Waters, 2011) and post-disruption supply chain
operations (Natarajarathinam et al., 2009; Skipper at al., 2010; MacDonald and Corsi, 2013)
fewer have focused on the pre-disruption behavioral aspects of the executives charged with
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supply chain operations. MacDonald (2008) has called for further research in this nascent
intersection between risk decisions and behavioral factors to build on the work begun by Manuj
and Mentzer (2008) while Lorentz and Hilmola (2012) note the benefit of understanding
behaviors as part of risk related decision making and how pre-disruption supply chain decisions
are made. Tokar (2010), in a focused discussion of behavior in supply chain research, notes the
substantial contribution to be made by such future research into managerial judgment and
decision making, to include possible extension of the supply chain management field into
behavioral areas. In turn, this may lead to improved understanding of operational decision
making and result in improved accuracy in understanding and anticipating managerial actions.
Research Objectives and Research Questions
This research has several goals. These include developing an understanding of supply
chain risk management behaviors as well as Executive Style influence on supply chain risk
management decision-making. This dissertation specifically addresses the relationship between
Executive Style and supply chain risk management activities. Justification is rooted in several
recent calls for new research topics. For instance, Waller and Fawcett (2012) urge researchers to
combine “ideas or paradigms that are not typically combined” (p. 261). While firm strategy,
Executive Style and risk management have been previously examined separately, the underlying
psychological aspects as they relate to variation in strategic decision-making previously have
been mainly examined from an economic, general management and behavioral psychology
perspective (Ben-David et al., 2010; Ben-David et al., 2007).
The first objective is to develop an understanding of the interactions between Executive
Styles and the risk management approach taken by managers. To address this gap in current
research, a multiple method approach has been used. Use of a multiple method approach
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incorporating both a survey of healthcare supply chain managers and semi-structured interviews
allows for a more rich examination of the topic (McGrath, 1982) and addresses weaknesses that
each research method possesses while providing complementarity between them. Multiple
method research utilizing survey and interview techniques has been used in management studies
involving uncertainty (Pagell and Krauss, 1999) where qualitative interview findings were used
to explain survey results, and has been advocated to increase the validity of the overall research
to ensure results are a reflection of the findings versus the method (Jick, 1979). Further, this
research seeks to answer the recent call by several researchers for additional, rigorous,
qualitative research in the supply chain field to compliment quantitative work (Gammelgard and
Larson, 2001; Mello and Flint, 2009; Fawcett and Waller, 2011a; Kaufmann and Denk, 2011;
Gligor and Autry, 2012) and is designed to uncover attributes of supply chain risk management
that may remain unknown (Kaufmann and Denk, 2011).
Executive Style and supply chain risk management relationship
Gligor and Holcomb (2012) call for increased research into the behavioral/relational
antecedents that can impact supply chain efficiency and effectiveness during disruptions. This, in
part, encompasses the first aspect of Executive Style, risk avoidance, and echoes Knemeyer and
Naylor (2011) who note the critical need to understand nuances of decision-making in supply
chains as “problem solving approaches by logistics and supply chain managers might be
influenced by an individual’s risk avoidance” (p. 296, emphasis added). The second aspect of
Executive Style is willingness to delegate, about which Sungul et al., (2012) note that
“delegation of decision making to managers is efficient when managers allocate resources,
including their own efforts, in ways that do not divert from owners’ objectives” (p. 376, emphasis
added) however they also note that while previous delegation work, “focused on the complex
reality of intraorganizational structures, incentives, and processes that shape many organizational
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choices” (Sungal et al., 2012, p. 376) these were focused internally. Supply chain risk
management maturity, at more advanced levels, incorporates a tightly entwined internal and
external focus (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013), a focus currently missing from delegation studies
(Sungal et al., 2012). Actions to address risk “such as organizational structures, task design,
explicit and implicit incentives, and management assignments” (Sungal et al., 2012, p. 376)
shape outcomes and apply a contingency view to the managerial context (Sungal et al., 2012).
Contingency Theory of leadership (Fiedler, 1964) notes that leaders and their styles may be
compatible with certain conditions and that leaders can be trained to recognize this fit and
understand if their style meets the needs of the firm.
In the context of supply chain risk management, Braunscheidel and Suresh (2009) point
out that there is a close relationship between “agility, risk preparedness and better response to
foreseen and unforeseen disruptions” (p. 135). Therefore, understanding the behavioral/relational
aspects of supply chain risk preparedness as measured with a supply chain risk maturity index is
important as it may benefit or detriment risk posture through managerial choices. Although
research has proposed prescriptive approaches to supply chain risk management (Ritchie and
Brindley, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) and professional organizations have developed
risk management guidelines for both broadly defined business ventures (ISO, 2009; AIRMIC et
al., 2010) as well as supply chain management (Cranfield University, 2003; Supply Chain
Council, 2010), March and Shapira (1987) find managers return to “individual taste” and “social
norms and expectations” (p. 1415) when responding to risk. This reliance on personal techniques
may be troubling to firms who already acknowledge that up to sixty percent of them “pay only
marginal attention to risk reduction processes” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p.2) of any kind.
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Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) note that supply chain operations in the 209 global firms they
surveyed were most sensitive to the skill sets and experiences of managers, scoring ahead of
commodity prices, energy reliance and regionalization of manufacturing, indicating that
managers and the attributes they bring indeed matter. In the risk management maturity domain it
is less well understood how this interaction is operationalized and what impact Executive Style
has on risk management.
Research Question 1: “How does Executive Style impact a manager’s approach to risk
management?”
Executive Style and supply chain risk management complexities
The second objective was to understand the complex influences encountered by supply
chain managers as they address risk management. Quantitative approaches such as the survey
technique allow researchers the opportunity to test hypotheses and theories directly, however,
this approach may fail to capture aspects of the inquiry that are beyond the scope of the survey
items presented to the respondents. Cronbach (1975) recognized the correlational benefit of
researchers incorporating analysis of controlled variables as well as information gathered in
specific contexts and which then take on a more important role. Understanding complex
interactions between managerial choices and external influences, such as those surrounding risk
management choices, may require dense, vivid data that is simultaneously clear in meaning.
This analysis of behavior is addressed by examining examples of specific topics or events of
interest; analysis of a specific topic across respondents allows for cross-case comparisons to
determine both similarities and outlier circumstances between respondents.
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The current topic of risk management is ideal for more nuanced research for several
reasons. As Tokar (2010) notes, assumptions about human behavior in quantitative research in
logistics and supply chain management must facilitate a more broad understanding and rely less
on assumptions such as “people are independent and unaffected physically or psychologically by
one another” and “people are not a major factor for the focal issue, people are deterministic and
predictable” (p. 93). Rather, behavioral categories such as those suggested by Bandoly et al.,
(2006) of personal “intentions, actions and reactions” (p. 94) provide a straightforward and
effective approach to explore behavior. Ritchie and Brindley (2007) also note that decisionmakers are influenced by “perceptions, attitudes, experiences, rewards and penalties” (p. 1403).
These factors in risk management may reveal previously unknown “intentions, actions and
reactions” (Bandoly et al., 2006, p. 94) as often, managerial behavior fails to follow normative
suggestions (March and Shapira, 1987) based on previous academic findings or practitioner
guidance, suggesting there are other factors to be discovered (Tokar, 2010). Therefore
exploration of managerial approaches to risk management are seen as complex and remain at an
early stage.
Tang (2006b) differentiates degrees of risk as those inherent in operations such as
“uncertain customer demand, uncertain supply, and uncertain cost” (p. 453) and those more
serious disruptions, “major disruptions caused by natural and man-made disasters such as
earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, terrorist attacks, etc., or economic crises such as currency
valuation or strikes” (p. 453). “In most cases, the business impact associated with disruption
risks is much greater than that of the operational risks” (Tang, 2006b, p. 453) and has been
selected as the focus area to increase validity of the findings. A possible remedy to significant
negative impacts to performance indicators, noted by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) is an increase in
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supply chain risk management maturity. Firms with more mature supply chain risk management
procedures drive disruption resilience and perform “better along all surveyed dimensions of
operational and financial performance than immature companies” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p.
22). Action to adjust supply chain risk management maturity levels will be executed by supply
chain managers, yet managers and their Executive Styles are varied and may yield varied
outcomes for the firm.
These aspects of complexity and risk management were examined specifically in the
context of risk management for a respondent-determined notional, serious-to-catastrophic supply
chain disruption that also occurs with medium-to-very low frequency (See Figure 1). The selfselected disruption that has the scope of serious to catastrophic impact to the firm may include
events such as tornadoes, earthquakes, technological or man-made disasters or other firm specific
events ultimately addressed by the supply chain practitioner and the influences that affect them.
Between this disruption and the supply chain is the supply chain manager and their Executive
Style as well as other influences.
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Figure 1: Supply Chain Risk Map – Qualitative Interview Focus Area

Knowing the probability an event may occur in the future, knowing the potential damage
that may occur, perhaps having already experienced a major disruption firsthand and with the
knowledge of firm strategy, priorities and resources, managers make the decisions to prepare or
not prepare their supply chains for risk. Normative frameworks exist yet are often not followed,
with a reliance instead on human judgment that itself seems to follow specific and systematic
patterns (Stanovich and West, 1998; Kahneman, 2003). Bendoly et al., (2006) note the lack of
rational activity of managers when compared to classical models of behavior that gave rise to
research in behavioral economics seeking to explain the anomalous behavior. Over forty percent
of respondents recently indicated supply chain vulnerabilities would increase in the future
(Juttner, 2005), yet supply chain risk management continues to require focus within specific
fields and industries (Juttner, 2005) to continue refinement and understanding. Added exigency
exists when the supply chain disruption occurs in a healthcare context, as the surrounding
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community, in a time of great disruption, may require medical services and requisite supplies to
ease their suffering; supply chain risk may extend beyond the focal firm if suppliers are also
negatively impacted by an extreme event. Comparison of healthcare supply chain manager
approaches to similarly scoped risks, i.e. very low-to-medium probability and serious-tocatastrophic impact, may reveal previously overlooked behaviors (Knemeyer and Naylor, 2011)
or relationship complexities (Juttner, 2005) that drive decision-making and lay the foundation for
future empirical investigation.
Research Question 2: “What are the complex influences encountered by supply
chain managers as they determine their risk management approach?”
The third goal was to develop an improved understanding of how supply chain managers
approach risk management for serious or catastrophic disruptions and determine if there are
homogeneous similarities or heterogeneous dissimilarities among supply chain managers.
Development of an appropriate understanding is a first step to develop and bolster future
theoretical development. Understanding the foundation that underlies managerial decision
making will inform stakeholders who are interested in addressing supply chain risk management
issues (Dobrzykowski et al., 2013) as well as researchers seeking to develop theory. Previous
studies have indicated that there may be differences in outcomes and effects based upon
specified managerial traits which vary across managers (Slater, 1989; Eagly and Johnson, 1990;
Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001; Bertrand and Schoar,
2003; Oreg and Berson, 2011) and these variances may impact operations and the firm
differently.
Cavinato (1999), building on work by Gluck et al., (1980) and Bowersox et al., (1992),
developed rankings of fit between five stages of strategic management and supply chain logistics
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across seventeen attributes. Consistent patterns developed as the strategic management of supply
chains matured from “very basic” to “very mature” (Cavinato, 1999, p. 167). This development
of strategy maturation is similar to that of Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and their examination of
supply chain risk management maturity which develops from “less mature” to “more mature” (p.
16).
Cavinato (1999) determined that managers who function successfully at a particular level
possess certain traits and characteristics. Although firms may span levels of maturity overall, the
attributes ranked the second and fourth highest in maturity level were management style and key
personnel skills (Cavinato, 1999). Stages of higher maturity built upon lower levels of style and
skill and distinct differences were readily noted at each stage from Stage 1 managers described
as task oriented and technically efficient to Stage 5 managers who were described as team
leaders, resource providers, consultants, small business unit partners and entrepreneurial
employees who learned for “personal, team and firm advantage” (Cavinato, 1999, p.171; Gluck
et al., 1980). Bourgeios and Brodwin (1984) discuss qualities of senior leadership across five
firm strategy models. They briefly describe the roles of these senor leaders across the range of
models. These include the Commander Model where the manager is the “’rational actor’ issuing
directives from the seat of power” (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984, p. 243) to the mid-range
coordinator who structures “interactions among the decision-makers in such a way that all good
ideas are entertained” (p.248) and finally the premise setter and judge who encourages a
subordinate “manager to develop, champion, and implement sound strategies” (p. 254). This
description of managerial engagement is similar to the scope of delegation preference found in
Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2012). Differing styles in the same conditions make a
difference as Waterman, (personal communication in Bourgeios and Brodwin, 1984) notes that
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among geological prospecting crews in New Zealand using identical methods, “the most
successful crew was the one with the boss who was to make frequent visits in his pick-up truck
to the men in the field” (pp. 250-251). The difference driving success appears to be, in part, style.
Waterman et al., (1980) include Style as one component of their 7-S framework and describe its
importance based on examining what managers do, what they spend time on, patterns of action
and symbolic behaviors during days often marked by disorganization rather than by the
compartmentalized and prescriptive modes of “planning, organizing, motivating and controlling”
employees and situations (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984, p. 22) that is often discussed. Style
embodied in actions and as discussed above differentiates successful managers in strategic and
tactical contexts. In the context of managerial responsibility for risk management activities,
understanding who may outperform another has direct bearing on success of the firm, post
disruption (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).
Research Question 3: Do supply chain managers possess similar or dissimilar
Executive Styles?
Based on the previous discussion set in a supply chain context, managerial activities in
relation to risk do not always follow normative models, implying that a still unknown factor or
factors are present. Understanding these behavioral underpinnings between Executive Style and
an executive’s subsequent approach to risk will develop findings for future research and will fill
a gap in current knowledge that may have great impact on a firm. The questions will be
addressed through the use of a multiple method study of supply chain managers.
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Research Approach
This dissertation will explore several concepts related to risk management that occur prior to a
disruption trigger event and is designed to understand the issues that currently affect choices
made by those responsible for supply chain operations and continuity. These broad areas may
span studies of behavior, anthropology or philosophy/ethics as some managerially relevant
behaviors may be the result of long-standing personal beliefs (behavioral) or industry/regulatory
standards (anthropological) as well as a healthcare facility’s unique capability to provide an end
to or a reduction of suffering during a time of civic and social upheaval (ethical).
As pre-disruption areas of concern, such a behavioral attributes and the interaction
between managerial behavior and risk management approach, have not been explored in the
literature, this research conducted a multiple method research strategy consisting of both
quantitative and qualitative examination of healthcare supply chain managers to provide
appropriate scope. These exploratory examinations included interviews with material managers
(at the daily operation level), and administration of a questionnaire to better understand
Executive Style. This was designed to understand what supply chain risk management means
from a healthcare practitioner context and what it means from an action perspective at a key level
of control and influence. Additionally, this research seeks to understand present versus future
direction for risk management choices.
Multiple method use in research is encouraged to gain information about problems using
“means that do not share the same weaknesses” (McGrath, 1982, p. 80). This convergence of
techniques works toward addressing the three-horned dilemma (McGrath, 1982) where research
seeks to maximize generalizability, precision and realism yet is hindered by use of any one
particular approach. Benefits of employing multiple method research include reduction of single-
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source and common method biases (Craighead et al., 2007) and improvement in synergies across
methods (Jick, 1979) and has been suggested as the best way to study logistics (Boone et al.,
2007) as it increases the breadth of insights and potential for breakthroughs and improves rigor
and reliability of the results (Sanders and Wagner, 2011; Fawcett and Waller, 2011).
The use of surveys allows for generalizability from a small population of respondents to a
wider population (Mentzer and Khan, 1995) while providing a numeric description of constructs
under examination (Creswell, 2007). Currently there are over 5,700 registered hospitals
throughout the United States (American Hospital Association, 2014). Analysis of a representative
sample of healthcare supply chain managers was facilitated through survey methodology as the
respondents were geographically dispersed, could complete the web-based survey at their
convenience and at relatively low cost to the researcher (Larson, 2005). The results strengthen
understanding of complex supply chain issues (Fawcett et al., 2014) such as Executive Style
impact on supply chain risk management and surveys are widely accepted in the supply chain
management field (Fawcett et al., 2014; McGinnis et al, 2010). Sachan and Datta (2005) found
that the majority, thirty-seven percent, of articles published between 1999- 2003 in Journal of
Business Logistics (JBL), Supply Chain Management: An International Journal (SCMIJ) and
International Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management (IJPDLM) were survey
based, with other techniques trailing in frequency. A survey of healthcare supply chain managers
was also appropriate as other no other method (such as experiment or use of secondary data)
could capture the specific information required. In conjunction with a more rich qualitative
portion of research, a survey allowed for context free determination of Executive Style as related
to SCRM maturity which was integrated with the qualitative portion for further analysis
(Creswell, 2007).
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While some forms of qualitative research stress beginning with no set theory (Creswell,
2013), there are opportunities for theory building when “a previously identified theoretical
framework can provide insight, direction and a useful list of initial concepts” (Corbin and
Strauss, 2008, p.40). This research incorporated the constant comparative technique which
provides validity and that stems from the Glaser and Strauss (1967) grounded theory method.
Recent usage examples include Randall et al., (2010) who incorporated the constant comparative
technique of grounded theory as part of a multiple method examination of the US trucking
industry and Pettit (2008) who used the systematic techniques of grounded theory to validate
findings from associated quantitative research. Golicic and Davis (2012) highlight four recent
multiple method studies using surveys and interviews as techniques.
Pagell and Krause (1999) listed two reasons for their approach that supports the current
proposed methodology, a) “to provide a benchmark comparison with the non-randomized depth
interviews in the primary study” (p. 311) and b) to provide statistical power for inferences drawn
from the interviews. Gammelgaard and Larson (2001) compared similarities and differences
between survey and case study interview results and determined knowledge gaps that would
have been unnoticed with only one method. Fawcett and Magnan (2002) used interview results
to contextualize survey results, finding that, often, supply chain management practice did not
match theory. A study of the specific process of configuration management in the aerospace
industry by Burgess et al., (2005) used interviews from a cross-section of industry respondents to
aid the interpretation of otherwise shallow and “inflexible” survey results. This research was
likewise designed to elicit information regarding the relationship between Executive Style via
survey and explore similarities and differences with interviews to determine if there were gaps
and provide appropriate context.
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Contingency Theory was used in this research to understand the fit between Executive Style
and risk management approach. Contingency Theory seeks to explain the fit between
organizational structure and context (Van de Ven and Druzin, 1985). This research focused on the
manager as the aspect of organizational structure and the context as that of supply chain risk
management activities. The performance outcome was the level of supply chain risk maturity
that is in place. No research could be found that examined this aspect of fit. This is key as a
manager implements activities in support of the firm, yet often does not adhere to norms
(Bandoly et al., 2005) and maturity of the supply chain risk management function has been
shown to directly impact firm financial performance following a disruption (Simchi-Levi et al.,
2013).
Contribution
This research and the subsequent research stream were designed to make several
contributions to extend the body of knowledge. Research surrounding behavioral aspects of
supply chain management are beginning to emerge as multi-disciplinary research gains a
foothold among academics. Through exploratory research, a clearer conceptualization of
Executive Style at work in supply chain management decision making will develop.
The first contribution will be a more complete understanding of the relationship between
Executive Style and risk management. The assimilation of behavioral studies with operational
studies is an area where additional interdisciplinary research has been called for and represents a
current gap in the literature (Davis and Golicic, 2012; Fawcett and Waller, 2012). This research
explored this behavioral dimension between manager and supply chain risk approach in order to
establish an understanding of how Executive Style, as measured through the survey instrument,
may influence critical pre-disruption decision making as part of risk management.
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The second contribution will benefit practitioners and researchers through development of a
previously unexplored, yet critical relationship between management style and risk management.
The human manager is often the decision maker and point of action or inaction when
implementing any of the myriad approaches to supply chain management. Academic research
and theory development as well as practitioner focused guidance are dependent upon a manager
to execute them. A formative understanding of actual supply chain risk management decision
making will provide contrast to normative studies of risk management found in the literature
(Juttner et al., 2003; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011) and which
direct risk management activities as a strict process. This will further extend understanding of
this function to incorporate the critical behavioral managerial input and influence on supply
chain risk maturity.
A third contribution answers several calls for interdisciplinary theory building in supply
chain management (Fawcett and Waller, 2012; Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer, 2013; Sanders et
al., 2013). Development of emergent topics, themes and processes, previously unknown, may
provide foundation material for further behavioral research in the area of critical decision
making, managerial calibration through a synthesis of behavioral psychology and the relationship
between a manager and their information environment. The complexities of human behavior
coupled with the complexities of supply chains may yield commonalities at certain levels of
understanding, such as taxonomy, typology, class or other subset. Identification of those
attributes extend behavioral psychology studies of Executive Style to the supply chain
management domain and extend risk studies to understand the behavioral influences that drive
risk management related managerial activities.
Håkonsson et al., (2012) advise that managerial attribute and firm strategy “misalignment
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leads to opportunity losses for the firm” (p.196). While the concept of risk management of itself
may seem to introduce bias, that is, if one doesn’t manage risk one is making a mistake, this
research seeks to understand why such trade-offs occur, without prejudgment of the activity
itself. If an executive decides not to prepare for risk, it occurs in a context that should emerge.
This understanding of choices in context will inform future multiple method and empirical
studies of the complexities of managing a supply chain. An attempt to prejudge an executive’s
choice not to prepare excludes other factors such as firm strategy, resources or complex
exogenous variables not easily discovered through normal procedures. This research will provide
needed context and illumination.
Dissertation Format
Chapter Two will discuss relevant literature as well as identify gaps in the literature. It will
also introduce a proposed methodological framework for data gathering. Chapter Three will
discuss specific aspects of the research design and methods used. Chapter Four will discuss the
results of the research. Chapter Five provides a discussion of conclusions and positions the
results within current knowledge while anticipating future research opportunities.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
This chapter introduces key concepts and definitions that serve as the foundation on which
the research builds. Specifically, this chapter introduces Contingency Theory as the theoretical
lens, and examines the key concepts of supply chain risk management, risk, risk management,
firm strategy, and Executive Style (ES). The goal is to provide a comprehensive understanding of
the research concepts under investigation.
Contingency Theory
Contingency Theory, as introduced by Fiedler (1965) addresses the unique relationship
between a leader and the performance of their group as contained in a unique group-task
environment. Fiedler (1965) suggested several key aspects of manager placement within the firm
were important. The first is that many different types of individuals can effectively lead across
many types of circumstances and situations, however the challenge lies in placement, training
and self-recognition of their leadership style. Fiedler (1965) found there are better fits between
certain conditions and particular leader styles and further notes that a leader can be trained to
self-awareness of the most compatible fit between conditions and their style. That fit, as part of a
larger contingency of the firm, will often drive the resulting success of the leader.
Burton and Obel (2004) utilize the contingency model in their examination of an entire
organization through building upon examination of individual strategic factors and incorporating
analysis of strategic influences, including leadership style, as a means of understanding the role
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that a manager’s style plays in an organization, as one part of an all-encompassing model.
Combined with other identified contingency factors such as size, technology, environment and
strategy (Child, 1972), leadership style was found to “explain a good portion of the variance not
explained” (Burton and Obel, 2004, p. 107) by the other factors.

Characterizing fit
Van de Ven and Drazin (1985) discuss how fit has expanded in the ongoing development
of Contingency Theory and provide two approaches to define fit. The first is through Selection
fit which occurs at the micro or managerial level. This approach to fit examines how contexts
interact with design to impact an outcome. This can be as discreet as a manager being selected
for a particular job to be successful. The second is through Interaction fit which seeks to
understand how the interplay and dependence of organizational structures affect an outcome of a
choice and provides an understanding of how context and design characteristics explain part of
firm performance (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). As discussed previously, strategic firm
performance is partly addressed through a firm’s supply chain risk management approach, where
context is important.

Contingency in a dynamic context
Donaldson (2006) discusses the continued appropriateness of contingency theory to
dynamic business contexts. Contingency theory, as a formulation of how structures fit
circumstances, allows for business strategy adaptation, as circumstances of a business
environment are rarely static. Trkman and McCormack, (2009) noted this dynamic impact due to
environmental turbulence and Park (2011) noted risk taking propensity, a firm’s willingness to
commit resources to address risks, ranging from risk-taking to risk-avoiding activities, as a
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dynamic antecedent to supply chain resiliency. Fit enables growth, and change that then arises
from growth may trigger a misfit in strategy, requiring a reexamination of what is the proper fit.
Periodic managerial revisitation of organizational design and decisions may be required to
maintain or increase performance levels, and is understood to be part of the dynamic process
(Donaldson, 2006) to attain a higher performing organization that realizes a competitive
advantage, based in part on strategies.

Contingency and strategic risk
The dynamic context of contingency approaches to strategic risk taking has been partially
addressed by Baird and Thomas (1985). Their research acknowledges the complexity of risk
taking by individual managers and notes that previous examinations of strategic risk either
ignored the individual impact altogether or extrapolated individual human behaviors to that of an
organization. Ideally, research that encompasses individual human behaviors and the interactions
among those traits and firm risk postures will aid future development of the topic. This is echoed
by Wagner and Bode (2008) who note “matching or aligning organizational resources with the
organization's context, and especially to environmental opportunities and threats, is a major task
for decision-makers” (p. 309) with the manager being the organizational resource of interest
(Barney, 1991). Wagner and Bode (2008) encourage further empirical study of a firm’s risk
strategy process and context in a supply chain setting. Context is one approach to contingency
theory and decision-making that is advocated by Nutt and Wilson, (2010). Context, as defined by
both external and internal boundary conditions and attributes, may influence how decisions are
made (Perrow, 1967). These unique internal context attributes include organizational approaches
to complexity and uncertainty such as “surprise, confusion and threat” (Nutt and Wilson, 2010, p.
17), as well as decision-maker traits such as “propensity to take risks, tolerance for ambiguity”
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(Nutt and Wilson, 2010, p. 17) and decision style (Nutt and Wilson, 2010; Håkonsson et al.,
2012). Based on this, Nutt and Wilson (2010) call for studies at the managerial level that are
context specific to continue development of contingency theory and its relationship to strategic
risks to the firm, which can include hazards, disruptions and managerial choices.

Hazards to the firm
Hazards exist within most all activities, technologies and nature (Turner and Pidgeon,
1996; Tierney et al., 2001; Weick and Sutcliff, 2001; Blair et al., 2004; McDaniel, 2004; United
Nations, 2004; Rush and Runyon, 2007; Woo, 2011; Homeland Security, 2012). These hazards
are often classified as risks and can vary from the unremarkable to risks that are serious or
catastrophic in impact. The desire to understand risk impacts has led to practitioner and academic
risk research, in particular from an economic perspective and specifically in the areas of profit,
insurance and finance. These research efforts initially related to goods (Smith, 1863; Knight,
1921) and more recently have broadened to include national security (Adams, 2013, GAO,
2013), severe weather impacts (McClure et al., 1999; Woo, 2011) and supply chains
(Christopher, 2000; Zsidisin et al., 2000; Sheffi, 2005; Manuj and Mentzer, 2008). Of late,
behavioral aspects of approaches to risk have been studied, notably in the work of Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and Kahneman (1992) which explore decision making under
risk and Slovic (1987) which examines how the public examines, characterizes and responds to
risk. Most individuals and groups have been found to possess differing preferences for risk
(Slovic and Weber, 2002) and this understanding begins to bridge an individual gap between risk
and managerial performance and reaction to risk, based upon an individual’s personal beliefs.

50
Impact of individual Executive Style and potential risk
Executives, as humans, are each unique and manage their affairs while simultaneously
connected to their own feelings, beliefs and values. However, as such, they are subject to
variability, limitations and the effects of personal traits in a number of areas such as decisionmaking, awareness and understanding (Payne, 1976). Crowe et al. (1972) found that a manager’s
personal trait, described as style, may adjust when dealing with subordinates who possess a
differing style. Covin and Slevin (1988) found that organizational structure may impact the
entrepreneurial style of managers. Likewise, managerial style may impact business unit
performance (Slater, 1989), while Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found manager fixed effects are
significantly related to a wide range of corporate decisions and these can be tied back in part to
fixed effects of managerial characteristics or style. Executive Style, therefore, matters to a firm.
When a firm operates in an environment of risk, Executive Style may possess a greater impact
than previously understood, yet little empirical work has been done to understand the connection
between Executive Style and risk. When the potential impact of risk falls in the serious-tocatastrophic range, managerial choices may likewise become amplified in effect and outcome.
Risk should be studied, therefore, through the systematic identification and
characterization of managerial risk management attributes. Risk to firms may be affected by
interaction with risk antecedents through managerial decision making and action/inaction (Park,
2011). These same risks may extend beyond firm boundaries due to the interconnected nature of
contemporary business and may pose threats to other firms in the supply chain either directly or
indirectly.
A means to control these risks in a supply chain is termed supply chain risk management
(SCRM) (Juttner at al., 2003; Norrman and Jansson, 2004; Ritchie and Brindley, 2007; Tummula
and Schoenherr, 2011). However, SCRM operates in an environment subject to other influences.
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In the context of this research, these include firm strategy and the particular attributes of the
managers executing the SCRM processes (March and Shapira, 1987; Burton and Obel, 2004;
Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012).
Building on the intersection of SCRM and managerial attributes to address risk, the
remainder of the chapter will discuss the key concepts of supply chain risk management, risk,
risk management, firm strategy, and Executive Style as well as identify the research hypotheses.

Supply Chain Risk Management
Supply chain risk management (SCRM) is a recent construct, and as such development
continues towards a more clear definition. Early attempts at definition (Normann and Lindroth,
2002; Christopher, 2002) acknowledge SCRM’s roots in the broader field of risk management
and identify SCRM as a partner enabled collaboration to deal with risks that impact logistics
activities. Changes to the definition have been incremental with Kajuter (2003) noting that a
structured approach that is embedded in planning to reduce vulnerability as a whole (Juttner et
al., 2003) is important. Tang (2006) adds that serious supply chain risk may lead to business
failure and that continuity of the business must be a consideration. Carter and Rogers (2008)
extend the understanding beyond the normative and prescriptive when they stress the firm must
understand the variety of risks present in the supply chain. Understanding moves the process
from simple identification into a preliminary stage of analysis. Although there was an effort by
the Supply Chain Council (2008) to provide a comprehensive practitioner-driven definition,
Skulte and Wilkerson (2011) and Zeng (2011) continued development of academic SCRM
definitions with the additional requirements of ensuring reliability and building resilience (Skulte
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and Wilkerson, 2011), and implementation of an all stakeholder inclusive, holistic approach that
identifies all supply chain failure points (Zeng, 2011).

Supply chain management scope, complexity and variability
The scope of supply chain management is widely varied and supply chain influence
reaches within and across multiple business functions and firms as well as major academic fields
including finance/economics, psychology/sociology, strategy and information/communication
(Frankel et al., 2008). Accompanying this wide scope is increased complexity (Juttner et al.,
2003). Wilding (1998) likens this increase in the number of channels and echelons as
representative of degrees of chaos in the supply chain which can be triggered by uncertainty, for
instance uncertainty regarding supply availability (Wagner and Bode, 2008). This complexity
maintains a state of variability in the supply chain (Cooper and Lambert, 1997; Peck et al.,
2003). When a process leaves a state of control the cumulative variability may be increased as it
passes through subsequent stages. Although several processes may be performing individually at
a 99% performance level their cumulative performance deteriorates. A series of ten processes
operating each at .99 effectiveness, together yield a much reduced 90.4% (0.99)10 effectiveness.
Therefore the potential for a negative outcome in the supply chain is a function of scope,
complexity and variability (Juttner et al., 2003; Cooper and Lambert, 1997; Peck et al., 2003;
Wagner and Bode, 2008), however many firms do not address the potential negative effects
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).

SCRM and low adoption
Allianz (2014), a global insurance firm, in a yearly ranking of global business risks and
business interruption, found that supply chain risk remained as the number one identified risk for
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both 2013 and 2014 among 43% of survey respondents, followed by natural catastrophes (33%)
and fires or explosions (24%). The World Economic Forum (2014), in its ninth edition of insights
into global risk, listed increased incidents of extreme weather such as floods, storms and fires as
the sixth risk of highest concern, yet in an era of global supply chains, with the accompanying
perception of risks held by CEOs, implementation of SCRM techniques remains low. In a recent
study, Curkovic et al., (2013) examined the congruence of ISO 31000:2009 with extant SCRM
frameworks. ISO 31000:2009 is a global standard to aid firms in development of enterprise-wide
risk management processes, structures and strategies and SCRM is a support function within
such a framework. The authors found that, while firms desired to implement risk management
processes, “relatively few firms indicated that their company takes a proactive risk management
approach” (Curkovic et al., 2013, p. 626). Despite increases in budgets for SCRM there was a
feeling among respondents that budgets were not high enough and in times of great economic
pressures, the supply chain manager may need to make a stronger case. One respondent to
Curkovic et al., (2013) noted regarding SCRM that “we take the approach that it’s everyone’s
responsibility. Good in theory, but during very busy parts of the year, other commitments may
take the focus off risk management, thus leaving us open to issues” (p. 628).
Particularly left out are small organizations who were found to lack widespread adoption
of SCRM compared to larger firms (Ritchie and Brindley, 2007). Christopher et al., (2011) found
that among fifteen case studies in seven industries where global sourcing occurs that there is high
variability between adopted risk practices and, when risks were known, there was no systematic
or holistic application of risk management principles. Likewise, Manuj and Mentzer (2008)
noted that firms with a short term focus bestowed less importance to supply chain risk
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management tasks, tasks the authors acknowledge as continual in nature that require “long term
dedication of supply chain members” (Manuj and Mentzer, 2008, p. 202).

Managers and SCRM planning
Yet, as one recent study found in their qualitative review of severe event management,
two factors were identified as key to maintaining formal plans to deal with such disruptions.
These included “the individual manager’s personality and his/her previous experiences”
(Macdonald and Corsi, 2013, p. 277). Given that planning relies on the idiosyncrasies of
individual managers, the findings of a recent study that 60% of companies pay marginal attention
to risk reduction efforts seem understandable (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). When more robust and
mature supply chain risk management capabilities were present, the firms were more resilient to
disruptions and operational and financial performance was better than peer companies (SimchiLevi et al., 2013). However, the role of the individual managers in planning for disruptions
through SCRM activities is poorly understood.

Definitional understanding of SCRM
A first step is a common definition. For this dissertation we will use that provided by the
Supply Chain Council (2008) which states SCRM is
“The systematic identification, assessment, and quantification of potential supply chain
disruptions with the objective to control exposure to risk or reduce its negative impact on
supply chain performance. Potential disruptions can either occur within the supply chain
(e.g. insufficient quality, unreliable suppliers, machine break-down, uncertain demand,
etc.) or outside the supply chain (e.g. flooding, terrorism, labor strikes, natural disasters,
large variability in demand, etc.). Management of risk includes the development of
continuous strategies designed to control, mitigate, reduce, or eliminate risk.”
This definition has built upon one of the earliest definitions developed by Wilding at
Cranfield University (2003) of “the identification and management of risks within the supply
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chain and risks external to it through a coordinated approach amongst supply chain members to
reduce supply chain vulnerability as a whole” (p. 26).

Tang (2006) notes key findings from examinations of previous research that, even with
definitions readily available,
•
•
•
•
•
•

Managers are quite insensitive to estimates of the probabilities of possible
outcomes.
Managers tend to focus on critical performance targets, which affect the
way they manage risk.
Managers make a sharp distinction between taking risks and gambling
Most companies invested little time or resources for mitigating supply
chain risks
Good estimates of the probability of the occurrence of any particular
disruption and accurate measure of potential impact of each disaster are
difficult to obtain
Firms rarely invest in improvement programs in a proactive manner
because ‘‘nobody gets credit for fixing problems that never happened.’’
(Tang, 2006, pp. 479-480).

Lack of understanding of a formal definition by some practitioners does not preclude use
of SCRM approaches, and some firms have become very mature in their application of SCRM
(Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Although adoption of an agreed upon definition is currently ongoing
and employment of formal processes, as mentioned previously, is often low, supply chain
managers’ approach to risk management can be contrasted through comparisons to a maturity
level on a supply chain risk management maturity framework (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).

Framework
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) in their recent examination of supply chain risk management
practices in global firms that have exposure to high risk scenarios developed a framework that
“Assesses the degree to which companies are applying the most effective enablers of
supply chain risk reduction (e.g., flexibility, risk governance, alignment, integration,
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information sharing, data, models and analytics, and rationalisation) and their associated
processes. The model depicts where a company stands in relation to its competition and
the rest of the industry” (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013, p. 2).
Supply chain risk management frameworks are an extension of risk management (RM)
frameworks. Risk management frameworks are the end product of a process that occurs prior to
the risk or disruption event start point. As a process, they have received normative treatment and
discussion in multiple disciplines. As with the various definitions, there are certain key risk
management steps that occur across most of the risk management processes. These include 1)
identification or awareness of the risk, 2) assessment and evaluation of the risk, 3)
implementation of a strategy for management, mediation or treatment, 4) monitoring the process
or learning through feedback loops (Omenn et al., 1997; Normann and Jansson, 2004; US
Department of Defense, 2006; Waters, 2011). Key incident reports have focused attention on the
ability of a firm to manage risk, often focusing on the post-disruption activities that occur
(Sheffi, 2005; Atwater et al., 2010). Often a firm’s risk management process is considered in
hindsight and weighed against an actual risk event, particularly when the risk event is very
public. Less frequent is it understood how those plans or approaches are developed and the
managerial impact that is present, particularly in regard to the impact of Executive Style on
attaining a specified maturity level.
Overview of the SCRM maturity framework
Seven enabling areas of concern were identified by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and form
the basis of their framework rankings (see Table 1). The framework divides into four levels of
maturity across both supply chain management as well as risk management and are
complimentary at lower levels and closely tied together at higher maturity levels (see Table 2).
The goal is not to reconsider the rich stream of literature that seeks to explicate the necessary
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steps to move a firm from unmanaged to managed (Hallikas et al., 204; Kleindorfer and Saad,
2005; Ritchie and Brindley 2007; Manuj & Mentzer, 2008; SCOR, 2010; Juttner and Ziegenbein,
2010; Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council 2011; Tummala and Schoenherr, 2011). Rather the
focus is in understanding the stages of maturity from basic to those found to produce improved
post-disruption resilience and performance and how a manager’s Executive Styles influences
achievement of a maturity level.

Table 1: SCRM maturity framework enablers and attributes (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013)
Enabler
1. Risk Governance
2. Flexibility and redundancy in
product, network and process
architectures
3. Alignment between partners
in the supply chain
4. Upstream and downstream
supply chain integration
5. Alignment and integration
between internal business
functions
6. Complexity
management/rationalization
7. Data, models and analytics

Attributes
The presence of appropriate risk management structures,
processes and culture
Having the right levels of flexibility and redundancy
across the value chain to be able to absorb disruptions and
adapt to change
Strategic alignment on key value dimensions,
identification of emerging patterns and advancement
towards higher value propositions
Information sharing, visibility and collaboration with
upstream and downstream supply chain partners.
Alignment and integration of activities between company
value chain functions on a strategic, tactical and
operational level.
Ability to standardize and simplify networks and
processes, interfaces, product architectures and product
portfolios and operating models
Development and use of intelligence and analytical
capabilities to support supply chain and risk management
functions.

Level I
Supply chains categorized as Level I are generally described as functional in operation
and ad-hoc in their management of risk and are the least effective as characterized by level of
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maturity (see Table 3). Functional supply chains are considered stove piped and show little sign
of integration and often display disconnected processes, duplication of activities and fail to use
techniques such as business analytics, which have been shown to improve performance in a
supply chain (Trkman et al., 2010; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Risk management approaches at
this level are often reactive in nature with no visibility into potential risks and a lack of a
coherent structure to drive risk governance (Hillson, 1997). Berg et al., (2008) further describe
this level as chaotic, with a reliance for success based on key people and their personal initiatives
who possess a “just do it” approach with no leadership present (SCRLC, 2013) and inflexible
processes (De Oliveria et al., 2011).

Table 2: SCRM maturity classification model (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013)
Level I
Level II
Level III
Level IV

Supply Chain Management
Functional
Integrated
Collaborative
Dynamic

Risk Management
Ad-hoc
Buffer planning
Proactive
Flexible

Less Mature
More Mature

Level II
Firms must use a building block approach to achieve increased effectiveness as processes
improve. Oliveira et al., (2012) found higher levels of maturity must build on previous
accomplishments to be effective. Level II firms are generally described as integrated in operation
and employ aspects of buffer planning and redundancy in their risk management approach, when
they implement plans at all. As such, limited cross-functional organization can be observed that
is aided by integrated internal processes and some alignment with internal planning (Simchi-Levi
et al., 2013) is present, although meetings are often coordinated with functional representatives
focused only on their traditional functions (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Some basic supply
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chain processes are documented and the change process may be formalized, yet low customer
service, high costs and missed targets are frequent occurrences (Lockamy and McCormack,
2004). Supply chain coordination is hampered by boundary concerns and competing goals of
various functions and some improvement in customer service can be seen compared to Level I
(Locakmy and McCormack, 2004). Risk management at this level also begins to document
processes and integrate internally with other functional areas. Adjustments to demand signals are
explored using postponement or design considerations and basic disruption threats may be
countered with capacity and inventory buffers (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Visibility beyond the
firm may remain low and although not always present, (Hilson, 1997), some uniform processes
are applied across the firm utilizing defined tasks around a basic risk management infrastructure
(Berg et al., 2008).

Level III
Level III approaches are described as collaborative from a supply chain perspective and
utilize more proactive approaches to managing risk. This is also the first level considered more
mature and where collaboration outside the firm is regularly found. As a result, information
sharing and visibility between partners is high (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Also described as the
‘breakthrough level’ (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004) as more advanced maturity processes are
employed, risk management processes and performance become more predictable, costs begin
decreasing and risk management activities can be seen to be prepared to address appropriate risks
(IACCM, 2003; Oliveira et al, 2012). Firms are seen to develop business response plans and
firms proactively use sensors and predictors as part of risk management processes (Hilson, 1997;
Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Supply chain functions between partners include increased visibility,
information sharing and rationalisation of the supply chain, with strategic foci (Simchi-Levi et
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al., 2013; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Benefits realized in the supply chain at this level
include achievement of performance goals both internally and externally, SC planning processes
are formalized and both procurement and strategic teams, to include customer involvement as
appropriate, meet regularly to develop strategy, own the plans and make firm commitments to
goals (Oliveira et al., 2011; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Results
may include an increased sense among partners of esprit de corps and falling SCM costs as
customer satisfaction rises (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004).

Level IV
Level IV is the highest level of achievement in the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) framework
and operations at this level were reported by the lowest percentage of firms (9%). This
performance level finds firms fully aligned with partners with strategies driven by common goals
and objectives (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). These goals are supported through use of advanced
SCM practices such as CPFR, administered by multi-firm teams who enjoy broad authority to
make investments and share rewards across the value chain (Lockamy and McCormack, 2004).
The supply chain is able to effectively respond to short term customer demands and can be
segmented to meet those demands through active monitoring of demand signals, leading to
increased levels of trust and mutual dependency across the extended supply chain to include
suppliers having access to company inventory and production planning information (Oliveira et
al., 2011; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004). Proactive risk management activities include realtime monitoring, analytics and reporting, but with flexibility to respond to environmental
changes and adapt responses to gain competitive advantage (Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003;
Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Risk governance is formalized and strategies are developed based on
supplier profiles and market-product considerations (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) and is supported
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by a culture of risk awareness that seeks opportunities from managed risk and actively moving
risk away from weaker partners (Hillson, 1997).
While not all firms achieve the same level of maturity in their operations, the current
maturity possessed by a firm and opportunities to change maturity levels may have profound and
important impact on both current and future competitiveness and operations.
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Table 3: Comparative supply chain risk management frameworks
Maturity Models
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)
Maturity
Level
I

SC
•

RM
Limited coordination
between
internal
functions
Resources are
locally owned
and managed
Performance is
measured
separately
based on
functional Key
Performance
Indicators
(KPIs)
Absence of
integrated plan

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Ad-hoc risk
management
processes
No visibility
into changes
outside the
functional
domain
No planning of
redundancy
buffers towards
potential
disruptions
Can only absorb
limited volatility
around
standard
functional input
parameters

Maturity Models
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)
Maturity
Level
II

SC
•

RM
Information
sharing and
common
planning
activities

•

Positioning of
redundancy
buffers based on
a common,
cross-functional

IACCM (2003)

Hillson (1997)

RM

RM

LEVEL: NOVICE
•
Risk averse
•
Lacking
awareness/
understanding
•
Lacking strategy
•
Lacking
commitment
•
Processes are
inefficient,
informal or adhoc

LEVEL: NAÏVE
• Unaware of need
for RM
• No structured
approach
• Repetitive and
reactive
management
processes
• No attempt to
learn from the
past
• No attempt to
prepare for
future threats or
uncertainties

IACCM (2003)

Hillson (1997)

RM

RM

LEVEL:
COMPETENT
•
Patchy,
inconsistent
•
Some

LEVEL: NOVICE
• Experimenting
with RM
• Few individuals
involved

Lockamy and McCormack
(2004)
SC

De Oliveira et al., (2011)

LEVEL: AD-HOC
•
Unstructured, illdefined processes
•
Process measures are
missing
•
Jobs and organization
not based on
horizontal SC
processes
•
Performance is
unpredictable
•
Targets are often
missed
•
SCM costs are high
•
Customer satisfaction
is low
•
Functional
cooperation is low

LEVEL: FOUNDATION
•
Processes changes are hard to
implement
•
Customers dissatisfied with
delivery time performance
•
No visibility or control on
undelivered orders
•
No special treatment of orders is
possible
•
Processes are inflexible
•
Inadequate demand forecasts and
internal processes lead to
production shortfalls and
overpromised orders
•
IS do not fully support SCM
processes
•
Strategic suppliers are unidentified
•
Service levels are not agreed,
understood or documented

Lockamy and McCormack
(2004)
SC

De Oliveira et al., (2011)

LEVEL: DEFINED
•
Basic SCM processes
are defined and
documented
•
Jobs and organization

LEVEL: STRUCTURE
•
Investments made to document
planning and scheduling flows
•
Metrics developed for planning and
production

SC

SC
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•

between
internal
functions
Key resources
and
performance
objectives are
jointly
managed

•
•

plan
Basic risk
governance
processes
No visibility
into emerging
changes and
patterns outside
the company
domain

•
•
•
•

understanding/
awareness
Cautious
approach/
reactive
Inconsistent
No learning from
experience
Standard
approach/ generic

•

•

No generic
structured
processes in
place
Aware of
benefits but fails
to implement
and gain benefits

•
•
•

•
•

Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)
Maturity
Level
III

SC
•

•

•
•

RM
Visibility,
information
sharing and
integration of
key activities
between supply
chain partners
Incorporation
of external
input into
internal
planning
activities
Supply chain
rationalisation

•

•
•
•

Use of sensors
and predictors to
proactively
position
response
mechanisms
Business
continuity plans
Partner
resilience
monitoring
Quantitative risk
management

IACCM (2003)

Hillson (1997)

RM

RM

LEVEL:
PROFICIENT
•
Prepared to take
appropriate risks
•
Good
understanding of
benefits across
most of
organization
•
Strategy mapped
onto process
implementation

LEVEL:
NORMALIZED
• Management of
risk built into
routine business
practices
• RM
implemented on
most or all
projects
• Formalized
generic risk
processes
• Benefits
understood at all
levels of the
organization, but
not consistently
achieved

remain traditional
Process performance
is more predictable
Targets defined but
missed more than not
Functional silos hard
to overcome due to
boundary concerns
and competing goals
SCM costs remain
high
Customer satisfaction
has improved, but
remains low

Lockamy and McCormack
(2004)
SC
LEVEL: LINKED
•
Breakthrough level
•
SCM employed with
strategic intent and
results
•
SCM measures and
goals reach
horizontally across
the SC
•
Process performance
goals often achieved
•
SCM costs begin
decreasing
•
Feeling of esprit de
corps replaces
frustration
•
Customers included
in process
improvement
•
Customer satisfaction
shows marked
improvement

•

Detailed plans developed for each
item or service offered
•
Production plans begin integration
along firm divisions
•
Applied methodologies consider
capacity constraints
•
IS support operations and begin
integration with organizational
processes
•
Demand analysis and forecasting
implemented and formalized
•
Statistical methods used to baseline
planning and forecasting
•
Process changes evaluated before
implementation
De Oliveira et al., (2011)
SC
LEVEL: VISION
•
Procurement team formally
designated and meets periodically
across functions
•
Order commitments are owned and
monitored for fulfillment
•
Teams are designated to develop
strategic plans
•
Strategic planning team meets
regularly and uses adequate tools
•
Planning process of operational
strategy is documented
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Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)
Maturity
Level
IV

SC
•

•
•

•
•

•
•

•

RM
Alignment on
key customer
value
dimensions
across the
extended
enterprise
Supply chain
segmentation
to match
multiple
customer value
propositions
Identification
of emerging
value chain
patterns in
complex
dynamic
environments
Ability to adapt
the supply
chain to
frequent
changes in the
value chain

•

•
•
•
•

Investment in
flexibility
(processes,
products,
plants, capacity)
Management of
pressure away
from weak
partners in the
value chain
Risk strategy
segmentation

IACCM (2003)

Hillson (1997)

RM

RM

LEVEL: EXPERT
•
Proactive
•
Intuitive
understanding
•
Belief, full
commitment to be
the best
•
Adaptive
•
Proactively
developed
processes
•
Processes fit for
purpose
•
Best of breed

LEVEL: NATURAL
• Risk aware
culture with
proactive
approach to RM
in all aspects of
business
• Active use of
risk information
to improve
business
processes and
gain competitive
advantage
• Emphasis on
opportunity
management
(“positive risk”)

Lockamy and McCormack
(2004)
SC

De Oliveira et al., (2011)

LEVEL: INTEGRATED
•
Company, vendors
and customers
cooperate at the
process level
•
SCM measures and
management systems
are embedded in the
organization
•
Advanced SCM
practices, i.e. CPFR,
take shape
•
Process performance
becomes very
predictable and
targets are reliably
achieved
•
SCM costs
dramatically reduced
•
Customer satisfaction
and esprit de corps
become a competitive
advantage

LEVEL: INTEGRATION
•
Develops with partners capabilities
to respond to demand pull signals
•
Sales, operations and distribution
collaborate with production
planning and scheduling
•
Forecasts are developed for each
customer individually
•
Company aligns with supplier’s
developing plans
•
Measure and controls monitor
supplier performance
•
Suppliers have access to company
inventory and production planning
information
•
Critical suppliers are considered
partners
•
Strategic planning team constantly
assesses impact of its strategies

Lockamy and McCormack
(2004)
SC
LEVEL: EXTENDED
•
Competition based on
multi-firm supply
chains
•
Advanced SCM
practices that allow
transfer of
responsibility without
legal ownership are

De Oliveira et al., (2011)

SC

SC
LEVEL: DYNAMICS
•
Sales, marketing, distribution and
planning collaborate between
themselves
•
Order commitment process is
integrated with other SC processes
•
Demand management and
production planning are completely
integrated
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•

•

in place
Multi-firm SCM
teams with common
processes, goals and
broad authority take
shape.
Trust, mutual
dependency and
esprit de corps are
the glue holding the
extended supply
chain together.
Process performance
and reliability of the
extended system are
measured and joint
investments in
improving the system
are shared, as are the
returns.

•
•

Companies are responsive and
attentive to short term demands of
customers
Supply times are continuously
revised and updated
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Importance to the firm
Disruption types affecting operations are as broad and varied as firms and industry
sectors. The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP) has recognized the
importance of deliberate SCRM activities “to identify and, when possible, mitigate operating
risks in a way that protects operating profits” with mitigation activities “based on a cross
functional understanding of the defined risk and the potential financial consequences of the risk,
if it should actually occur” (CSCMP, 2012, p. 1). Some examples of how this importance is
reflected in firms include:
One unidentified firm, using the metric of time to recover (TTR) as part of a formal and
robust SCRM program, reported savings of millions through improved pre-disruption
adjustments based on SCRM analysis (Supply Chain Risk Leadership Council, 2011). However,
it was also noted that TTR measures may be strained if analysis and decision-making are
overwhelmed by the disruption as exemplified by events surrounding a recent major East Coast
storm. Superstorm Sandy overwhelmed storm surge estimates in lower Manhattan by up to three
feet causing power loss for 350,000 more customers than anticipated and in the Rockaways area
there was total power loss for an extended period. This event triggered large scale patient
movement from affected healthcare facilities on short notice, straining the capacity to coordinate,
move, and house them appropriately (Gibbs and Halloway, 2013). In this instance, the lowprobability event was unanticipated and any TTR estimates by the city or the Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) became useless. Prior contingency planning by the Army COE was hampered
by underestimation of damage and faulty or outdated power requirements for key buildings.
However, the implementation of the contingency Coastal Storm Plan, first developed in 2000 and
refined following activation in 2007 and 2011, is credited with preventing worse effects (Gibbs
and Halloway, 2013).
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As noted, risks must be balanced, as in the case of healthcare evacuations, where risk of
additional injury and mortality from the move must be weighed against potential injury and
mortality from remaining in place and cultural and operational fit and responsiveness should be
determined as well. Sheffi (2005) notes two examples where, based upon the unresponsiveness
and dismissiveness of suppliers following a west coast port shutdown, Dell and P&G fired
suppliers who were deemed too reactive, unresponsive and culturally misaligned with their own
sense of urgency. A second example is that of a faulty dialysis filter manufactured by Baxter. In
2001, it was determined that the $15 dialysis filters experienced a faulty quality control process
that left residue in the filter, causing air bubbles to form in some patients’ bloodstreams, which
led to the patients’ deaths. Following more than fifty deaths, an investigation and cessation of
filter production, the firm suffered a loss of over $189 million in damages and 360 workers in
Sweden and Florida became unemployed. Although this seems an extremely bad outcome,
scanning the environment and mandatory reporting of deaths to Baxter helped identify the event
at the earliest possible time; understanding the causes and taking actions to mitigate the effects
prevented worse outcomes (Sheffi, 2005).
Other firms may face supply chain disruptions from fraud. A recent US Department of
Justice investigation highlighted the case of one firm who sold $15.8 million dollars of
counterfeit integrated circuits to several hundred companies. “Counterfeit integrated circuits can
result in product or system failure or malfunction, and can lead to costly system repairs, property
damage, and serious bodily injury, including death. They also raise national security concerns
because their history is unknown, including who has handled them and what has been done to
them” (Department of Justice, 2011). Although a financial penalty was imposed on the
counterfeiter to help with the cost of brand infringement, firms had to address the issues of
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potentially dangerous parts in their supply chain along with recalls and repairs. Worldwide illicit
trade is estimated by the World Economic Forum to be in the $1.3 trillion range (Chacon et al.,
2012).
Supply chain failure in terms of timeliness or cost was in the top three of Chief
Procurement Officer (CPO) concerns in a recent UK survey. Here, a supply chain disruption was
acknowledged to have a negative impact on brand, performance and reputation (Achilles, 2012).
Lloyds (2013a) Risk Index report discusses the various risk exposures faced across the world. In
seventeen high-growth economies there is a collective insurance exposure of $168 billion to the
impact of natural catastrophes on firms. Insurance is a means to transfer or mitigate risk, but
cannot account for lost trust, lost business and competitive disadvantages to operations. In a
separate report, Maynard et al., (2013) writing for Lloyd’s, detail the exposure the North
American population faces from a solar disruption ‘Carrington-level’ event. These solar
geomagnetic storms occur on average once every 150 years. The last occurred in 1859. The
estimated impacts, given North America’s reliance on electrical power now versus during the
previous event, include a power outage lasting from sixteen days to 1-2 years and affecting 20-40
million US citizens, concentrated mostly on the East Coast due to population density. The
estimated financial impact ranges from $0.6 - $2.6 trillion. The report does not include other
effects such as social or healthcare related issues. Faced with impacts from internal functions,
such as Baxter faced with the faulty filters, or from external events, such as a potential disruption
from a solar flare or other natural act, supply chain decision makers approach the task of risk
management and decisions that drive firm action. They must make the right decisions for their
supply chains.
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Making the right decisions
The process of managing risk is one of many tasks an executive may face. The
identification of a low-probability/high-impact risk as a threat additionally requires greater
insight, resources and time than a disruption that occurs more frequently, and is therefore more
identifiable, or a risk that creates less negative impact and may be ignored with reduced risk. So
the question of why manage these risks becomes key. Recent research, in addition to recent high
visibility, high-impact events, suggests that a firm with more mature SCRM capabilities is more
resilient to disruptions (Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Oliveira
et al., 2011; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Key findings from the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) study of
209 global firms include more than sixty percent of the respondent firms indicating performance
measure declines of three percent or more due to supply chain disruptions, considered significant
by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Firms with more mature risk management capabilities (measured
across seven enablers) were impacted to a lesser degree and recovered more quickly than those
without. Firms that invested in flexibility across their supply chains were more resilient and
those with “mature capabilities in supply chain and risk management do better along all surveyed
dimensions of operational and financial performance than immature companies” (Simchi-Levi et
al., 2013, p. 5). Only forty percent of surveyed firms were considered mature, however.
Level I maturity is described as ad hoc processes without collaboration, standards or
redundancy and that is liable to volatility. Level II maturity involves some buffer planning to
include anticipating some risk and investment in inventory and basic governance mechanisms.
Level III maturity consists of proactive steps including quantitative risk management, continuity
planning to include partner capabilities and use of early warning indicators. Level IV maturity
adds flexibility of processes, products, plant and capabilities, provides aid in moving risk away
from weak suppliers and managing bottlenecks in the supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).
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Table 4 summarizes the distribution of respondents from the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) study.
Ultimately, the main goal is to minimize the impact of a risk to operations and continue with
normal supply chain functions in support of the firm in a complex operating environment.
Development of an understanding of what risk is, in the context of a firm, may help decisionmakers as they address uncertainties.
Table 4: Supply chain risk management risk maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013)
Capability
Maturities

Percent of
Respondents

Supply Chain

Risk Management

Level I

17

Functional Supply
Chain Management

Ad-hoc Management of Risk

Level II

42

Internal Supply
Chain Integration

Positioning of Planed Buffers
to Absorb Disruptions

Level III

32

External Supply
Chain Collaboration

Proactive Risk Response

Level IV

9

Dynamic Supply
Chain Adaptation

Fully Flexible Response to
Risk

Risk
A risk has been described as a “negative deviation from the expected value of a certain
performance measure, resulting in negative consequence for the focal firm” (Wagner and Bode,
2010, p. 274). The presence of a hazard, whether actual or possible, may lead to a disruption as
the hazard develops into a trigger. In turn, this trigger event may lead to unacceptable levels of
negative impact/damage (Sheffi, 2005). This impact can take many forms depending on the
circumstances and may be unpredictable in nature. This continuum of damage may range from
manageable and within coping capabilities to unmanageable, even with the presence of
exogenous coping capabilities.
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Risk as a phenomenon is an aspect of most activities. In fields such as decision theory,
March and Shapira (1987), drawing on the work of Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965), discuss risk
as “most commonly conceived as reflecting variation in the distribution of possible outcomes,
their likelihoods, and their subjective values. Risk is measured either by nonlinearities in the
revealed utility for money or by the variance of the probability distribution of possible gains and
losses associated with a particular alternative” (p. 1405). There is often the chance that an
adverse outcome may present itself during any of the instances that occur in a process.
Uncertainty surrounding these chance events further complicates preparation and response
decisions. Contemplation of risk and associated uncertainty has been ongoing for nearly one
hundred years.
Knight (1921) and Fayol (1916) are among the earliest to discuss the concept of risk in a
firm. Knight (1921) separated the concepts of risk and uncertainty as occurrences that are either
quantifiable, i.e. risks, or not quantifiable, i.e. uncertainties and this research adopts the same
understanding of the quality of a risk. Knight (1921) further acknowledged the roles of
psychology of conduct, judgment and estimation in managerial comprehension and decisionmaking as related to risk and notes that it had been widely avoided as a topic of study. Under the
title of Security Function, Fayol, in 1916 (Fayol trans. Gray, 1984) broadened previous views of
security as dealing with physical assets and personnel protection to include protection from all
forms of threat. This included the tasks of “exposure identification, risk evaluation, risk control
(eliminating hazards, minimizing the effects of those that cannot be eliminated, warning against
the remainder), and risk financing (such as absorbing losses, self-insuring, outside insuring,
sinking funds and transferring risk to a supplier or client through contracts)” (Fayol trans. Gray,
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1984, p. 11). Following Fayol (trans. Gray, 1984) and Knight (1921), risk remained in the realm
of finance and insurance as a topic area for the bulk of the 20th century until recently.
Risk as a current active academic discipline is evident from the numerous journals
devoted to the topic and sub-specialties. A sample of titles include Risk Analysis, The Journal of
Risk, The Journal of Risk Research, Stochastic Environmental Research and Risk Assessment,
Risk Management: An International Journal, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Climate Risk
Management, Journal of Risk and Insurance and Journal of Therapeutics and Clinical Risk
Management. The main focus of many of these journals is finance at the corporate or
governmental level; however risk to firm operations and corporate behavior renders risk an
appropriate and important topic for examination in the field of supply chain management as well
given the existence of supply chains in most all business fields and the prevalence of risk across
all business fields.

The importance of managing risk
The importance of action in the face of risk derives from the concept that negative risk
impacts financial performance, which if severe enough, may lead to firm demise (Mathur and
Kenyon, 1997) and should be addressed to ensure continuity of operations and achievement of
firm goals. The story of risk management failure at Barings Bank is a cautionary example for
multiple industries. A trader, Nick Leeson, conducted unauthorized trading of financial options in
Singapore. These transactions and subsequent mounting losses were hidden in an error account.
There was no audit in place to detect this activity and losses mounted. Reports were altered by
Leeson, including falsification of performance measures, to hide this activity to maintain cash
flow for authorized activities. Financial market responses to a 1995 earthquake increased the
volatility of the Nikkei market, where the unauthorized trading occurred, and the volatility and
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subsequent losses of the unauthorized trading. In an attempt to correct the losses, even greater
bets were placed by Mr. Leeson that subsequently failed. Ultimately the 223 year old bank
suffered losses of $1.4 billion, the institution was forced to insolvency and sold for a little more
than $1 to ING Bank. (Goto, 2007; Sunstrom and Hollnagel, 2006). Goto (2007) identifies that
key governance mechanisms were not in place or monitored to align the actions and decisionmaking of one of its employees with the firm strategy. Independent oversight appears to have
been missing and the ability of one individual to expose the firm to ever greater risk was
unlimited. Some of these risks were caused by the firm itself through lack of early warning
techniques built into a complex and dynamic system. Use of a dynamic, feedforward tool allows
a system, such as an early warning system, to receive constant information, which allows
managerial reaction to current and likely events. Feedback allows for a reaction to events, often
classified as negative, and may delay the ability or timeliness of an appropriate response thereby
negatively affecting resilience (Sundstrom and Nagel, 2006) In the case of Barings, neither risk
management system was in place as part of a more broad firm strategy.

Risk and strategy development
Risk, strategic decisions regarding hazards to a company, and industry characteristics are
important considerations when developing strategy. Although there are admitted difficulties
regarding prediction of risk and historical understanding of risk, risk remains linked to
performance (Bettis, 1982; Hillson, 1997; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) and requires careful
consideration. Timeliness may be critical. Risk management as a function is usually developed
and conducted ex-ante to a trigger event, however effectiveness is measured ex-post (Ritchie and
Brindley, 2010). Risk management activities cannot wait for a disrupting trigger event, they must
be in place prior to achieve the greatest benefit (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).
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The ability to understand risk as well as the scope and context of such threats are subject
to the bounded rationality of the manager, as all organizational learning takes place within a
member of the organization and this learning has to be transmitted among members to develop
understanding (Simon, 1991). Not all parts of the organization know something, learn something
or learn the same thing. Having knowledge where it is needed is therefore important for decisionmaking. This understanding can also be incorporated from knowledge gained outside the
organization through the acquisition of a new employee (Simon, 1991), but the employee’s
decision-making will also be subject to their own bounded rationality.
Management of anticipated risk phenomenon allows a firm the opportunity to avoid or
mitigate the impacts of those risks. This negative risk may result in damage to a portion or all of
a firm, up to dissolution of the firm in the most catastrophic circumstances. To address this, the
concept of risk management and associated frameworks are relevant. Managers in alignment
with firm strategy should desire to reduce the impact of variability that leads to damage or loss
(March and Shapira, 1987).
Risk management
Recent discussions of risk that are relevant to the current research have examined
managerial perceptions of risk (Slovic, 1987) and risk aversion (Dutton and Webster, 1988;
Berdica, 2002; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For instance, risk aversion has been observed to
possess multiple dimensions, often varying among managers. When faced with risks, Berdica
(2002) found managers may seek new solutions to mitigate risks or abandon the idea that
triggered the risk. March and Shapira (1987) found some managers ignore low probability, high
significance outcomes, while Dutton and Webster (1998) and Pillai and Min (2010) found that
high uncertainty leads to underestimation of an issue or mis-calibration of a response. Moving in
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the opposite direction of managerial response, several researchers (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Johnson et al., 1993; Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Viscusi et al., 1987) found managers assign
too much weight to low-probability, high-impact event probabilities.
When the research is combined it indicates development of a human based understanding
of risk phenomenon, but one that is disjointed. This human based understanding is subject to
multiple forces including bias (Goto, 2007) and use of heuristics (Siegrist and Sutterlin, 2014)
when making risk determinations. However, the interdisciplinary nature of risk (Wilkins, 2001),
risk perception in extreme events (Slovic and Weber, 2002) and risk in supply chains (Hauser,
2003; Christopher and Peck, 2004; Trkman and McCormack, 2011; Tummala and Schoenherr,
2011) requires a greater degree of systematic control to ensure alignment with firm strategy and
avoid serious to catastrophic disruptions more than heuristics and bias provide. When the
attributes of managers and forces such as mis-calibration of risks, heuristics and biases coalesce,
they create a more uncertain and complex environment for a supply chain manager to navigate.
This navigation may be accomplished through the process of risk management activities to the
extent a manager engages in the process and uses the tools provided.

The tool of risk management
Risk management as a tool was used initially in the US to reduce insurance costs, but its
use has been noted elsewhere as early as 1738 by Bernoulli (trans. Summers, 1954) as a tactic
used by traders to understand the utility cost of a risk choice, expressed by Bernoulli as a gain or
loss. Discussion of firm and business enterprise level risk management that encompassed
identification, evaluation and reaction to risks began in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Mehr and
Hedges, 1963). Per Verbano and Venturini, (2013) risk management as simply an insurance
function remained the goal until the insurance market crisis of the 1980s, when insurance fell
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from favor as the only means to hedge against risk. In the 1990s, optimizing firm performance to
create value through a multi-disciplined and proactive approach to operations developed.
Examples provided by Verbano and Venturini (2013) of specific disciplines that have branched
from the core risk management concepts and developed unique perspectives include:

“1.

Strategic risk management - the implementation of an integrated and continuous process

of identification and assessment of strategic risks that are considered to be obstacles to reaching
the financial and operational goals of an organization (Chatterjee et al., 2003; Miller, 1992).
2.

Financial risk management - the practice of creating economic value in a firm by using

financial techniques and methodologies to manage exposure to risk (Crockford, 1986).
3.

Enterprise risk management - a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors,

management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed
to identify potential events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk
appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives. (COSO,
2004).
4.

Insurance risk management - the process of management of pure risk (understood as a

risk that can be insured) in a firm, based on the observation of damaging events that have already
occurred, the application of a premium and the subjective assessment based on the experiences
and competences of the assessor (Gahin, 1967).
5.

Project risk management - a formal, systematic process integrated into the life cycle of

any project that involves defining objectives, identifying sources of uncertainty, analyzing these
uncertainties and formulating managerial responses to them in order to develop an acceptable
balance between risks and opportunities (Verbano and Venturini, 2011).
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6.

Engineering risk management - a complex and continuous process that involves

managing the planning, design, operation and evolution of an engineering system in order to
identify and choose appropriate responses to problems related to different risk factors through the
adoption of a systemic and proactive approach (Patè-Cornell, 1990; Regan and Patè-Cornell,
1997).
7.

Disaster risk management - a holistic and flexible approach and an integral part of the

governing of any community, involving a series of actions (programs, projects and measures)
and tools expressly aimed at reducing disaster risks in regions at risk and mitigating the spread of
disasters, maintaining the processes, structures and rigor typical of RM (Garatwa and Bollin,
2002).
8.

Clinical risk management - An approach to improving quality in healthcare which places

special emphasis on identifying circumstances which put patients at risk of harm, and then acting
to prevent or control those risks. The aim is to both improve safety and quality of care for
patients and to reduce the costs of such risks for health care providers (Johnstone and Kanitsaki,
2007).
9.

Supply chain risk management - collaboration with the partners in the entire supply chain

with the aim of developing a shared RM process in order to deal with the risks and uncertainties
resulting from logistic activities and resources (Norrman and Lindroth, 2002).” (Verbano and
Venturini, 2013, pp 187-188)

In addition to the field specific definitions above, the concept of risk management, as in
other newer areas of research, has not settled on a comprehensive definition (see Table 5). To
varying degrees, however, the definitions of risk management agree in that there is a need to
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reduce, control or eliminate risks to benefit the firm. Waring and Glendon, (1998) provide one
definition that seeks to comprehensively engage all risks, describing risk management as “a field
of activity seeking to eliminate, reduce and generally control pure risks (such as from safety, fire,
major hazards, security lapses, environmental hazards) and to enhance the benefits and avoid
detriment from speculative risks (such as financial investment, marketing, human resources, IT
strategy, commercial and business risks)” (p. 3). More recently COSO (2004) offers “enterprise
risk management is a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and other
personnel, applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential
events that may affect the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity objectives” (p. 2) as a potential
definition.
Table 5: Risk management definitions
Source

Risk Management

Dickson (1989)

The identification, analysis and control of those risks which can
threaten the assets or earning capacity of an enterprise

Waring and Glendon
(1998)

A field of activity seeking to eliminate, reduce and generally
control pure risks (such as from safety, fire, major hazards,
security lapses, environmental hazards) and to enhance the
benefits and avoid detriment from speculative risks (such as
financial investment, marketing, human resources, IT strategy,
commercial and business risks).

Sundes and
Birnbaum (2003)

Human actions that are directed towards modification of the
probability that a hazard will be converted into an event and
eventually into a disaster

Norrman and
Jansson (2004)

The making of decisions regarding risks and their subsequent
implementation, and flows from risk estimation and risk
evaluation
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Federal Aviation
Administration
(2006)

An organized, systematic decision- support process that
identifies risks, assesses or analyzes risks, and effectively
mitigates or eliminates risks to achieve program or
organizational objectives

US Army (2006)

The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks
arising from operational factors and making decisions that
balance risk cost with mission benefits

US Department of
Defense (2006)

An overarching process that encompasses identification,
analysis, mitigation planning, mitigation plan implementation,
and tracking of future root causes and their consequence

Al Mannai (2008)

The process of understanding risk and deciding upon and
implementing action to achieve an acceptable level of risk at an
acceptable cost

Department of
Homeland Security
(2008)

The process of identifying, controlling, and minimizing the
impact of events whose consequences are or may be unknown,
or events that are themselves fraught with uncertainty

Supply Chain
Council (2010)

SCOR 10 - Improving (mitigating) the risks of an undesired
event taking place, limiting the impact of such an event and
improving the ability to recover from the event

van Mieghan (2010)

The broad activity of planning and decisionmaking designed to
deal with the occurrence of hazards or risks.

Waters (2011)

The process for systematically identifying, analyzing and
responding to risks throughout an organization

British Standards
Institution (2011)

Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with
regard to risk

Even with a definition, risk management is a complex task that occurs in the context of a
complex business environment. To aid in understanding a manager’s role in implementing risk
management practices, broad frameworks have been developed which aid in understanding a
firm’s level of implementation maturity.
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Risk management frameworks
Enterprise risk management frameworks provide a means for firms to exert a level of
control over potential future activities and attempt to take actions to have those activities remain
within an acceptable level of variation. More recently the field has grown in response to
pressures felt from specific disciplines. Additional impetus to engage in broad risk management
activities across US industries include the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and a
requirement that firms trading on the New York Stock Exchange provide an audit of nonfinancial risk (Beasley et al., 2005).
Several frameworks exist which firms can use to address enterprise risk concerns. One
example is ISO 31000:2009 - Risk Management Principles and Guidelines which states “the
adoption of consistent processes within a comprehensive framework can help to ensure that risk
is managed effectively, efficiently and coherently across an organization” (ISO, 2009). This
approach to risk will also serve as an enabler to
— increase the likelihood of achieving objectives;
— encourage proactive management;
— be aware of the need to identify and treat risk throughout the organization;
— improve the identification of opportunities and threats;
— comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international norms;
— improve mandatory and voluntary reporting;
— improve governance;
— improve stakeholder confidence and trust;
— establish a reliable basis for decision making and planning;
— improve controls;
— effectively allocate and use resources for risk treatment;
— improve operational effectiveness and efficiency;
— enhance health and safety performance, as well as environmental protection;
— improve loss prevention and incident management;
— minimize losses;
— improve organizational learning; and
— improve organizational resilience.
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Enterprise Risk Management tools such as the ISO 31000:2009 framework, provide a
comprehensive means for firms to address variations that may require additional resources to
bring those variances under control. However, usage of these tools has been less than universal.
Recent longitudinal research regarding ISO 31000:2009 implementation conducted by Scannell
et al., (2013) indicated that alignment between SCRM usage and ISO 31000 principles presented
serious challenges. These included external knowledge acquisition and the internal ability to
obtain necessary information, key for decision-making efforts; the ability to share information
among partners and obtain information from the environment, key to ensuring the widest
congruence between plans and executors; and lack of a proactive approach of most firms, with
notable exceptions being those firms who communicated regularly regarding risk. Risks deemed
serious to catastrophic yet outside of firm control were generally addressed through dual
sourcing or buffer inventory strategies. Overall the authors found little integration of formal
SCRM with formal enterprise wide risk management, with many firms opting instead for a
decentralized sense of responsibility spread among employees.
The existence of such extensive frameworks and their level of employment indicates
several dynamics key to this research. The first is that risk management is important to firms and
regulatory bodies. The second is that managers are heterogeneous in decision-making and output
and a normative framework, customized to a firm, can correct the differences and better align
managerial activities with firm strategy, if employed. These issues become important as
identification of firm maturity within risk management frameworks allows firms to consider the
“potential impact of all types of risks on all processes, activities, stakeholders, products and
services”, including the “upside of risk” (AIRMIC, 2010, p.2). Research in this area will
contribute to the understanding of the intersection of managers and risk management, as “beyond
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a few case studies published in academic journals . . . not much is known about best practices
employed by managers” (Manuj, 2013, p. 81). While best practices may be scarce in academic
literature, cautionary examples of failures have been documented.

Examples of risk management failure
The healthcare infrastructure of facilities in New Orleans, Louisiana impacted by
Hurricane Katrina were unprepared, and had not considered the risk of a long-term interruption
to services. When the impact of the storm’s disruption began to take full effect, fuel and medical
supplies were undeliverable and electrical service failed. As a result, several deaths were
attributed to inadequate risk and resilience preparation, response and coping (Franco et al.,
2006). Further, mistrust and blame regarding inadequate preparation and subsequent response
were quickly placed at all levels of government (Boin et al., 2010). Lack of planning created
conditions that were worse than if effective planning and coordination had been present
(Thevenaz and Resodihardjo, 2010). However, several years later, with the benefit of lessons
learned (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001) from Hurricane Katrina, a powerful storm approached the
East coast of the United States.
New York City hospitals that were in the projected path of Superstorm Sandy had state
regulatory requirements for power, communication and services to continue uninterrupted for an
extended shelter-in-place event, but were overcome by unanticipated high storm surges. These
unmitigated failures, which inundated electrical systems, ultimately affected five hospitals, thirty
residential facilities, all of which were situated near the vulnerable NYC waterfront, and 6,300
patients were unable to shelter-in-place (Gibbs and Holloway, 2013). These facilities and city
administrators had the benefit of lessons learned from prior storms (Weick and Sutcliff, 2001;
Tierney et al., 2001), several days advance forecast of a predicted impact cone and subsequent
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storm related effects as they conducted their decision-making processes. Certain decisions, made
in light of previous knowledge of large storm impacts, were chosen as the correct decisions for
the ‘firm’ of New York City, yet plans were inadequate to meet the storm. However, some prior
planning had undoubtedly mitigated worse effects (Gibbs and Halloway, 2013) from a complex
disruption.
Healthcare supply chain risk management is a complex and potentially life and death
field. Where ‘firm’ strategy of New York City may have been expressed through documents and
statements (Clarke, 1999) that implied readiness for ‘all-hazards’ that could be encountered,
concrete activities that occurred to prepare for the actual risk were inadequate. The complexities
and the consideration of known and unknown events (Knight, 1921) may require advanced
planning and coordination, but must be balanced against competing needs to support overall
strategy. In serious to catastrophic disruptions firms suffer losses, some to the point of
dissolution as well as experiencing negative impacts to revenue and reputation, all at odds with
firm continuity. Firm strategy development and execution is a key component for a firm to
support goals, such as loss reduction, business continuity and competitive advantage. Therefore a
discussion of firm strategy will provide context for risk management within a firm.
Firm strategy
Firm strategy defined
Firm strategy serves a key purpose by providing guidance to align efforts across the firm
to achieve a goal. Over time, this strategy may also provide vision and motivation as well
(Eisenhardt, 1999). When viewed from outside or inside the firm, understanding firm strategy
will also serve to explain changes in action as conditions change (MacCrimmon, 1993). Key
aspects of a complete firm strategy, which is difficult to achieve perfectly, include:
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1a. Strategy is a series of related actions involving resource deployments
1b. Strategy is goal-directed with the goals serving to coordinate the actions
2. Strategy has a wide scope in space and time
3a. Strategy is conditional upon environmental events including actions of other agents
3b. Strategy takes account of the effect of one's actions on other units, the possible actions of
other units, and the various interactions that arise (MacCrimmon, 1993).

Strategy Frameworks
Multiple frameworks to understand firm strategy have been developed and used in the
context of understanding supply chain management’s role in firm strategy. Rumelt (1974, 1986)
discussed the interaction of diversification strategy, corporate structure and performance, based
on a combination of dominant related businesses or business lines. Miles et al., (1978) provide a
theoretical framework "to analyze an organization as an integrated and dynamic whole - a model
that takes into account the interrelationships among strategy, structure, and process" (p. 547).
Miles et al., (1978) further present assumptions that managers may need to adapt their style to
the style required by the firm strategy. Porter (1979, 1991) developed a theory of strategy that
uses a dynamic system of determinants that are mutually tied together. Although firms desire
stability, the environment is constantly shifting. When prompted by forces to change to maintain
advantage, value and advantage must be developed with understanding of the other determinants.
Analysis of these five forces can help guide strategy development and understand potential
viability of the firm and whether offensive or defensive action would be appropriate (Porter
1979, 1991).
Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney (1991) developed a resource based view of the firm that
found tangible and intangible assets, tied semi-permanently to a firm, provide sustained
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competitive advantage if they are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable.
While the ability of firms in the same industry to develop formal strategy is therefore imitable,
the underlying informal strategy development and the strategy decision and implementation may
be valuable and rare and hence contribute to a competitive advantage (Barney, 1991). Teece
(1997) discussed that competitive advantage stems from firm internal high-performance routines
that are then shaped by processes and positions. Soft assets such as values, culture and
experience must be built. This dynamic capability approach both develops new capabilities and
uses old capabilities as well (Teece, 1997).
The field of strategy research continues to grow. Desarbo et al., (2005) reexamined and
extended the work of Miles et al., (1978) through a reconsideration of the factors that drive
placement into the four distinct groups Miles previously identified. The Miles et al. (1978)
groups of Defender, Analyzer, Prospector and Reactor (P-A-D-R) were expanded to include
groupings of Prospector/Analyzer, Defender/Reactor, Analyzer/Prospector/Defender and
Prospector/Analyzer. These second-order derivatives of the P-A-D-R groups emerged when
strategic types, capabilities, environmental uncertainty and firm performance variables were
added to Miles and Snow's classifications. Obviously, the field of firm strategy is complex,
multifaceted and is subject to revision as frameworks are tested and variables are added and
adjusted. Within the complexity of the role of the firm is the role of the supply chain.

Importance of firm strategy in supply chain research
Supply chain management (SCM) has been identified as a strategic level function of a
firm (Mentzer, 2001; Stank et al., 2005) and as such adds value for a firm and stakeholders
through integration across the supply chain (Lambert et al., 1998). SCM is influenced by firm
strategy, therefore firm strategies and frameworks must be acknowledged and understood which
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in turn aids SCM in developing supporting strategies and actions. MacCrimmon (1993) noted
that firm strategy may be variable and change over time due to influences such as mergers and
acquisitions, market forces and regulatory influences and that firm strategy is implemented and
impacted by managers and the resources they bring to bear.

Impact of individual managers on strategy implementation
Research indicates that managerial style matters (Burton and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et
al., 2006, 2008, 2012). Early discussions urged firms to consider leadership styles as they filled
their executive ranks with technically adept personnel (Fiedler, 1965). From the fit between
leadership styles of those selected for an executive position, a firm could adjust a leader’s power
and the subsequent power structure they operated within, change the task structure as a form of
governance and alignment, or change the subordinate structure to provide complimentary styled
employees (Fiedler, 1965) were all suggestions to improve firm performance. Shortly after,
Woffard (1971) found congruence between the effectiveness of managers who possessed a
security and maintenance focus operating in a large complex organization and between a
manager focused on personal interaction working in a simpler and more centralized operation.
Very different environments, yet each manager successfully performed their role to support the
firm. More recent research indicates some managerial traits are universally desirable in all
circumstances, while some are contingent on the structure of the business unit where the
manager operates (Slater, 1989). Some traits that were found to be significant in a recent study
were firm tenure, congruence between entrepreneurial behavior and firm strategy, and a thinking
mode of decision-making in ambiguous situations (Slater, 1989). Managerial style may also play
a role in how blame is assigned when negative events occur. Boin et al., (2010) examined the
leadership style of political leaders following Hurricane Katrina and noted that leadership during
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crisis is a function of a leader’s need for control and the contextual sensitivity that is brought into
play. In uncertain circumstances, leaders will behave differently due to inherent qualities they
possess. When change is involved, Oreg and Berson (2011), in a study of school principals and
employees, found the principal’s personal attributes and leadership style were able to explain
resistance to change or acceptance to change in school teachers. Managers therefore have an
impact on their immediate environment and their actions may span to dimensions beyond the
firm as well in support of firm strategy. While managers are heterogeneous in style, less
understood is how that style impacts firm strategy.

Firm strategy at the managerial unit of analysis
While firm strategy has received considerable attention in the literature (Rumelt, 1974;
Hofer, 1975; Porer, 1979, 1981, 1996; Bettis, 1982; Eisenhardt, 1989; Williamson, 1999) and
effects of managerial or Executive Style are beginning to be explored in the literature (Burton
and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008, 2012), there has been scant research on the
intersection of Executive Style and risk management, a key component of firm strategy (Bettis,
1982; Baird and Thomas, 1985; Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). As a component of strategy, risk
management plays a key role in maintaining the viability of a firm under serious to catastrophic
disruption conditions, when a firm may experience the greatest loss, perhaps to dissolution. In a
supply chain context, the impact of a supply chain manager’s Executive Style on their approach
to supply chain risk management in preparation for such a disruption may be significant. A more
thorough understanding of this relationship between risk management and Executive Style is a
key goal of this research and to date there has been no literature identified that fills this gap. A
first step is developing an understanding of managerial Executive Style.
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Executive Style
Henri Fayol, in 1916, was one of the earliest management writers to express that
managerial qualities play an important role within a firm. This role requires different abilities
harnessed in different proportions based upon the position/role of the manager within the firm,
the task to be accomplished and the size of the firm (Fayol trans. Gray, 1984). The importance of
placement of a manager within the firm, based upon his perceived style and abilities, Fayol
believed, would allow a firm to increase its effectiveness when dealing with internal and external
relationships. The understanding of style continues to evolve as researchers probe continued
knowledge gaps and how to define the unique attributes of a manager.

The uniqueness of managers
Managers are not homogeneous and selfless as they conduct their jobs as part of a set of
larger firm processes. Selflessness in this context indicates a managerial view that suppresses any
personal desires or inclinations in favor of total stewardship of the firm (Bertrand and Schoar,
2003). With this view, it would be easy for a firm to substitute one matching manager with
another and achieve the same output. In essence, this would carry with it the understanding that
managers as individuals do not matter. Firms in the same field with managers possessing certain
quantifiable qualities would perform similarly, make similar strategic choices and execute the
same level of risk-taking and risk-averse activities. However, multifaceted factors pertaining to
individual managers are known to exist (Bolman and Deal, 1991; Gammelgard and Larson,
2001; Burton and Obel, 2004; Ben-David and Ben-David, 2007, 2010; Håkonsson et al., 2012).
For instance, it is understood that agency issues are present with managers (Zsidisin and Ellram,
2003; Fayezi et al., 2012), malleability of style (Crowe et al., 1972) and gender differences
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(Eagly and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001) in relation to Executive Style
also exist and Executive Style has been recently characterized as a two dimensional construct of
risk avoidance and preference to delegate (Burton and Obel, 2004; Håkonsson et al., 2006, 2008,
2012). That is, executives are heterogeneous, yet have traits that can be measured and separated
to understand their approach to the task of management. There are multiple avenues to approach
this examination and delineation of style.
Previous discussions of Executive Style have examined whether a manager models the
style of their boss in order to be perceived more favorably (Stimpson and Reuel, 1984), if a
manager changes their behavior in order to produce an improved interpersonal fit with
subordinates (Crowe et al., 1972), if leadership style plays a role in job satisfaction and
organizational commitment (Lok and Crawford, 2004), and whether components of managerial
style (personality traits, background characteristics and managerial behaviors) exert a strong
influence on business unit performance (Slater, 1989). Executive style in the literature has been
variously termed management style or leadership style, but there is general agreement that style
makes a difference and matters to the firm.

Why style matters
Researchers have found that as a unit of analysis, managers have various attributes
described as style, which yield varied decisions and outcomes. Attributes such as gender (Eagly
and Johnson, 1990; Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001), fatherhood (Dahl et al., 2012), age
and educational attainment (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003), esteem accorded to them, charisma,
ability to inspire (Bass and Yammarino, 1991) as well as risk acceptance and delegation
preference (Håkonsson et al., 2008, 2012), overconfidence (Deaves et al., 2008) or degree of
interpersonal accommodation (Crowe et al., 1972) have all been explored. Differences in
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managerial traits may lead to differing outcomes under the same or similar circumstances, due to
the heterogeneity of managers themselves and their traits. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) have
found that manager fixed effects did impact firm performance. Firms understand this variance
exists and to reduce variance from these effects, often firms will employ governance mechanisms
(Williamson, 1979). This research focuses on the impact of Executive Style in the supply chain
risk management context.

Where to find Executive Style in research
Executive Style has been discussed in a broad range of disciplines. The social science
field is concerned with how a social group functions as well as interacts. There are several
related disciplines which have developed from this. Crowe et al., (1972) examine the effects of
subordinate behavior on managerial behavior; Eagly and Johnson (1990) and Eagly and
Johannesen-Schmidt (2001) examine the effects of gender and managerial style. General
management studies have examined how an organization’s structure affects entrepreneurial
orientation of the manager and subsequent financial performance (Covin and Slevin, 1988),
managerial personality, background and behaviors impact on performance (Slater, 1989),
managerial vision and strategy, including the differing direction middle managers may take
(Rotemberg and Saloner, 2000) and how national cultural differences and leadership style affect
satisfaction and commitment (Lok and Crawford, 2004). An area that has been unaddressed is
Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity.
The fields of economics and finance discuss how financial performance over time is
significantly related to the fixed effects that managers have through their heterogeneity (Bertrand
and Schoar, 2003) while Malmendier and Tate (2005) note that managerial overconfidence as a
trait leads to miscalibrated investments and impacts the amount of personal funds placed at risk.
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Kofodimos (1990) provides an example from applied behavioral science of an
ethnographic approach to understanding an individual manager’s style and the impact of personal
history in shaping style. Behavioral modeling, where a subordinate mimics the behavioral style
of their manager was examined by Stimson and Rueul (1984) who found that “a democratic style
was likely to be modeled and an authoritarian style resulted in counter-modeling” (p. 171).
Gender differences were noted here as well with females displaying increased tendencies for
modeling. Followers were influenced likewise by managerial style in an organizational change
context studied by Oreg and Berson (2011), who verified the effect of complexity, such as
individual follower differences, in the effectiveness of a transformational leader.
Bolman and Deal (1991) present a four-frame model that uses four constructs to help a
leader understand the appropriate approach to be successful based upon possible issues they
encounter and actions that may be taken. Multiple frames may be used simultaneously. Ledlow
and Coppola (2010), in discussing healthcare leaders, describe a dynamic culture leadership
model that relates how diverse styles are present in individual managers and these styles can
contribute to a balanced team, once they are discovered and understood. In the related realm of
strategic planning, Håkonsson et al., (2012) tie together Executive Style and firm strategy
implementation to better understand how matching style with strategy leads to increased
profitability of the firm. Yet the effects in the supply chain management field have remained
generally unexamined.

Executive Style and supply chain management
The field of supply chain management treats Executive Style cursorily. This in spite of
the observation by van Hoek et al., (2002) that managers are “the critical dimension” (p. 119)
and that textbook knowledge and application itself is inadequate to yield differentiated firm
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performance. Meyers et al., (2004) examine supply chain management human capital as an asset
to develop, i.e. build competencies in the form of education, work experience and specific skill
sets to drive successful performance. Development of these are proposed to increase employee
worth. Andre (1995) examined leadership styles of logistics managers to understand how
diversity of work-teams leads to competitive advantage while Cooper et al., (2007) found that
female logistic executives displayed a managerial style well suited to making decisions in the
workplace.
Managers are ultimately heterogeneous. Faced with homogeneity, managerial
replacements could be accomplished with anyone, as the results would be equivalent. However,
managers differ and their effects differ as well (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). To this end, March
and Shapira (1987) note that although managers “vary in their individual propensities to take
risks, those variations are obscured by processes of selection that reduce the heterogeneity
among managers and encourage them to believe in their ability to control the odds, by systems of
organizational controls and incentives that dictate risk taking behavior in significant ways, and
by variations in the demand for risk taking produced by the context within which choice takes
place” (p. 1414). Therefore understanding how managerial differences, expressed as Executive
Style, interact with structures designed to manage risk is a key concern for firms as failure to
manage risk can lead to severe costs (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013).

Executive Style
This research adopts the usage of the term Executive Style per Håkonsson et al., (2012)
where Executive Style is a multidimensional construct based on a manager’s information
processing. Based on prior research conducted by Cyert and March (1963), Likert (1967) Yukl
(1981), Miller et al., (1982) and Kotter (1988), Burton and Obel (2004) found that managers

93
process information and use their time in different ways. The first root characteristic of
Executive Style identified by Burton and Obel (2004), information processing, was found to be
congruent with Cyert and March’s (1963, p. 119) concept of uncertainty avoidance, and who
describe uncertainty avoidance to include:
•

Avoid correctly anticipating events in the distant future by using short-run reaction
to short-run feedback, i.e. solve pressing problems rather than develop long run
strategies

•

Avoid anticipating the environment by negotiating with it

Information processing is a key component of Executive Style as each manager handles
information differently. Håkonsson et al., (2012) also discuss the importance of information
processing to strategy when they note “a misalignment of Executive Style and strategy implies
that the Executive Style will not support the implementation of a strategy” (p. 183). The authors
further explain that, “the more uncertainty is embedded in the strategy, the more information
processing support will be required by the executive” (Håkonsson et al., 2012, p. 183).
Information processing can also be challenging due to the possible amount of data
available for analysis and the constrained abilities of a manager to synthesize and act upon the
information. Daft and Lengel (1984, 1986) discuss the role of information processing in a firm as
a means to first reduce uncertainty and second to reduce equivocality, a term distinct from
uncertainty in that equivocality presumes a “messy, unclear field” (p. 554) while uncertainty has
been described as “an individual's perceived inability to predict something accurately” (Milliken,
1987, p. 136) and has been typified as a topic requiring additional research between the
uncertainty types of 1) perceived environmental uncertainty, 2) effect uncertainty and 3) response
uncertainty (Milliken, 1987).
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The second characteristic identified by Burton and Obel (2004), the use of time, correlates
to preference to delegate. Burton and Obel (2004) note “a leader is likely to delegate when
he/she finds it efficient in terms of his or her own time availability and further when he/she
thinks the organization will make decisions congruent with his/her preferences and experience”
(p. 104). These two dimensions led to the identification of four styles termed Manager, Maestro,
Producer and Leader (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Executive Styles (Håkonsson et al., 2012)

The four styles - Manager
The first two styles to discuss are styles of managers who prefer less delegation and more
personal involvement in decision-making. The Manager style is characterized by a low degree of
delegation and a low degree of uncertainty avoidance. Characteristics identified by Burton and
Obel (2004) and Håkonsson et al., (2012) include a leader who attends to detail, controls
feedback and has a short-term, income now, focus rather than a long-term profits later focus.
This type of leader may prefer to make line-by-line decisions (Miller and Toulouse, 1986a,
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1986b) and collect his/her own information. Reacting to events as they occur, this manager may
be faced with emerging crises which threaten to overwhelm their information processing
capacity. This may present difficulties as organizations become more complex and information
processing requirements increase, although some aid may be provided by information processing
and decision support systems (Daft and Lengel, 1984; Robbins, 1990) but ultimately may
challenge this leader’s wish for control.

The four styles - Maestro
Maestro style managers possess a more long term proactive view and are managers who
prefer stability to variance. They tend to focus on the difficult and new and work to bring it under
control, similar to an orchestral maestro, hence the name (Håkonsson et al., 2012). However, this
focus may proves to be a bottleneck as they may prefer personal involvement with decisionmaking and information requirements in uncertain situations may prove overwhelming
(Håkonsson et al., 2012; Robbins, 1990). The proactive approach they bring, such as “creative
thinking,[and] a vision for the future” (Burton and Obel, 2004, p. 116) also require a great deal of
information processing, but does not restrain the manager from long-range, perhaps risky,
planning while providing inspirational leadership to subordinates (Miller and Toulouse, 1986).

The four styles – Producer
The two styles that remain are characteristic of managers who prefer more delegation of
tasks. The Producer tends to focus more on control and prefers a decentralized structure (Burton
and Obel, 2004). While they support bottom-up innovation they prefer to let subordinates pursue
ambiguous situations (Håkonsson et al., 2013). In contrast to the Manager style of leader, a
Producer may want to understand the decisions being made, and doesn’t wish to make line-by-
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line decisions (Miller and Toulouse, 1986) but still may have to react to situations as they occur,
due to the Producer’s short-term orientation. The Producer’s use of delegation may enable others
to address ambiguity while they maintain overall focus and control, all while avoiding
development of innovative ideas themselves. This behavior may be supported by their desire to
avoid risks, which innovation may represent (Burton and Obel, 2004; Miller et al., 1982; Miller
and Toulouse, 1986).

The four styles - Leader
The final style is the Leader style. This style of executive displays a more global focus on
what is happening next and is less focused on the present in favor of the future. They may prefer
to leave the near term decisions to subordinates as well as information processing tasks, allowing
the Leader to work on long term strategic decisions (Håkonsson et al., 2012). As part of the
delegation process the Leader will only provide general versus detailed guidance to subordinates
and instead of exerting a great deal of control will provide a great deal of autonomy and
independence (Zaleznik, 1977). However, the Leader benefits from this in their ability to
envision long term solutions and opportunities, although greater risk may be involved, both
positive or negative (Burton and Obel, 2004). Inspiration versus direct control of subordinates is
the preferred motivation method (Toulouse and Miller, 1986) and may be seen as entrepreneurial
to observers (Håkonsson et al., 2012).
Each of these styles of leader must engage with risk management decisions that face their
supply chain risk management postures. Based on their differing attributes, it may be anticipated
that different managers may address supply chain risk management differently, leading to
differing amounts of fit between certain Executive Styles and attainment of a particular supply
chain risk management maturity level.
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Executive Style and fit
Håkonsson et al. (2012), in their examination of Danish enterprises, examined the concept
of fit between firm strategy and Executive Style. The authors explored if a certain Executive
Style is best aligned with a firm strategy, would firm performance realize a positive impact. The
hypothesis was that alignment raised the possibility of superior performance based upon the
alignment fit between strategy and style. The study examined decision-making and informationprocessing styles to arrive at an understanding of Executive Style and found the attributes
associated with information-processing, referred to as ‘uncertainty avoidance’, is “relevant for
strategy implementation” (Håkonsson et al., 2012, p. 185), which, as was noted by Miller and
Friesen (1983), is an aspect of the system needed to meet and overcome dynamic challenges.
Overall, Håkonsson et al., (2012) found “alignment between Executive Style and strategy has
positive performance implications” (p. 195).
Understanding Executive Style and the inherent challenges managers face can help a firm
understand if future strategic direction can be best fulfilled by the current manager in place, or if
style adjustment may need to occur to best match strategy. The examination of Executive Style
conducted by Håkonsson et al. (2012) provides an increased granularity of managerial definition
that incorporates the interaction effects of the two concepts of uncertainty avoidance and degree
of delegation. The proper fit between style and strategy is opined to reduce performance loss
stemming from misalignment of these two fields when merged with firm strategy. Knowing the
executive and their style therefore becomes an important part of firm knowledge. One area of
research extension where this interaction may have critical impact is when deliberations and
decisions surrounding supply chain risk occur, accompanied by risk management decisions.
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Research Hypotheses
Firm strategy provides guidance to align efforts across the firm to achieve a goal. Over time,
this strategy may also provide vision and motivation as well. An understanding of a firm’s
strategy will aid in understanding changes that are made as the environment changes
(MacCrimmon, 1993). To retain a competitive advantage, Porter (1980) has noted that firms
must be able to adopt an offensive or defensive position against competitive forces. In the face of
a serious to catastrophic disruption to operations, an effective risk management structure will
allow for mitigated damage and a more resilient and timely recovery to pre-disruption operations
(Sheffi, 2005; COSO, 2004). If a firm has the capability to manage disruption risk better than its
competitor, it may gain a competitive advantage post-disruption (Sheffi, 2005; Simchi-Levi et
al., 2013).
Implementation of a risk management plan and process requires a decision-maker who has
been assigned the task. If a firm benefits from implementation of risk management processes and
plans (Sheffi, 2005; Sheffi and Rice, 2005), the closer aligned Executive Style is to firm strategy
the more congruence there will be between a manager’s decision to participate in the risk
management process and a firm strategy that desires risk to be managed. The manager becomes
key. “The influence a leader exerts in altering moods, evoking images and expectations, and in
establishing specific desires and objectives determines the direction a business takes. The net
result of this influence changes the way people think about what is desirable, possible, and
necessary” (Zelaznik, 1977, p. 76). Therefore, the manager tasked with risk management sets the
tone and direction of risk management execution. When a manager of either the Maestro style or
Leader style assumes this task, greater congruence with firm strategy would be expected due to
the increased risk acceptance and long-range focus of both managers. Advanced states of supply
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chain risk management maturity involve time, vision and resource commitment that may be more
congruent with the Maestro, followed by the Leader.
When the executive prefers a short-term focus, similar to that of the Manager and Producer,
less congruence with achieving greater stages of supply chain risk management maturity levels
may be anticipated. These managers are known for a more short term focus and a reactionary
approach to management. This approach may be less supportive of the requirements to achieve
higher levels of maturity. As it relates to risk management support of overall strategy, when a
leader delegates the risk management task to subordinates, similar to the middle manager of
Balogun and Johnson (2004), there appears to be a further distance and disconnectedness from
firm strategy, which may be seen in the Producer and their delegates. This may be due to the
imperfect information received by the middle manager and may be corrected with explicit risk
management instructions, but perfect transmission of information in a firm is problematic. This
gives rise then to “the emergence of unintended consequences out of intended strategies as a
result of a process of sensemaking by middle managers” (Balogun and Johnson, p. 295). Middle
managerial sensemaking processes of subordinates determine that strategic “plans are translated
into action through the medium of these inter-recipient processes (everyday experiences of the
actions and behaviours of others, and the stories, gossip, jokes, conversations and discussions
they share with their peers about these experiences), turning top-down intended change into an
emergent and unpredictable process” Balugun and Johnson (2005, p. 2). Therefore, the further
removed from firm strategy through delegation, which also introduces another layer of activities,
and strategy dilution through individual sensemaking, the less congruent with firm strategy the
risk management process may be. When considering congruence with Level IV of the supply
chain risk management maturity framework, the Leader style, therefore may experience less
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congruence than the Maestro style leader, while it is anticipated that the Producer style manager
would possess the least congruence with Level IV maturity, following the Manager style. How
these managers approach the task of risk management either through the use of heuristics or a
more formal adoption of risk management techniques, such as established frameworks and the
overall maturity of their efforts may impact firm performance.
Supply chain risk management implementation is a marker to identify implementation of
firm strategy in anticipation of a serious to catastrophic business impact (Simchi-Levi et al.,
2013). The supply chain manager’s approach to risk management maturity achievement and
subsequent actual planning may be affected by their Executive Style. From this discussion the
following hypotheses are proposed and illustrated in Figure 3.
H1a: The Maestro style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity
H1b: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity
H1c: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level III SCRM maturity
H1d: The Maestro style is positively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.
H2a: The Leader style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity.
H2b: The Leader style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.
H2c: The Leader style is positively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.
H2d: The Leader style is negatively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.

H3a: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level I SCRM maturity.
H3b: The Manager style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.
H3c: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.
H3d: The Manager style is negatively associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.

H4a: The Producer style is positively associated with Level I SCRM maturity.
H4b: The Producer style is positively associated with Level II SCRM maturity.
H4c: The Producer style is negatively associated with Level III SCRM maturity.
H4d: The Producer style is negatively associated with Level IVSCRM maturity.
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Figure 3: Executive Style congruence with supply chain risk management, adapted from
Håkonsson et al., (2012)

Supply chain risk management and Executive Style
As previously discussed, Supply Chain Risk Management is an interdependent topic that
draws upon relationships between firm strategy, risk, risk management and the individual
manager, as expressed through the construct of Executive Style. The complexities that develop
from these relationships impact a firm’s ability to be resilient when faced with disruptions
(Hillson, 1997; IACCM, 2003; Lockamy and McCormack, 2004; Oliveira et al., 2011; SimchiLevi et al., 2012). Understanding this interaction is made challenging by several factors
including that the “critical dimension” (van Hoek et al., 2002, p. 119) of manager as a unit of
analysis has been under-researched in supply chain literature. Although the heterogeneity of
decision-makers has been recognized in the literature of other fields, notably finance and
economics, it remains poorly understood in supply chain contexts and has only been researched
fleetingly.
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Figure 4: Scope of research (adapted from Håkonsson et al., 2012; Simchi-Levi et al., 2013)

Additionally, how the manager interacts with the task of risk management may be subject
to situational and individual (perspective driven) influences, although within the context and
influence of firm strategy. For instance a manager may be faced with a disruption possibility
along a range of probabilities and impacts and the manager’s individual attributes, such as prior
experience or aversion to risk, will guide their decision-making. The individual risk management
approach of managers, linked to their Executive Styles, has not been previously considered and
collectively, these risk management topics have not been appropriately studied in a supply chain
context. Figure 4 illustrates the scope of the present research.

This chapter discussed key literature pertaining to risk management and Executive Style as
well as supply chain risk management and risk. Chapter Three describes the methodology used
for this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The complex interaction between Executive Style and a manager’s approach to risk
management has not been adequately explored or understood and represents a gap in the
literature. McGrath (1982) and Creswell (2003) note the importance of converging qualitative
and quantitative research methods to gain greater understanding of a research problem. Chapter 3
will provide the justification and description of the qualitative and quantitative methodologies.
Multiple Method Research Overview
The purpose of the multiple method approach in this research is to more completely
understand the effect of Executive Style on supply chain risk management in a healthcare
context. Data was collected concurrently using a survey and semi-structured interviews. The
selected approach, one of several as shown in Figure 5, allowed for both a numeric
understanding of the relationship through quantitative research as well as provided additional
detail derived through qualitative research (Andrew and Halcomb, 2009; Davis et al., 2011).
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Figure 5: Research purposes in multiple methods research designs (Davis et al., 2011)

Multiple methodologies approaches
There are multiple possible approaches when combining methodologies for a single study
(Creswell, 2002; Andrew and Halcomb, 2009). This research employed a concurrent
implementation sequence, where the qualitative and quantitative data collection was conducted
simultaneously. The emphasis was split equally between the quantitative determination of the
relationship between Executive Style and supply chain risk maturity, Study 1, and the qualitative
study, exploring the complex influences faced by supply chain managers, Study 2. The
qualitative study was designed to provide more in depth exploration with selected respondents to
understand if there are other important factors influencing supply chain risk managers that may
cause their choices and influence decisions that lead to the current risk maturity of their supply
chain. Additionally, Study 2 sought to add depth and nuance to results generated in Study 1
(McGrath, 1982). This approach is important as the concurrent examination of the supply chain
management from a risk management and leadership perspective and a more complete
understanding of the breadth of the topic, provided by the exploratory qualitative portion added
nuance and depth to the groundwork quantitative portion which sought to understand current
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conditions with healthcare supply chain managers. An overview of the process is provided in
Figure 6.
Figure 6: Methodological process

(Poole and Van de Ven, 2010; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; adapted from Rowland and Perry,
2009)

Study 1 - Quantitative Research Overview
Several authors have noted that the influence of Executive Style in supply chain decisionmaking has received limited attention and is underdeveloped (Gattorna, 1998; Trkman and
McCormack, 2009; Godsell et al., 2010). Research in managerial decision making should include
an estimation of fit between supply chain managers, to include how managers approach the risk
of supply chain non-performance and the firm’s supply chain risk management maturity level.
Gattorna (1998) notes the different impact of leadership styles on firm strategy and stresses the
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ability to assess and understand a manager’s style as an aid to determine gaps in managerial
capabilities. To better understand these potential gaps, a process focused on uncovering the covariation between Executive Style and SCRM maturity was proposed.

Quantitative research and survey methodology
Quantitative research methods, as deductive processes, use a variance approach to
understand proposed hypotheses and serve to provide an outcome-driven (Aldrich, 2001)
explanation for the variation of the output (Van de Ven, 2007). Surveys are one method that is
widely accepted in SCM research (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009; Richey et al., 2010; Speier,
2011). Use of an electronically administered survey was justified for several reasons. First, the
data required to address the research questions was not readily available through secondary data
or other quantitative methods (Dillman et al., 2009). Second, a survey methodology provided,
from among a select sample frame, a statistically validated numeric description of a relationship
from which interpretations and generalizations were formulated across the survey population
(Jick, 1979; Dillman, 2000; Creswell, 2003; Dillman et al., 2009). The third is its accepted use in
supply chain research (Chen and Paulraj, 2004; Mangan et al., 2004; Braunscheidel and Suresh,
2009; Richey et al., 2010; Speier, 2011) to include exploratory studies (Juttner, 2005) supply
chain personnel research (Keller and Ozment, 1999; Ellinger et al., 2002; Myers et al., 2011) and
managerial research (Schriesheim et al., 1988; Slater, 1989). Fourth, electronic surveys have
been shown to possess advantages over paper based surveys in perceived urgency, receipt-toresponse time, data entry, delivery knowledge (mis-sent e-mails are promptly indicated to the
sender as undeliverable) and speed of delivery (Griffis et al., 2003; Dillman et al., 2009). Fifth,
surveys are appropriate when relationships are not readily observable and manager perceptions
are required for the analysis (Schneider et al., 1996). Finally, as part of a multiple method
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approach, “surveys became more meaningful when interpreted in light of critical qualitative
information” (Jick, 1979, p. 606). Jick (1979) further found concurrent use of surveys as one of
“various techniques and instruments generated a rather rich and comprehensive picture” (p. 606).

Survey instrument overview
The survey instrument was adapted from Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) for the supply chain
management and risk management items (Table 6) and Håkonsson et al., (2012) for the
Executive Style items. The complete survey item list is found in Appendix A. Simchi-Levi et al.,
(2013) identified characteristics of both supply chain maturity and risk management maturity
within a four level framework progressing from least capable at Level I to most capable at Level
IV. The measured maturity level, as achieved by a firm through managerial decision-making and
strategy choices, is indicative of a firm’s propensity to recover following a supply chain
disruption. A manager’s particular style (Håkonsson, et al., 2012) may bear on their willingness
to achieve and maintain a particular level of maturity.
Table 6: Generalized Capability Maturity Classifications
Capability Maturities

Supply Chain

Risk Management

Level I

Functional Supply Chain
Management

Ad-hoc Management of
Risk

Level II

Internal Supply Chain
Integration

Positioning of Planed
Buffers to Absorb
Disruptions

Level III

External Supply Chain
Collaboration

Proactive Risk Response

Level IV

Dynamic Supply Chain
Adaptation

Fully Flexible Response to
Risk
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Håkonsson et al., (2012), building on prior Executive Style studies (Håkonsson, 2006,
2008), identified four categories of managers based upon their styles as delineated by a
combination of preference for delegation and their preference for uncertainty avoidance (Figure
7).
Figure 7: Executive Style Classification
High Uncertainty Avoidance
Low Delegation
Preference

Manager

Producer

Maestro

Executive

High Delegation
Preference

Low Uncertainty Avoidance

Survey sample
Participants were selected through probabilistic random sampling of both civilian and
military hospital supply chain managers. This sample was justified as the research sought to
understand the relationship between supply chain decision-makers and their approach to risk
management. Random sample responses allow for adequate confidence that the general
population is represented in the results (Singleton and Straits, 2004; Van de Ven, 2007). Kotzab
(2005), in a review of supply chain management survey research, found a large number of
researchers utilized non-probabilistic samples and noted the “disadvantage of such samples is
that the findings from the collected data cannot be considered to be statistically representative for
the total population” (p. 134). This research provides more generalizable results in the healthcare
supply chain discipline than were available previously. The initial sample was generated from a
membership list of a professional organization that specializes in healthcare supply chain
management. Flynn et al., (1990) suggests limiting survey research “to a group which is
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homogeneous with respect to at least one characteristic, such as industry” (p. 257). As
leadership, delegation and decision-making are considered important traits for respondents, a
search of the organization’s membership list for those who were designated as Vice President,
Director or Manager of supply chains was conducted. Additionally the survey was distributed to
US military officers who were active in the medical logistics career field and had recent hospital
supply chain experience, which was the closest US military equivalent to the civilian role.

Error handling
Coverage, sampling and nonresponse errors are aspects that must be addressed in survey
research. “Coverage error occurs when not all members of the population have a known, nonzero
chance of being included in the sample” (Dillman et al., 2009, p. 17). This is a recognized
weakness, as not all US based healthcare supply chain managers in a leadership role are
members of the professional association from which respondent names were selected.
Identification of the appropriate contact at the over 5,700 registered US hospitals (AHA, 2014)
was beyond the cost and time considerations available for this study and the membership role of
the professional association was referenced due to the organization’s mission and vision.
The association’s stated mission is “to advance healthcare through supply chain
excellence by providing education, leadership, and advocacy to professionals in healthcare and
related organizations that are accountable to the community and committed to health
improvement” (AHRMM, 2014) and their vision statement is “Advancing healthcare through
supply chain excellence” (AHRMM, 2014). As such, members in healthcare leadership positions
were deemed adequate as a respondent pool.
Sampling error occurs as a result of not every member in the population being sampled
(Dillman et al., 2009) and is recognized as a part of all surveys. Increased completed samples
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mitigates this effect and guidance provided by Dillman et al., (2009) to increase response rates
was followed.
Nonresponse error “results when people selected for a survey who do not respond are
different in a way that is important to the study from those who did respond” (Dillman et al.,
2009, p. 19). This will be addressed through the use of carefully worded explanatory follow-up
reminders as nonresponse is recognized as “far outweighing random sampling error in
contributing to total survey error” (Assael and Keon, 1982, p. 121).

Procedure
The survey instrument was developed using the supply chain risk maturity framework
items of Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and the Executive Style framework of Håkonsson et al.,
(2012) and will generally follow the procedures outlined by Gligor and Holcomb (2012). A first
draft of the questionnaire was reviewed by several academic experts in supply chain
management and was pilot tested with practitioners in the healthcare supply chain management
field. The unit of analysis and informant in this research was the individual manager. Because
managers are key decision makers in the supply chain who have a responsibility to the firm to
support firm strategy (March and Shapira, 1987) and have also been under-researched in the
supply chain field (Christopher, 2012; Manuj, 2013) the key informants were managers in a
supply chain role. The healthcare industry was selected to reduce cross-industry bias (Flynn et
al., 1990).
The respondents received an e-mail at the e-mail address provided as part of their
membership information. The email contained a brief description of the study, a note that the
lead researcher is also a member of the association and a request for assistance (Dillman et al.,
2009). A copy of the initial e-mail and second wave e-mail request can be found in Appendices B
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and C. Instructions assured respondents that their responses will remain anonymous and an
opportunity to receive a tabulated copy of the findings was offered in exchange for their e-mail
address. No further incentives were offered (Dillman et al., 2009).

Pretest
The questionnaire was pretested for content, predictive, construct and face validity.
Experienced supply chain managers and academic subject matter experts reviewed the
questionnaire and recommended adjustments were evaluated and incorporated.

Instrument
The questionnaire consisted of a brief introduction, directions and demographic data
collection. The remainder of the questionnaire administered the scale items. Individual portions
of the questionnaire are discussed below and the complete protocol will be found in Appendix A.
The study was assigned research number H14139 by the Institutional Review Board.
The overview portion introduced respondents to the general purpose and scope of the
research. Respondents were reminded that participation is entirely voluntary, may be ended by
the participant at any time without penalty and there was no compensation sought or offered for
completion of the survey beyond summary results in exchange for an e-mail address. A total of
twenty-one items were used to measure Executive Style and fourteen items were used to measure
supply chain risk maturity. A brief section of demographics was also included.
Slight modifications to the items from Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) were made for
readability and to maintain the original intent. Items from Håkonsson et al., (2012) were not
modified. A five point Likert scale was used for the majority of questions, in keeping with the
original form of the questionnaires. The scales were reexamined to ensure continued reliability.
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The survey was delivered electronically through Qualtrics (Qualtrics, 2014), a web-based survey
administration firm.

Scale Purification
Following the procedure for a survey scale purification of Mentzer et al., (1999), a
random sample of responses were subject to Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to determine
continued inclusion and possible exclusion of scale items. The remaining items were then
assessed for both validity and reliability. SPSS was used to perform the analysis and verify the
scales. Basic descriptive statistics were analyzed for normality, skewness, kurtosis, means,
standard deviations and outliers. Items identified as discrepancies were considered for removal
and validity was established (Cresswell, 2007). Modification indices were not utilized to
minimize the impact of removal of one item on the overall scales (Hair et al., 2010).

Common method bias
Common method bias occurs when scores are either inflated or decreased due to factors
involving the measurement method or use of the same respondent to reply to all questionnaire
items (Conway and Lance, 2010). Podsakoff et al., (2003) provides a comprehensive review of
the topic and methods to address potential common method bias issues as they are reported to be
“one of the main sources of measurement error” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 879). The goal is to
minimize any effect that measurement of one construct of interest has upon another construct of
interest.
Several steps were taken to address the possible effects of common method bias in this
research following Dillman et al., (2009). To minimize the effect of respondents’ pre-judgment of
a topic and what the researcher was ultimately addressing, i.e. an item priming effect,
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introductory headings were minimized to the most basic of instructions. Item ambiguity, the
situation where respondents respond to items using their own heuristic or entirely at random, was
addressed by ensuring items are clearly worded and represented distinct, discrete concepts.
Measurement context effects include those pertaining to time, location and medium. As the use
of separate survey instruments may have led to reduced overall response rate as a factor of
survey fatigue (Dillman et al., 2009), all constructs were included on the same instrument to be
completed concurrently, however survey items were separated by appearing on differing pages of
the survey instrument. Location refers to where the survey is administered and was beyond the
scope of influence of the researcher as the survey could be taken online at any location.
Online delivery of the survey instrument has been shown to decrease social desirability
effects (Richman et al., 1999) and increases accuracy when compared with face-to-face interview
data collection techniques. To avoid effects from context induced mood, the questions pertaining
to supply chain risk management maturity level were randomized to avoid building from least
mature to most mature (Podsakoff et al., 2003). These are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Common method bias sources of control
Method of Bias

Control Technique

Item priming effects Minimize explanatory headings of questions
Item ambiguity Review questionnaire wording to minimize
inclusion of respondent’s own heuristic
Measurement context effects Spatial separation of questions within the
survey to reduce cueing from retrieval effects
Social desirability and accuracy Use of survey vs. face-to-face data collection
Context induced mood Randomize questions of supply chain risk
maturity level determination
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Data analysis – cluster analysis
Cluster analysis was employed to group supply chain maturity levels. Classification of
maturity levels was accomplished through generation of groups of respondents based upon
survey responses. This technique recognizes that aspects of multiple maturity levels may be
present in a firm, while placing a respondent within the most homogenous grouping when
compared with other respondents (Aldendorfer and Blashfield, 1984, Hair et al., 2010). This
technique groups responses based upon similarity and serves as a method to represent
respondents in this study as Simchi-Levi, et al., (2013) put forth maturity levels in their study of
supply chain risk management.
This research classified a maturity level as a measure of prevailing presence of activities
within a level. Cluster Analysis has been used previously to classify supply chain relationships
(Humphries et al., 2007), introduce a taxonomy of supply chain management practices (Paulraj et
al., 2013), introduce maturity level classification for e-commerce applications (Senarathna et al.,
2013, Daniel et al., 2002) and for business process maturity (van Looy et al., 2013) and “places
the most similar observations into groups” (Hair et al., 2020, p. 510). Cluster analysis further
seeks to maximize homogeneity within clusters and maximize heterogeneity between clusters
while allowing for objects to appear in multiple groups.
This classification allowed identification of the structure of a maturity level based upon
responses to survey questions which formed clusters that were further analyzed for dependence
relationships. The resulting clusters were non-metric, ordinal measures of maturity levels based
upon the observed structure within the groups using SPSS software results.
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Field, (2009) and Mooi and Sarstedt, (2011) suggest multinomial logistic regression as an
appropriate technique for examining the relationship between one or more non-metric dependent
variables and two or more non-metric independent variables.

Data analysis – multinomial logistic regression
One goal of this research is to understand the effect of Executive Style on Risk
Management maturity levels. While the effect of a single variable may be examined through the
exclusive use of cross-tabulation, any interaction effects from multiple independent variables
would remain unknown. A common method used to explore similar relationships is multiple
regression, however, the current model includes variables that are non-metric, may not be
normally distributed and seeks to determine a relationship between a single dependent variable
and multiple independent variables. Discriminant analysis was eliminated due to the need for the
independent variables to be metric (Hair et al., 2010)
Multinomial logistic regression combines multiple regression and multiple discriminant
analysis (Hair et al., 2010), when prediction of membership is desired with more than two
categorical outcomes (Field, 2009), can accommodate single and multiple metric and non-metric
independent variables and the dependent variables are non-metric.
The objective was to use the Executive Style classification to predict group membership
in a Maturity Level cluster. Literature support for grouping maturity levels of supply chain risk
management maturity levels has been previously identified by Simchi-Levi, et al., (2013),
IACCM, (2003), Hillson, (1997), Lockamy and McCormack, (2004), and De Oliveira et al.,
(2011). These studies have classified maturity levels as occurring variously on four or five levels,
yet all exhibit general descriptive agreement as to the capabilities present in a given maturity
level.
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The dependent variables were be the risk management maturity clusters. The independent
variables were the four Executive Styles. Descriptive statistics were analyzed and are reported
below.
The process of data inspection began with a check for missing data and followed the
guidelines of Hair et al., (2007) regarding the potential impact and application of any remedies.
Means and standard deviations were examined, skewness, kurtosis, scatterplots and normal
probability plots were also examined to determine normality of the data. Normal distribution of
the variables used to form Executive Style construct is a key criteria for data to insure further
statistical testing is valid (Hair et al., 2007). Corrective measures are possible and are discussed
in Chapter 4, if applied. Skewness is a measure of the balance of data distribution to the left or
the right from being centered and having the same shape. Kurtosis is an indication of the amount
of peak or flatness in the distribution. Normal distributions are indicated by a value of zero (Hair
et al., 2007).
Visual examination of large data sets is accomplished through graphical representation of
the data. Common methods include generation and examination of a normal probability plot and
scatterplot to assess any departure from normal distribution. The scatterplot examination yields
insight into the homoschedasticity of the data. Homoschedastic data is preferable as dependent
relationships should be explained across all of the predictor variables and according to Hair et
al., (2007) these relationships are best examined through graphical means. The scatterplot
examination also provides a check on the linearity of the data distribution. Presence of a nonlinear relationship may indicate weakened strength of the relationship.
Once the data was been evaluated, multinomial logistic regression was conducted
following Field, (2009) and Mooi and Sarstedt, (2011) suggestions. The model was assessed
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using the log likelihood statistic which compares the predicted values of the outcome with the
observed values of the outcome and “is analogous to the residual sum of squares in multiple
regression in the sense that it is an indicator of how much unexplained information there is after
the model has been fitted” (Field, 2009, p. 267). The log-likelihood is a measure of unexplained
observations, therefore the larger the value, the less predictive value the model possesses.

Study 2 - Qualitative Research Overview
Testing the dynamic human behavior driven relationship between Executive Style and risk
management is an emergent research area, therefore a qualitative approach which uses semistructured interviews is appropriate (Gligor and Autry, 2012) to provide additional details that
may fall outside the scope of a survey. With scant preexisting empirical research in the area of
supply chain risk management (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) this approach allows researchers to
conduct studies “attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings
people bring to them” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 3). Trkman and McCormack (2009) suggest
further qualitative study of both risk mitigation and risk impact in the developing but “currently
disorganized” (Trkman and McCormack, 2009, p. 255) field of SCRM. Exercising this method
as part of a larger multiple method approach provides an opportunity for converging data
(Denzin, 1971; Jick, 1979; Bak, 2005) as a means of validation. This confirmation is key to
expanding and validating knowledge, as use of multiple methods “enhances our belief that the
results are valid and not a methodological artifact” (Bouchard, 1976, p. 268). This approach also
serves to address Hunt’s (2010) reminder that when seeking to understand theory the process
should do so “through a systematized structure capable of both explaining and predicting
phenomena” (p. 194) as both induction and deduction are important aspects of empirical

118
confirmation (Hunt, 2010). However there has been a lack of mixed empirical confirmation in
the SCM field.

Qualitative research and interview methodology
The supply chain management field has been dominated by deductive research (Ellram
and Cooper, 2013) and as Creswell (2003) notes, research decisions should develop from the
nature of the problem and fit appropriately. To provide greater validity to the quantitative results,
and address some concerns of the three-horned dilemma (McGrath, 1982), an exploratory
qualitative approach will be employed as part of this dissertation. The three horned dilemma
addresses the challenge of research having the ‘horns’ of generalizability, precision and realism,
yet methods which are strong in support of one ‘horn’ are weak in the support of the others.
Multiple methods in a research project or stream address more than one horn. The interview
process, as a qualitative approach, allows participants to provide historical information, personal
responses and allows the researcher to tailor the questions to a specific scope of interest
(Creswell, 2003) to explore nuances that quantitative methods cannot capture. The use of
qualitative, grounded research can “bring to light deeper or different perspectives and behaviors
of participants than those discovered previously” (Mello and Flint, 2009) and helps understand
antecedents, processes and outcomes (Randall et al., 2010).
A grounded approach, described as research “grounded in data from participants who
have experienced the process” (Creswell, 2013, p. 83) and using qualitative analysis for
“examining and interpreting data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop
empirical knowledge” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.1), develops an explanation of an interaction
or action as described by actual participants through “rich, full, earthy” data (Miles, 1979).
Further it provides “a basis for corroboration and greater explanatory power” (Ritchie and
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Brindley, 2007, p. 1406) and allows for the continued conceptualization/definition of integrated
approaches in research (Tashakkori and Creswell, 2008).
Qualitative interview methodology was determined to be an appropriate approach to the
research questions as no research has been identified that explores the complexity underlying
Executive Style and supply chain risk management maturity. Although scales exist for
measurement of these two concepts separately, other influences may have an effect and may
emerge through the interview process. Incorporating a systematic interview and analysis process,
grounded in the actual experiences of practitioners, was designed to obtain insights that may not
be currently known (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). In this manner, the current research sought to
combine methods to provide intellectual vitality (Golicic and Davis, 2011) and generate multiple
perspectives of the topic. Combinations of qualitative and quantitative research are rare in supply
chain management (Golicic and Davis, 2011) and the presence of both in a research stream may
support more full understanding of supply chain complexities and contingencies that occur
between cases in different firms.
Although Contingency Theory will be the formal theoretical lens to understand the
relationship between Executive Style and risk management in the quantitative portion of this
research, a qualitative research approach was selected within grounded theory guidelines and
utilized a substantive understanding of literature (Flint et al, 2005). A substantive understanding
of literature acknowledges that although researchers enter any endeavor with preconceptions
based on prior research and knowledge, this research is conducted with an awareness and a
sensitivity to reduce researcher preconceptions and bias based upon prior theoretical exposure.
The goal is to allow the voice of the respondent to emerge (Creswell, 2007; Mello, 2006). Use of
a pre-developed interview protocol, for instance, allows the researcher to focus on discovery
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leading to verification of a phenomena (Randall and Mello, 2011) as topics to be addressed are
delimited, yet provide flexibility for exploration. To address some of these concerns, three
specific steps were used to support theoretical sensitivity, ensure rigor and control bias (Flint,
1998; Mello, 2006).
The first step was to reflect on the larger scope of inquiry. Using self-reflective questions
such as “What is really going on here?” and “Does my interpretation fit the reality of the
phenomenon as indicated by the data?” (Mello, 2006) allowed the researcher to remain focused
on the data and avoid returning to biases that may have derived from a focus on preexisting
theory. The next step was to ensure a strong skepticism to any explanations that seem to support
a theoretical perspective, to include creation of categories during analysis or adjusting questions,
until a thorough verification, grounded in the data, was conducted (Mello, 2006). The final step
was to ensure adherence to grounded methodology techniques that support rigor and theoretical
sensitivity (Mello, 2006).

Interview protocol overview
Interviews are considered a valuable tool to collect information from research subjects
(Kvale, 1996; Witzel, 2000; Creswell, 2013) as they allow the researcher to collect rich, nuanced
data unavailable through other techniques. They also allow the researcher to branch into relevant
topics as they emerge and follow-up new topics of interest. Following a literature review,
questions were developed that supported exploration of key topics also under consideration in
the quantitative portion of the research, such as supply chain risk management maturity (SimchiLevi et al., 2013) and Executive Style (Håkonsson et al., 2012). The interview protocol was
reviewed by academic experts in the field of supply chain management and a pre-test was
conducted with several practitioners to refine the questions. As with the quantitative portion of
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the study, respondents were be geographically dispersed. Interviews with the sample respondents
near the researcher were conducted in person while those at a distance were interviewed via
telephone, following prior coordination (Creswell, 2013). A copy of the final protocol can be
found in Appendix A.

Sampling
The participants chosen were supply chain managers in a US based healthcare supply chain
with multiple suppliers. These healthcare supply chains are either civilian or Department of
Defense entities. Initial contacts were generated from a convenience sample of the author as well
as contacts provided by those with knowledge of the healthcare industry, with additional
informants selected based on purposive sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Eisenhardt, 1989).
Purposive sampling builds upon conceptual relationships formed during initial interviews which
allows the researcher to identify new respondents to understand conceptual gaps that have been
identified (Charmaz, 2000; Macdonald and Corsi, 2013) and are not available from former
respondents.
Sampling continued until saturation was been achieved, which is a point described as “when
no new categories or relevant themes are emerging” (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.148).
Ultimately, a greater understanding of the relationship between executives and supply chain risk
management maturity is the goal underlying data collection and analysis.

Data Collection Procedures
Mello and Flint (2009) encourage the expanded use of the interview as part of a
qualitative approach and echo McCracken (1988) who encouraged depth interviews to prompt a
deeper understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. The semi-structured style of
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interview is designed to understand a process that presents a problem for those involved
(Creswell, 2013) and utilizes an instrument that is fluid and refined during the data collection
process based upon ongoing input and analysis (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).
Key to development of this understanding of interview usage is use of the researcher as a
key instrument in the data collection process (Onwuegbuzie and Leech, 2004; Creswell, 2013) in
contrast with a survey instrument or experiment. To best prepare for the collection of data and
ensure methodological rigor, a systematic process was followed. As previously discussed, a
literature review was conducted of the relevant key topics under examination and a gap was
identified (Suddaby, 2006) in understanding the impact of Executive Style on supply chain risk
management maturity. From this groundwork, a semi-structured interview protocol was
developed to guide both the researcher and subject regarding the scope of the questions and to
remain focused on the core issues (Creswell, 2007). This step is important as it avoided an
unstructured approach to the material and allowed easier cross case analysis across similar topics
of interest. After receiving consent from the subject, interviews were audio recorded and then
transcribed by the researcher.
Prior to the interview, the subject was asked to complete a supply chain risk map
indicating their top four to six supply chain disruption risks. Discussions framed by the
interviewer began with questioning about risks identified in the lower right quadrant of the map,
which encompasses risks that occur with medium to very-low probability and have an impact
characterized as medium to catastrophic (see Figure 8). These were followed by discussions of
risk that indicated in the upper left quadrant of the map to provide contrast. This technique was
utilized to allow the specific item of concern to the particular supply chain to emerge from within
the quadrant. Forcing a particular event for discussion, such as a hurricane, may have led to
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discussions where subjects placed the risk in another quadrant, if those risks were judged
differently at that facility. Placing the discussion in a certain quadrant aids in quadrant cross case
comparison of underlying attributes when the specific concerns differ. However, the particular
event is of less concern than how each facility addressed a similarly scoped concern, and it is
acknowledged that these events may be unique between facilities and contingent on unique firm
strategies and attributes. However, development of similar and contrasting themes and categories
through analysis were believed to lend insight into similarities and differences between managers
and firms.

Figure 8: Sample completed supply chain risk map

Coding and memoing
The use of codes allows the researcher the opportunity to group emergent data based on
categorical and thematic concepts as the data reveals them and rejects use of pre-determined or
theoretically derived concepts, categories or themes (Mello, 2006). Key functions of grounded
theory are addressed by coding, as outlined by Strauss (1978, pp. 55-56) who states coding:
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1) Both follows upon and leads to generative questions;
2) Fractures [breaks into distinct meaning units] the data, thus freeing the researcher from
description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction;
3) Is the pivotal operation for moving toward the discovery of a core category or categories;
and so
4) Moves toward ultimate integration of the analysis; as well as
5) Yields the desired conceptual density (i.e., relationships among the codes and the
development of each).
The researcher began by transcribing the interview and conducted a line-by-line analysis,
noting initial similarities and differences and developing initial groupings of words, phrases,
thoughts, sentences and paragraphs (Glaser, 2001). As transcription review continued, the
researcher added to extant categories and added new categories as necessary, regardless of any
preconceptions based on a priori knowledge (Charmaz, 1998).
As categories emerge from codes, they should be reflective of boundaries between concepts
as well as identifying an integrated set of concepts (Glaser, 1978). The following criteria should
be present to elevate a category to the level of a core category, one that becomes a guide for
directing future data collection efforts include (Goulding, 2002, p. 89):
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

It must be central and account for a large portion of behavior.
It must be based on reoccurrence in the data.
A core category takes longer to saturate than other categories/concepts.
It must relate meaningfully to other categories.
It should have clear implications for the development of formal theory.
The theoretical analysis should be based on the core category.
It should be highly variable and modifiable.

The use of memoing allows researchers the opportunity to organize their thoughts regarding
ongoing analysis (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Memos reflect and explicate the researchers
thought process regarding coding, categorization and linkages between them in order to maintain
an accounting of how ideas change over time as well as allowing for informal reflection on idea
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development (Glaser, 1978). To allow for efficient and effective use of memos Glaser (1978)
recommends:
1) Memos should have a title related to the category or property to which it is initially
related,
2) Any other category or property mentioned in the memo is to be highlighted,
3) If two categories or their properties are identified in the memo, their relationship should
be discussed or highlighted,
4) Memos should be kept separate from data (e.g., not written in the margins of field notes),
and
5) The analyst should be prepared to sort memos however the theory emerges, and not on a
predetermined set of ideas. (in Mello, 2006).
These guidelines were employed by the researcher and served as a groundwork for the next
higher order of grouping and analysis as themes developed across and within cases.

Theoretical sorting
Once coding has sufficiently developed, theoretical sorting begins to organize the data
into a coherent framework as a preparatory phase to writing (Glaser, 1992). Sorting allows for
further refinement of connections between categories and data properties and allows researchers
to conceptualize more broadly. This conceptualization may aid in theory development as
concepts and themes build in complexity and depth (Glaser, 1978). Building on Glaser (1978)
and following the example of Mello (2006) the subsequent sorting and writing rules that were
observed include:
1) Starting to sort: The analyst can start sorting anywhere in the memo bank.
2) Core variable: Begin sorting all other categories and their properties only as they relate to
the core category. This rule forces focus, selectivity, and delimiting of the analysis.
3) Promotion-demotion of core variables: When the analyst is faced with two equally
qualified variables, one must promote one variable to the core, and demote all other
variables. Only those properties of the demoted variable that relate to the core variable
are used in the analysis.
4) Memoing: Once sorting on the core variable begins, new ideas are likely to be generated,
especially on theoretical codes for integrating the theory. It is necessary to stop sorting at
these points and write memos.
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5) Integrative fit: All ideas must fit somewhere in the outline, or the integration must be
changed or modified. The basic rule is unwavering.
6) Sorting levels: The analyst first sorts for chapters, then sections of each chapter, and then
within sections.
7) Cutting off rules: The firm rule to follow is only to stop when theoretical completeness is
achieved. This means that the theory explains variation of behavior in the phenomenon
with the fewest possible concepts, and with the greatest possible scope.

This technique was designed to provide a parsimonious theoretical development that captured as
much of the relevant behavior as possible. Of note is Glaser’s (1978) observation that additional
rules may be developed as necessary, based on requirements of a specific research topic and with
the goal of ensuring the trustworthiness of the results is solid.

Trustworthiness
A broad criticism noted by Glaser and Strauss (1967) is that early qualitative research
lacked credibility, which then led to their seminal work on grounded theory guidelines. These
guidelines addressed this credibility criticism through establishment of criteria that address their
multiple concerns. As grounded theory has matured, other guidelines have been developed as
part of a rigorous assessment of qualitative research. Flint et al., (2002), drawing on the work of
Hirschman (1986) and Wallendorf and Belk (1989), note that several critical criteria must be
addressed during data interpretation (see Table 8).
Table 8: Trustworthiness considerations in grounded theory (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106)
Credibility

The extent to which the results appear to be acceptable representations of the
data.

Transferability

The extent to which findings from one study in one context will apply to
other contexts.

Dependability

The extent to which the findings are unique to time and place; the stability or
consistency of explanations.
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Confirmability

The extent to which interpretations are the result of the participants and the
phenomenon as opposed to researcher biases.

Integrity

The extent to which interpretations are influenced by misinformation or
evasions of participants.

This research addressed these areas through multiple means. Credibility is addressed by
providing complete information about the respondents and having multiple academic experts
review the analysis results. Also, respondents were provided initial results and feedback was
requested to confirm findings are in line with their views (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al.,
2002). Transferability was addressed through the use of purposive sampling and periodic checks
with practitioners as to the possibility that ongoing results and conclusions from other
respondents were reasonable (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Dependability was
determined as specific events were discussed and compared with the responses from other
respondents (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Confirmability was addressed through
maintenance of documents and availability of interpretative notes and discussions. Integrity was
addressed through conducting a professional interview that was consistent with the protocol,
assuring interviewee anonymity to encourage truthful and non-evasive answers and providing a
non-threatening or intimidating atmosphere (Flint and Mentzer, 2000; Flint et al., 2002). Once
the assurances outlined above were met that the data meets the trustworthiness goal, assessment
of the data began.

Assessment

128
Early qualitative research was subject to much criticism as being unstructured and
therefore lacking validity. Glaser and Strauss (1967) developed a systematic process to analyze
qualitative data that was designed to answer these criticisms. Further, Glaser (1992) specified
that the criteria of fit, relevance, work, ease of modification as well as parsimony and scope of
explanatory power were valid criteria for evaluating grounded theory.
Fit “refers to the relationship of the core category to the salient social problem and its
ability to account for most of the variation in behavior used to address the problem” (Hall and
Callery, 2001, p. 259) as well as the “extent to which findings fit the substantive area under
investigation” (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106). If the categories develop from the data they should
easily fit empirical situations and be considered appropriate. This concept was assessed through
provision of data summaries to respondents and assessment of their comments related to
accuracy as it relates to their experiences. This step allowed for further refinement of data
interpretation and improved accuracy.
Relevance is achieved when practitioners feel conclusions are focused on core issues they
face in their work environment. Again, respondents were provided a summary of research
findings from the initial draft and their input was used to assess the relevance from a practitioner
point of view. As theory develops from findings it should remain focused on the core issues that
emerge from the data (Hall and Callery, 2001). Academic experts were asked to provide their
input regarding relevance of the initial results to the academic supply chain field (Mello, 2006).
Work implies that developing theories should effectively “provide predictions,
explanations and interpretations of what was going on in the area under study” (Hall and Calery,
2001, p. 191). This implies that the researcher should carefully and accurately record facts. Once
again, respondents reviewed summaries of the findings and were asked if they recognized the
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activities, strategies and processes of others in the industry (Glaser, 1978). While not explicitly
describing the theory, this step allows the researcher to ensure facts are faithfully reported.
Modification addresses the adjustment to findings as they are constantly compared with
new data (Glaser, 2002) in the substantive area of study. To provide clear explanation of
modifications, an audit of modifications was established to clearly show how and why changes
were made. (Mello, 2006).
Parsimony and scope are considered “two major requirements of theory” (Glaser and
Strauss, 1967, pp. 110-111). Parsimony addresses the requirement that as few salient categories
as possible are retained to explain relationships and findings. Scope strives to have any emerging
concepts and findings be as widely applicable as possible to “discover multiple aspects of the
phenomenon” (Flint et al., 2002, p. 106). A concept with a broad enough scope will allow for
change and variation while continuing to remain relevant and practical. Extended, semistructured interviews were used to discover facets and nuances that were present yet previously
unknown (Flint et al., 2002). This lead to examination of both the quantitative and qualitative
results simultaneously to understand the supportive and integrative nature of findings from each
study.
Multiple method integration
The complementarity design of concurrent research addresses differing aspects of the
same phenomenon related to the research question (Golicic and Davis, 2012). The concurrent
data collection and analysis precludes one study informing another study, i.e. quantitative data
results influencing formation of the subsequent qualitative portion (e.g. Pagel and Krause, 1999).
Data are then analyzed, interpreted and reported as a single report. The benefit of this approach
was noted by Fawcett and Magnan, (2002) who found that “the insight gained by combining the
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surveys with the interviews yielded a rich and robust view of modern supply chain” (Fawcett and
Magnan, 2002, p. 343) practice. Integrated results, including comparisons, contrasted findings,
findings which build upon another or are embedded will be discussed as appropriate (Creswell
and Tashakkori, 2007), following the guidance of Caracelli and Greene (1993). The use of data
transformation will be used for integrated analysis. Data transformation involves the
transformation of quantitative data “into narrative and [is] included with qualitative data in
thematic or pattern analysis” (Caracelli and Greene, 1993, p. 197). Barriers to multiple method
integration are presented in Table 9 with proposed mitigation techniques.
Table 9: Barriers to integration of quantitative and qualitative findings (adapted from
Bryman, 2007)
Barrier

Mitigation Technique

Different audiences

Ensure balanced analysis and write up of findings do not
emphasize one technique over another

Methodological
preferences

Ensure each technique receives equal focus; obtain additional
training in new techniques

Structure of the research
project

Develop the methods concurrently to ensure a mutual supporting
role of methods and interlinking of findings is supported

Skill specialisms

Obtain additional training in techniques as required; future work
may integrate a team with varying strengths

Nature of the data

Avoid focusing on ‘more interesting’ results from the data at the
expense of the entire integrated findings

Publication issues

Avoid emphasis on reaching certain conclusions or focusing on a
certain method based on ‘publishability’ in a certain journal based
on perceived journal bias

The first potential barrier is to conduct research and develop findings based upon possible
readership that has a preference and bias for a particular methodology (Bryman, 2007). The
researcher addressed this concern by ensuring careful weighting was provided for each method
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and associated findings. Methodological preferences as a barrier may occur when a researcher
places more faith in one type of method than others and experiences difficulties in finding
meaningful combinations (Bryman, 2007). This was addressed through research design as each
protocol was designed to be mutually supportive and provide greater rigor to the findings
through triangulation. Structure of the project (Bryman, 2007) was addressed through careful and
thoughtful consideration of how each method was individually appropriate to the research
question as well as adjusting the particular methods to support both verification through the
quantitative study and emergence of new concepts through the second study.
The concept of skill specialisms addresses the particular strengths and weaknesses that
particular researchers bring to a project (Bryman, 2007). The lead researcher has developed
rigorous techniques for each method through solid basing in literature and relevant texts that
allow the full capabilities of each method to strengthen the overall interlinked research approach.
A danger lies in one method producing results that are of greater interest to a researcher
(Bryman, 2007). The research must be careful to not pursue a particularly appealing finding at
the detriment of other findings. This may also lead to missed interactions and thoughtful
reflection of more nuanced and relevant findings (Glaser, 1978). Finally publication issues is
concerned with the research taking on aspects that favor publication in a journal of interest
(Bryman, 2007) rather than allowing the finding to lead to their natural conclusions. Researchers
can address this through a varied team or through feedback from a committee which is the
approach this research will pursue.

Summary
This chapter discussed the methodological choices for this research and provided
explanation for their appropriateness to address the research question. Further the chapter
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highlighted strengths of survey and interview based research, combined in a single research
project. Understanding the strengths and barriers and means to address methodological gaps may
spur further multiple method studies in supply chain management.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

This chapter will discuss the results and findings from both the quantitative and
qualitative portions of the research. They will be discussed separately for clarity. Study 1, the
quantitative portion, will be discussed in terms of sample rationale, sample size, data purification
and data analysis and summary of findings. Study 2, the qualitative portion, will be discussed in
terms of sample rationale, data collection and interview processes, trustworthiness, data analysis
and assessment of results.
Study 1 Quantitative Research Findings
Sample
Participants were healthcare supply chain managers in the United States who were drawn
from two groups. They were members of the Association of Healthcare Resource and Material
Managers (AHRMM) and members of the US military who served in hospital supply chain
positions. The AHRMM members were selected from the AHRMM membership list and were
screened for two qualities. The first is that they were employed by a hospital, versus members
who were employed by a healthcare material supplier or distributor. The next is that they held
senior leadership positions as determined by their title. The membership description screening
terms were ‘senior,’ ‘vice president,’ and ‘manager’. 777 e-mails were sent to civilian
respondents. 50 e-mails were returned as undeliverable. 224 respondents attempted (began) the
survey. 371 e-mails were sent to military respondents in the US Army and US Navy. The US Air
Force declined to participate. Seven were returned as undeliverable. 57 automated responses
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indicated the respondent had left their position or were out of the office. 109 respondents
attempted (began) the survey.

Data Cleaning and Transforming
Data cleansing consisted of several steps. The first was an examination of missing data.
As missing data values can affect the calculation of multiple types of statistical analysis, steps
were taken to reduce this impact while retaining an adequate sample size for analysis. One
variable “preference for minimizing business risk” was standardized from a three-point to a fivepoint Likert score to match all other survey items following Hakonsson et al., (2012).
A visual inspection of the data identified several respondents with multiple non-response
fields. These were deemed too numerous to retain and these respondents were deleted. This
resulted in retention of 187 responses with a limited number of missing data values which
produced an overall response rate of 18.8%. Missing data was analyzed using the SPSS (2014)
missing values function to discern any patterns of missing data. Minimum missing percentage for
analysis was set to 0.01% to ensure all variables were examined for missing patterns. 30 different
variables were included in the analysis. Seven variables contained complete sets of responses.
Overall, of the 5,850 individual responses, 71 responses were missing, less than 1.2% and is
acceptable for imputation (Figure 9) (Hair et al., 2010).
Variables that are missing must be examined for a pattern that may impact the selection
of a remedy (Hair et al., 2010). A visual inspection of missing value patterns indicated
monotonicity of the data was not present, data was not missing at random and bias from a series
of non-responses was not present (Figure 10). As there were no islands of non-missing data in
the lower right portion of the grid and no islands of non-missing data in the upper left portion of
the grid the data was assessed to be non-monotone (SPSS, 2014). Non-monotonic patterns
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indicate that once a variable is missing, it will reappear in a subsequent measure and the
underlying reason for the absence may be considered random. This condition limits the
imputation choices available for remedy (Hair et al., 2010).
Figure 9: Summary of Missing Data Values for Retained Responses
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Figure 10: Missing Value Patterns

Univariate descriptive statistics were examined to understand at the variable level the
non-missing values (Table 10). No key survey variable had missing values > 5.3% indicating
there was no serious issues with missing values (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Examination of
cross-tabulations of demographics indicated no issues pertaining to membership in a particular
demographic group having a substantial pattern of missing data with the exception of the
question regarding disruption experience which had only a 65.2% response rate (Appendix H).
Demographic questions pertaining to Years of Supply Chain Experience, Years of Healthcare
Supply Chain Experience and Facility Bed Size all registered a 94.7% response rate.
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Table 10: Missing Value Univariate Statistics
Univariate Statistics
No. of Extremesa,b

Missing
N

Mean Std. Deviation Count Percent

Low

High

DelegUncert

177

2.21

.811

10

5.3

.

.

SolHumanProb

187

4.32

.706

0

.0

1

0

StimulCoopDivisions

187

4.33

.644

0

.0

0

0

FormIdeasVisions

185

4.32

.670

2

1.1

1

0

Daytodayguidance

187

3.18

.871

0

.0

0

0

DevNewRoutMethods

186

3.82

.732

1

.5

0

0

GovEconDecisions

186

4.17

.827

1

.5

9

0

CertaintRulesFollowed

187

3.91

.785

0

.0

0

0

DecisionBasedDetailInfo

187

4.08

.604

0

.0

.

.

WaitSeebeforeaction

187

3.03

.643

0

.0

.

.

MinimizeBizRiskStandardised

187

3.58

.977

0

.0

0

0

MgmntControlsLeadEmpFolRules

184

3.87

.966

3

1.6

0

0

MgmntControlsNonLeadEmpFolRules

186

3.87

.944

1

.5

0

0

MgmntControlsLeadEmpRchExpect

183

3.98

.994

4

2.1

0

0

MgmntControlsNonLeadEmpRchExpect

184

3.88

.956

3

1.6

0

0

MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivationLeadEmp

186

4.11

.812

1

.5

10

0

MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivationNonLeadEmp 185

3.89

.917

2

1.1

.

.

UseAdHomRMProcess

183

3.14

.890

4

2.1

7

0

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

185

2.77

.968

2

1.1

0

0

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt

186

2.56

.881

1

.5

0

3

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

184

3.28

.858

3

1.6

3

0

RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan

185

3.17

.908

2

1.1

8

0

BasicRskGovisUsed

186

3.46

.806

1

.5

5

0

NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns

183

2.60

.938

4

2.1

0

3

UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp

185

3.03

.932

2

1.1

0

0

HaveBCPlans

183

3.80

.822

4

2.1

.

.

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

185

3.14

1.001

2

1.1

0

0

EmployQuantRM

185

3.21

.887

2

1.1

6

0

InvestinFlexibility

184

3.30

.949

3

1.6

6

0

MovePresfromWeakPartners

183

3.26

.817

4

2.1

4

0

RiskStrategyisSegmented

185

3.25

.816

2

1.1

8

0

YrsSCExp

177

10

5.3

YrsHCSCExp

177

10

5.3

CurrentPosition

177

10

5.3

DisruptionExperience

122

65

34.8
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FacilityBedSize

177

10

5.3

BranchofService

58

129

69.0

a. Number of cases outside the range (Q1 - 1.5*IQR, Q3 + 1.5*IQR).
b. . indicates that the inter-quartile range (IQR) is zero.

Multiple Imputation of Missing Values
Imputation of data is a remedy that uses inputs derived from surrounding variables within
similar cases. A tradeoff occurs when imputed data is derived from similar cases, as qualities of
the case may be reinforced with the addition of a derived variable. However, this technique also
prevents possible listwise deletion of cases in subsequent analyses which may reduce the sample
size below acceptable levels (Hair et al., 2010). Maintenance of an adequate sample size was
determined to be of greater importance for this research. The SPSS module for Automatic
Imputation of Missing Values was utilized for the imputation. This procedure required a
selection of a random number generation method, which was set to Mersenne Twist method and
a random number seed start point was set at the SPSS default of 2,000,000 (SPSS, 2014). The
SPSS Automatic Imputation function scanned the data and selected the appropriate imputation
method based on the pattern of missing data (SPSS, 2014). Constraints were set to ensure each
variable being imputed and was subsequently used as a predictor. An Imputation Model,
Descriptive Statistics and Iteration History were generated. A new dataset was created following
10 imputations and the tenth data set became the data set used for subsequent analysis.
Multiple imputation is a process that examines patterns in the available data and
determines an estimate of what the missing value may be and produces a recommended
replacement. Whether or not to include missing data is examined in two manners. The first is to
determine the impact of the exclusion of the complete responses and the corollary, to understand
the impact of the use of imputed data to the overall analytical results. A criticism is that use of
imputed data tends to reinforce and increase the effect of cases already present in the data (Hair
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et al., 2010). Researchers must weigh this criticism against the possibility of discarding the entire
case and therefore construct survey instruments and procedures in a way that enough complete
responses are valid for analysis. As less than two per cent of values were missing, those values
were missing at random, were not tied to a particular demographic group and were not
monotonic, this was not considered a large concern in this study (McKnight et al., 2007).
Multiple imputation was conducted using SPSS with ten iterations. The tenth iteration
was used for further analysis. Delegation preference and uncertainty avoidance were calculated
following Burton et al., (2002). The variables were next tested for normality, as most statistical
methods assume a normal distribution homoscedasticity, which “ensures that the variance used
in explanation and predictions is distributed across the range of variables, thus allowing for a
“fair test” of the relationships across all values” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 74).
Variables were assessed for normality using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk
normality tests (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Normality plots for all variables are in Appendix D.
For all variables, the scores were significant (<.05), indicating an absence of normality in
distribution (Hair et al., 2010). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests begin with the null
hypothesis that the distribution is normal. Therefore, if the significance value is below 0.05 the
null hypothesis is rejected and non-normality is present indicating a remedy is required. The
sample size falls within the thresholds of between 30 and 1,000 suggested by Hair et al., (2010),
which indicates the usefulness of the tests Next, skewness z-test scores were examined to
determine if, at the 0.05 level of error, any values exceeded either 1.96 or -1.96 (Hair et al.,
2010). Values exceeding these thresholds indicate non-normal distribution for the characteristic
of skewness. Probability plots were examined as a verification of the normality tests and all
indicated varying degrees of non-normality. Based upon the non-normal distributions, skewness
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transformations were applied as recommended by Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011). All
transformed variables indicated improved z scores as a result of the transformation. The
transformed variables were used in subsequent analysis. Distribution characteristics, tests of
normality and remedies are shown in Table 11. Descriptive statistics for all survey variables are
in Appendix E and tests for normality of all variables are in Appendix F.
26 of 30 variables required a transformation remedy as they fell outside the critical z
score of ± 1.96, indicating a lack of normal distribution. The pre- and post-remedy information is
provided in Table 11. All remedies improved skewness and 15 of the variables moved within the
critical z value of ± 1.96 for normal distribution (Tabachnik and Fidell, 2006). Although the
remaining variables exceeded the ±1.96 threshold they were kept in the analysis based on their
presence in previous research.
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Table 11: Tests of Normality, Distribution Characteristics and Remedies
Shape Descriptors
Skewness

Normality Tests

Kurtosis

Variable

Statistic

z
value

Statistic

SolHumanProb

-0.640

-3.600

-0.415

StimulCoopDivisions

-0.434

-2.440

FormIdeasVisions

-0.589

Daytodayguidance

z
value

Kolmogorov-Smirnova

Shapiro-Wilk
Distribution
Description

Transformation

0.000

Slight negative skew,
positive kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

2.075

0.768

0.000

Slight negative skew

Reflect and
square root

1.038

0.000

0.782

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

1.557

0.241

0.000

0.865

0.000

Normal Distribution

-0.153

0.297

0.000

0.838

0.000

Negative kurtosis

0.291

0.823

0.249

0.000

0.806

0.000

-2.007

-0.328

-0.928

0.265

0.000

0.849

0.000

-0.042

-0.237

-0.293

-0.830

0.326

0.000

0.768

0.000

Normal Distribution

0.213

1.197

0.174

0.492

0.320

0.000

0.792

0.000

Positive kurtosis

0.491

2.764

-0.778

-2.199

0.415

0.000

0.645

0.000

Slight positive skew

Square root

-0.765

-4.304

0.353

0.999

0.254

0.000

0.862

0.000

-0.690

-3.883

0.218

0.616

0.255

0.000

0.863

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root

-0.838

-4.716

0.152

0.428

0.239

0.000

0.844

0.000

-0.690

-3.883

-0.010

-0.027

0.265

0.000

0.859

0.000

-1.178

-6.628

2.179

6.161

0.304

0.000

0.779

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root

-0.935

-5.259

0.820

2.320

0.308

0.000

0.828

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

Statistic

Sig.

Statistic

Sig

-1.175

0.286

0.000

0.779

-0.708

-2.001

0.274

0.000

-3.313

-0.200

-0.566

0.275

0.306

1.719

-0.599

-1.693

DevNewRoutMethods

-0.286

-1.607

-0.054

GovEconDecisions

-0.844

-4.750

CertaintRulesFollowed

-0.357

DecisionBasedDetailInfo
WaitSeebeforeaction
MinimizeBizRiskStandar
dised
MgmntControlsLeadEmp
FolRules
MgmntControlsNonLead
EmpFolRules
MgmntControlsLeadEmp
RchExpect
MgmntControlsNonLead
EmpRchExpect
MgmntUsesRsltBasedM
otivationLeadEmp
MgmntUsesRsltBasedM
otivationNonLeadEmp

Applicable Remedies

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and positive kurtosis

Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root

Sig. After
Remedy

2.446
-0.290

0.516
1.536
1.200
2.366
1.409
2.925
2.177
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UseAdHocRMProcess

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight positive skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight positive skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

0.913

Square root

-0.061

Square root

1.233

-0.485

-2.729

-0.460

-1.301

0.240

0.000

0.863

0.000

0.350

1.968

-0.687

-1.943

0.254

0.000

0.877

0.000

0.616

3.464

-0.233

-0.660

0.309

0.000

0.837

0.000

-0.388

-2.184

-0.538

-1.522

0.254

0.000

0.861

0.000

-0.698

-3.927

-0.133

-0.376

0.258

0.000

0.843

0.000

Slight negative skew

BasicRskGovisUsed

-1.119

-6.296

0.950

2.686

0.344

0.000

0.768

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

4.151

NoVistoOutsideChanges
andPatterns

0.466

2.621

-0.604

-1.708

0.296

0.000

0.857

0.000

Slight positive skew
and negative kurtosis

Square root

0.509

UseSensorsandPredictors
toPositResp

-0.392

-2.205

-0.712

-2.012

0.216

0.000

0.866

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

0.681

HaveBCPlans

-1.076

-6.056

1.632

4.615

0.356

0.000

0.789

0.000

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root

2.403

MonitorPartnersSCResili
ence

-0.300

-1.690

-0.909

-2.570

0.256

0.000

0.868

0.000

Negative kurtosis

EmployQuantRM

-0.633

-3.563

-0.529

-1.495

0.277

0.000

0.827

0.000

InvestinFlexibility

-0.628

-3.532

-0.496

-1.402

0.307

0.000

0.831

0.000

MovePresfromWeakPart
ners

-0.507

-2.855

-0.134

-0.379

0.245

0.000

0.857

0.000

Slight negative skew

RiskStrategyisSegmented

-0.802

-4.512

0.498

1.409

0.244

0.000

0.828

0.000

Slight negative skew

NoVisOutsideOurDomai
n
NoPlannedRedundforDis
rupt
OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatili
ty
RedundBasedXfuncCom
monPlan

a. Lilliefors Significance
Correction

Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis
Slight negative skew
and negative kurtosis

Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root

Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root
Reflect and
square root

0.215
2.238

2.171
1.717
0.716
2.312
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Reliability- Executive Style
Reliability of the internal consistency between multiple variables to measure the same
construct is obtained through the examination of Cronbach’s alpha (Cronbach, 1951) which
examines the entire scale (Hair et al., 2010). Scale items for Executive Style were examined for
their alpha score and compared with the Cronbach alpha scores obtained by Burton et al., (2002)
and are reported in Table 12. Executive Style is a summated score of Preference for Delegation
and Uncertainty Avoidance (Hakonsson et al., 2012, 2002). Preference for Delegation is a single
item construct and therefore alpha was not obtained. The two remaining multi-variable
constructs of Uncertainty Avoidance and Motivation through Control scored .622 and .711.
While .70 is often considered the acceptable lower limit threshold, some researchers have
suggested .60 may be acceptable for exploratory social science studies (Robinson et al, 1991)
such as this examination of the ES construct within the Healthcare industry.
Reliability was further examined to determine if elimination of any variable improved
score performance. The overall ES alpha improved with the deletion of the Results-based
Salaries for Non-leading Employees variable, changing from .680 to .685. Likewise, the score
for Motivation through Control sub-measure improved from .711 to .738 with the removal of the
same variable. However the increases were slight and the variable was retained. The Motivation
through Control sub-measure (f) reached an acceptable level both with and absent the variable.
To ensure the continued correspondence with Burton et al., (2002) measurements, the variable
was retained in future analyses.
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Table 11: Cronbach's alpha - Executive Style
Executive Style (ES)

(ES) Complete

Healthcare SC
Cronbach’s
alpha

Burton et al.
Cronbach’s alpha

.680a

.690

.622

.820

.711b

.730

(ES) Pref for deleg
(ES) Uncert Avoid
Solution of Human Problems
1
Stimulate Cooperation
2
Formulate Ideas and vision
3
Guide Employees
4
Implement new Routines and Methods
5
Control Accounts and Budgets
6
Rules and Procedures Followed
7
Detailed Information
Wait and See Before Action
Preference for Minimizing Risk
Motivation through control
Leading Employees Follow Rules
1
Non-leading Employees Follow Rules
2
3

Controls that Leading Employees Reach Expected
Results

4

Controls that Non-Leading Employees Reach
Expected Results
Results-based Salaries for Leading Employees

5
Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees
6
a
b

.685 when Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees is removed
.738 when Results-based Salaries for Non-leading Employees is removed

Reliability- RM Maturity
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The next area of reliability examined was the grouping of variables of RM Maturity level
measurement and Cluster formation. A first step examined how each measure correlated to the
summed score of the entire construct. Robinson et al., (1991) note that item-to-total correlations
should exceed .5 when examining each variable to the summated score. These results are found
in Appendix I. Most variables did not achieve this level of correlation, indicating that different
concepts were being measured by the separate variables when compared to the total of the
remaining variables.
Overall reliability of variables by Maturity Level and Cluster membership were examined
using Cronbach’s alpha (Table 13). Responses were examined across three sets of variables and
groupings. The first was the grouping of all respondents by RM Maturity level specified by
Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Only Level III responses displayed an acceptable level of internal
consistency (.717). Next, Cluster level groupings of variables across all respondents were
examined. Both Clusters 3 and 4 displayed internal consistencies considered acceptable or
marginally acceptable (.701 and .618). The final examination was of the Cluster level groupings
of the respondents that loaded on those clusters. Levels 2 and 3 displayed marginal scores of .610
and .664 respectively. Cluster 4 size was too small for the analysis to be conducted (n = 5).
However, it is important to note that the items and item groupings are identified as RM
Maturity groupings and RM clusters that, by their group and cluster construct, consist of
variables that may indeed measure divergent concepts, yet are related when examined through
response distance measures in the cluster analysis process. Therefore, while their relatedness to
measure a single construct’s internal consistency is poor with the possible exception of Level III/
Cluster 3, the function of those variables by group and cluster may not extend to requiring robust
scores in this measure. Cluster stability as examined by k-means clustering following
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hierarchical clustering addresses this concern (Hair et al., 2010, Aldenderfer and Blashfield,
1984) and is discussed in the cluster analysis section. The combination of both cluster stability
and Cronbach’s alpha may require future examination to determine overall importance.
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Table 13: Cronbach's alpha - RM Level and Cluster members

Variables

Simchi-Levi
et al

Variables

Healthcare SC
(All
Respondents)

Healthcare SC
(Cluster
Respondents)

.260

.293

.543

.610

.701

.664c

.618

d

Ad-hoc risk management processes

Level I/
Cluster 1

No visibility into changes outside the functional
domain
No planning of redundancy buffers towards potential
disruptions

Ad-hoc risk management processes
.392a

Can only absorb limited volatility around standard
functional input parameters

Can only absorb limited volatility around standard
functional input parameters
Positioning of redundancy buffers based on a common,
cross-functional plan
Level II/
Cluster 2

Basic risk governance processes

.562

No visibility into emerging changes and patterns
outside the company domain

No visibility into changes outside the functional
domain
No planning of redundancy buffers towards
potential disruptions
Positioning of redundancy buffers based on a
common, cross-functional plan
Basic risk governance processes

Use of sensors and predictors to proactively position
response mechanisms
Level III/
Cluster 3

Business continuity plans

No visibility into emerging changes and patterns
outside the company domain
.717

Partner resilience monitoring

Business continuity plans
Quantitative risk management

Quantitative risk management

Investment in flexibility (processes, products,
plants, capacity)
Risk strategy segmentation

Investment in flexibility (processes, products, plants,
capacity)
Level IV/
Cluster 4

Management of pressure away from weak partners in
the value chain
Risk strategy segmentation
a

.398 with removal of UseAdHomRMProcess
.449 with removal of RiskStrategyisSegmented
c
.676 with removal of HaveBCPlans
d
sample too small to obtain usable result
b

Use of sensors and predictors to proactively
position response mechanisms
.223b

Partner resilience monitoring
Management of pressure away from weak partners
in the value chain
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A Principal Component Factor Analysis was conducted to determine positive and
negative loadings of the supply chain risk management maturity response items as part of data
preparation. All variables were part of the analysis and varimax rotation was applied. The sample
size was adequate when compared to the rule of thumb for number of variables as advocated by
Mooi and Sartstedt (2011) as sample n ≥ 10* number of variables. Fourteen variables were
analyzed. Items were examined for high correlation values (Table 14). Highly correlated items,
those with a loading ≥ 0.90, when used in cluster analysis, may overweight the concept
represented by the variable in question (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). No values exceeded .600,
which was the correlation between the variables NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns and
NoVisOutsideOurDomain, indicating the variable are sufficiently different from each other.
However the correlation was not deemed strong enough to cut a variable.
Next, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s
tests were examined for the risk management maturity variables (Table 15). KMO is a measure
that indicates the presence of enough variables to sufficiently form a factor and the value should
exceed 0.70 (Kaiser, 1974). Kaiser’s ranges are described colorfully in Table 16. Bartlett’s test
was significant at the .001 level of sensitivity and measures the “overall significance of all
variables within a correlation matrix” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 92), indicating “significant
correlations among at least some of the variables” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 104).
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Table 12: Risk Management Variables Correlation Matrix
Correlation Matrix

Co
rre
lati
on

UseAdHoc
RMProces
s
NoVisOuts
ideOurDo
mnai
NoPlanne
dRedundfo
rDisrupt
OnlyAbsor
bLimitVola
tility
RedundBa
sedXfuncC
ommonPla
n
BasicRisk
GovisUsed

NoVistoOu
tsideChan
gesandPat
terns

a

UseSe
nsorsa
ndPredi
ctorsto
PositRe
sp

Have
BCPl
ans

Empl
oyQu
antR
M

Invest
inFlex
ibility

MovePr
esfrom
WeakP
artners

RiskStr
ategyis
Segme
nted

Monitor
Partner
sSCRes
ilience

UseA
dHoc
RMPr
ocess

NoVis
Outsid
eOurD
omain

NoPlan
nedRed
undforD
isrupt

OnlyA
bsorbL
imitVol
atility

RedundB
asedXfun
cCommo
nPlan

Basic
Risk
Govis
Used

NoVisto
Outside
Change
sandPatt
erns

1.000

-.104

-.209

.152

-.190

-.035

-.169

-.062

-.253

-.026

-.076

.044

.126

.105

1.000

.274

-.274

.236

.156

.600

.354

.272

.276

.270

.198

-.061

-.293

1.000

-.290

.403

.149

.396

.281

.342

.221

.271

.137

-.071

-.172

1.000

-.207

-.201

-.317

-.343

-.222

-.226

-.355

-.126

.048

.273

1.000

.365

.284

.457

.445

.463

.399

.245

.109

-.505

1.000

.253

.374

.285

.404

.295

.296

.096

-.284

1.000

.299

.353

.289

.437

.292

-.096

-.398
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UseSenso
rsandPredi
ctorstoPos
itResp
HaveBCPl
ans

EmployQu
antRM

InvestinFle
xibility

MovePresf
romWeak
Partners
RiskStrate
gyisSegm
ented
MonitorPar
tnersSCRe
silience

1.000

.284

.419

.439

.253

.023

-.404

1.000

.311

.351

.252

.002

-.454

1.000

.369

.091

-.049

-.386

1.000

.267

-.008

-.475

1.000

-.057

-.353

1.000

-.022

1.000
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Table 13: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy and Bartlett’s Test
KMO and Bartlett's Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy.
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity

Approx. Chi-Square

.828
690.374

df

91

Sig.

.000

Table 14: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Adequacy Standard
KMO/MSA value
Below 0.50
0.50-0.59
0.60-0.69
0.70-0.79
0.80-0.89
0.90 and higher

Adequacy of the correlations
Unacceptable
Miserable
Mediocre
Middling
Meritorious
Marvelous

The Executive Style Construct and Classification
Determination of a respondent’s Executive Style classification was conducted following
Burton et al., (2002) and Hakonsson et al., (2006, 2012). The technique used weighted summated
scores of the Executive Style variables to determine a score for both ‘Preference for Delegation’
and ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’ between 1 and 5. Based on their scores, respondents were placed
within the quadrants of the Executive Style chart to greater or lesser degrees, depending on their
score, yet still possessing the traits of that style (Table 17). A summary of the Executive Style
distribution for this sample is in Table 18. Respondents classified as a member of the Manager
group 57.8 percent of the time and as Maestro 27.8 percent of the time for a cumulative 85.6
percent of respondents who are low on preference for delegation and prefer to maintain close
control. Identifications by Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 183) noted that a Manager “prefers to deal
with matters in a disciplined way, focusing on the short term with an internal focus, a fine level of
detail, and high control of employee behavior” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 188) and Maestros “are
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executives that prefer to be personally involved in decision making; they embrace uncertainty and
prefer long-term, proactive decision making” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 187). Hakonsson et al
(2012) notes importantly that in times of uncertainty the Maestro may become a bottleneck during
decision-making.
Producer style was indicated in 7.5 percent of respondents. While not comfortable with
risk laden options, the Producer “is likely to enable other people to deal with ambiguous
information and take risky action while he himself maintains overall focus and control of the
situation” (Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 188). The Producer focuses on short term and immediate
results, while utilizing subordinates and in-place systems to navigate dynamic, long-term
situations. Leader style membership was identified 7.0 percent of the time. Hakonsson et al.,
(2012) notes “a Leader will focus more globally on what might happen next, with less attention to
the details of the here and now” and notes that as in previous research by Zaleznik (1977) “they
focus on the future and are willing to delegate, but they are unlikely to emphasize a great deal of
detail and control” (Hakonsson et al., 2012, p. 188). Hakonsson et al., (2012, p. 188) compares
them to an entrepreneur and further notes “Leaders are not necessarily successful; their success is
contingent upon the strategy to be implemented”.
Table 15: Executive Style Classification Statistics
Executive Style Classification
Cumulative
Frequency
Valid

Percent

Valid Percent

Percent

Leader

13

7.0

7.0

7.0

Maestro

52

27.8

27.8

34.8

Manager

108

57.8

57.8

92.5

Producer

14

7.5

7.5

100.0

187

100.0

100.0

Total

153

Table 16: Executive Style Distribution

Uncertainty
Avoidance

High

Manager makes
decisions alone

Low

Less acceptance of risk

Manager
n =108
(57.8%)
Maestro
n =52
(27.8%)

Producer
n =14
(7.5%)
Leader
n =13
(7.0%)

Greater acceptance of risks
Delegation

Manager
includes
others in
decision
making
High

Cluster Analysis for Risk Management Maturity
A multi-step cluster analysis process was used to identify the risk management maturity
categories. Use of a multi-step process is appropriate as determination of an appropriate number
of clusters is unavailable through other statistical procedures and is a method recommended to
provide increased levels of internal cluster homogeneity and between-cluster heterogeneity (Hair
et al., 2010). Hierarchical partitioning identified an initial set of clusters as a possible solution.
Following this, a non-hierarchical analysis was conducted to fine tune a final cluster solution.
Prior research in the area of supply chain and risk management maturity levels has
suggested four groupings (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013; Hillson, 1997, IACCM, 2003), based on
identified attributes, are appropriate and will be used as a suggested starting point for determining
clusters (Table 19).
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Table 17: Risk Management Maturity Models
Risk Management Maturity Models
Maturity
Level
I

Simchi-Levi et al., (2013)
•
•
•
•

•

II

•
•

•

III

•
•
•

IV

•
•
•

IACCM (2003)

Ad-hoc risk management
processes
No visibility into changes outside
the functional domain
No planning of redundancy buffers
towards potential disruptions
Can only absorb limited volatility
around standard functional input
parameters

LEVEL: NOVICE
•
Risk averse
•
Lacking awareness/
understanding
•
Lacking strategy
•
Lacking commitment
•
Processes are inefficient,
informal or ad-hoc

Positioning of redundancy buffers
based on a common, crossfunctional plan
Basic risk governance processes
No visibility into emerging
changes and patterns outside the
company domain

LEVEL: COMPETENT
•
Patchy, inconsistent
•
Some understanding/ awareness
•
Cautious approach/ reactive
•
Inconsistent
•
No learning from experience
•
Standard approach/ generic

Use of sensors and predictors to
proactively position response
mechanisms
Business continuity plans
Partner resilience monitoring
Quantitative risk management

LEVEL: PROFICIENT
•
Prepared to take appropriate
risks
•
Good understanding of benefits
across most of organization
•
Strategy mapped onto process
implementation

Investment in flexibility
(processes, products, plants,
capacity)
Management of pressure away
from weak partners in the value
chain
Risk strategy segmentation

LEVEL: EXPERT
•
Proactive
•
Intuitive understanding
•
Belief, full commitment to be the
best
•
Adaptive
•
Proactively developed processes
•
Processes fit for purpose
•
Best of breed

Hillson (1997)
LEVEL: NAÏVE
• Unaware of need for RM
• No structured approach
• Repetitive and reactive
management processes
• No attempt to learn from the
past
• No attempt to prepare for
future threats or
uncertainties
LEVEL: NOVICE
• Experimenting with RM
• Few individuals involved
• No generic structured
processes in place
• Aware of benefits but fails to
implement and gain benefits
LEVEL: NORMALIZED
• Management of risk built into
routine business practices
• RM implemented on most or
all projects
• Formalized generic risk
processes
• Benefits understood at all
levels of the organization,
but not consistently achieved
LEVEL: NATURAL
• Risk aware culture with
proactive approach to RM in
all aspects of business
• Active use of risk information
to improve business
processes and gain
competitive advantage
• Emphasis on opportunity
management (“positive risk”)

Hierarchical Cluster Analysis for Risk Management Maturity
Following data cleansing and transformation, hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted
as the first of two cluster analyses to determine the clustering of risk management maturity
respondents. The cluster analysis was executed using the single linkage method and the Euclidian
distance as a between variable measure. This methodology is appropriate as sizes of clusters may
not be uniform, based on previous research findings. Specifically, respondents in the highest and
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lowest maturity levels have been significantly fewer than in more central maturity measures (Hair
et al., 2010). The data was first examined for collinearity between variables which may produce
unwanted weighting. No issues (Pearson scores >.90) were found (Table 20). Three, four, and five
cluster solutions were requested from the SPSS statistical package. The choice to explore three to
five clusters is a heuristic based on moving one cluster size smaller and larger than previous
maturity models which suggested four levels of maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013; Hillson, 1997,
IACCM, 2003). Greater than five clusters risked having too few variables to distinguish between
cluster characteristics. Each cluster solution was saved as a new case.

Ensure Hierarchical Cluster Requirements are Met
Mooi and Sartstdt, (2011, p. 243) caution that a sufficient sample size must be available
for the cluster analysis and notes that “Formann (1984) recommends a sample size of at least 2m,
where m equals the number of clustering variables” and that there is low multicollinearity
between variables. Fourteen clustering variables are present and the sample size >28, exceeding
the suggested levels. Risk Management variables were next checked for collinearity. Correlates
may be candidates for deletion if the correlation coefficients >.90. No variables exceeded this
threshold and all remained in the analysis.

Cluster Specification
Hierarchical clustering is an agglomerative technique which identifies two of the closest
variables, based on their similarity measure, which in this research was determined through the
use of Euclidean distance between centroids. Hierarchical agglomerative clustering begins with
each response in a unique cluster. Thus, for this research, 187 clusters were formed at the
beginning of the process. The first variable was then compared to other variables until the closest
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match was found and a new cluster was formed as well as a new centroid being computed. This
process continued until one final cluster was formed. A noted weakness of the process is that a
cluster member cannot move from one cluster to another, even if a better fit would be available
with a subsequently derived centroid (Andendorfer and Blashfield, 1984). Hair et al., (2010) notes
that “no standard objective selection procedure exists” (p. 536) to determine the number of
clusters that best represent the underlying data.
Four clusters, identified in previous literature as Maturity Levels, have been identified
and were used as a base taxonomy. However, it was unknown if healthcare supply chain risk
management maturity levels in the United States follow the same taxonomical clustering among
healthcare supply chain practitioners as the previous constructs which surveyed managers in
multiple global industries (Simchi Levi et al., 2013, IACCM, 2003, Hillson, 1997). Cluster
analysis was chosen for the main investigative tool as this method returns multiple cluster
solutions which can be further analyzed for membership and comparison with the base
taxonomy. Based on this, cluster solutions that contained three to five solutions were examined
closely using the initial hierarchical clustering method.
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Table 18: Risk Management Variables Correlations
Correlations

UseAdHocRMPro Pearson Correlation
cess

NoVisO

NoPlann
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utsideO

edRedun

OnlyAbs
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n
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olatility

mmonPlan

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N

-.104

.152

**

-.190
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-.035
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sSCRes
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Partners
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tRM
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**

-.026

-.076

.044

.126
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-.253

.021

.400

.000

.719

.304

.549

.085

.153

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

-.104

1

.274**

-.274**

.236**

.156*

.600**

.354**

.272**

.276**

.270**

.198**

-.061

-.293**

.000

.000

.001

.033

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.007

.408

.000

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

1

**

**

*

**

**

**

**

**
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-.071

-.172*

N

187

187

**

**

-.209
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Sig. (2-tailed)
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.018
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.000
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.000

.000
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187

-.201**
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.404**
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.253

.000

.000

.000

.000

.751

.000

187

187

187

187

187

187

1

**

**

**

.002

-.454**

.311

.351

.252

.000

.000

.001

.978

.000

187

187

187

187

187

187

.419**

.311**

1

.369**

.091

-.049

-.386**

.000

.000

.000

.000

.216

.510

.000

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

**

**

**

**

**

1

**

-.008

-.475**

.000

.909

.000

.295

.437

.439

.351

.369

.267

Sig. (2-tailed)

.304

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

N

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

MovePresfromWe Pearson Correlation

.044

**

.137

-.126

**

**

**

**

**

.091

**

1

-.057

-.353**

akPartners

Sig. (2-tailed)

.549

.007

.062

.086

.001

.000

.000

.000

.001

.216

.000

.440

.000

N

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

RiskStrategyisSe

Pearson Correlation

.126

-.061

-.071

.048

.109

.096

-.096

.023

.002

-.049

-.008

-.057

1

-.022

gmented

Sig. (2-tailed)

.085

.408

.337

.517

.136

.192

.190

.751

.978

.510

.909

.440

N

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

MonitorPartnersS

Pearson Correlation

.105

-.293**

-.172*

.273**

-.505**

-.284**

-.398**

-.404**

-.454**

-.386**

-.475**

-.353**

-.022

1

CResilience

Sig. (2-tailed)

.153

.000

.018

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.000

.769

N

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

187

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

.198

.245

.296

.292

.253

.252

.267

.769

187
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The single linkage method (nearest neighbor) method was utilized using SPSS, and
Euclidean (straight line) distances were analyzed. Data did not require standardization as all
responses but one were on a 5-point Likert scale. The one variable on a 3-point Likert scale was
transformed prior to analysis. Weighting was not applied. An examination of scree plots, as
suggested by Burns and Burns (2008) failed to provide appropriate identification of a clear
demarcation between cluster solutions (Figure 11). This demarcation would have appeared as a
sharp elbow-like change in direction. Following the suggestion of Hair et al., (2010), previous
conceptions of aspects of the clusters indicated by prior research may be used as a start point.
Additional analysis was required to determine the appropriate number of clusters.
Figure 11: Hierarchical Cluster Agglomeration Scree Plot
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The hierarchical cluster analysis process generated an agglomeration schedule which
included information regarding the distances between cases and the order in which they entered
the cluster solution. This schedule included all clusters generated from 186 to 1 cluster. Clusters
were generated using two different methods. The agglomeration outcomes between clusters 7
and 1 were analyzed using two different methods to determine between-cluster changes in
heterogeneity and facilitate identification of the optimal stopping rule (Table 21 and Table 22) as
suggested by Hair et al., (2010). The centroid agglomeration method used squared Euclidean
distances and calculated the similarities between centroids of clusters under consideration for
joining. Ward’s method used Euclidean distances to identify clusters for joining which have a
minimum variance between cluster centroids (Aldenderfer and Blashfield, 1984).
Figures 12 and 13 provide a graphic representation of the stopping rune changes in
heterogeneity and should be examined in addition to the agglomeration chart to increase
understanding of the stopping rule attributes. Examination of changes in heterogeneity can
provide insight into the stopping rule, however, the choice of stopping point has no firm criteria
and is ultimately left to the discretion of the researcher, while considering the literature, specifics
of the data and managerial impact (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Sarstadt, 2011). The presence of
similar agglomerative traits when multiple methods are examined lends weight to a decision and
indicates stability of the cluster solution.
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Table 19: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Ward’s Method
Euclidean Distance
Agglomeration Schedule Nearest Neighbor Euclidean Distance

Stage

Cluster
1

Cluster
2

Coefficients

Number of
Clusters
After
Combining

180

1

63

1.244

7

0.040

3.250%

Increase is very small and
favors combination to six
clusters

181

1

9

1.285

6

0.102

7.935%

Increase is relatively large,
favoring combination to five
clusters

182

155

171

1.387

5

0.018

1.313%

Increase is very small and
suggests a combination of
four clusters over five
clusters is appropriate

Cluster Combined

Differences

Proportionate
Increase in
Heterogeneity to
Next Stage

Stopping Rule

183

1

163

1.405

4

0.029

2.072%

Increase is relatively small
and may suggest a
stopping point favoring four
over three clusters

184

1

155

1.434

3

0.220

15.335%

Increase is large and favors
a three cluster solution over
a two cluster solution

185

1

152

1.654

2

0.063

3.815%

Large increase from two to
one is normal

186

1

16

1.717

1

0

One-cluster solution is not
meaningful
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Figure 12: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Ward’s Method Euclidean
Distance
Proportionate Increase in Heterogeneity to Next Stage (Ward's Method
Euclidean)
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Table 20: Hierarchical Clustering Agglomeration and Stopping Rule Centroid Method
Squared Euclidean Distance
Agglomeration Schedule Centroid Squared Euclidean

Stage

180

181

182

183

Cluster
Combined
Cluster Cluster
1
2
152

2

2

1

155

3

24

39

Coefficients

2.255

2.377

2.475

2.603

Number of
Clusters
After
Combining
7

6

5

4

Differences

0.122

0.098

0.128

0.107

Proportionate
Increase in
Heterogeneity to
Next Stage

Stopping Rule

5.406%

Increase is very small
and favors
combination to six
clusters

4.106%

Increase is relatively
large, favoring
combination to five
clusters

5.191%

Increase is relatively
small and suggests a
combination of four
clusters over five
clusters is appropriate

4.113%

Increase is relatively
small and may
suggest a stopping
point favoring four
over three clusters

163

184

16

152

2.710

3

0.393

14.481%

Increase is large and
favors a three cluster
solution over a two
cluster solution

185

1

2

3.103

2

4.785

154.204%

Large increase from
two to one is normal

186

1

16

7.888

1

One-cluster solution
is not meaningful

Figure 13: Proportional Change in Cluster Heterogeneity Centroid Method Squared
Euclidean Distance
Proportionate Increase in Heterogeneity to Next Stage (Centroid Method
Squared Euclidean)
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This initial examination of agglomerations and development of likely stopping rules
provided a base reference number of clusters and formed the foundation for further
nonhierarchical analysis of a four cluster solution through k-means cluster analysis. Initial
agglomeration analysis of the current data indicates either three or four clusters would be the best
candidate for nonhierarchical analysis. The determination of the number of clusters may not be
able to be established through statistical analysis and is left to the researcher to determine, with
support from literature and analysis of cluster membership (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Sarstedt,
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2011) as clusters will always form using clustering techniques. Four clusters was determined the
preferred solution to proceed to the non-hierarchical clustering process based upon both visual
observation of the proportionate increases in heterogeneity, development of appropriate stopping
rules based on the heterogeneity change and previous literature which had identified four clusters
for risk management maturity. Additionally, the presence of too few or too many clusters may
aggregate or dilute cluster solutions that are less managerially relevant or lack sufficient intercluster distinction to be useful or well supported by the variables (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and
Sarstedt, 2011).

Non-hierarchical k-means clustering
The next step consisted of nonhierarchical k-means analysis, which allowed the
researcher “to adjust, or “fine-tune”, the results from the hierarchical procedures” (Hair et al.,
2010, p. 554). A key component of this step is to identify cluster membership for each variable
and is often conducted following initial hierarchical clustering. However, once a variable is
placed within a cluster using hierarchical clustering it cannot be reassigned to another cluster
even if the fit is improved, which is a limitation that nonhierarchical clustering seeks to address
(Hair et al,., 2010, Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011). Unlike hierarchical clustering which begins by
assuming each variable is a cluster by itself, k-means begins with random assignment of
variables to the four clusters indicated in hierarchical clustering or from the literature. Unlike
hierarchical clustering, in k-means clustering a variable may be reassigned to a different cluster
as within-cluster variation is calculated and minimized (Mooi and Sarstedt, 2011) with the goal
of achieving improved placement of variates within a prescribed number of clusters.
The initial seed point for the k-means technique is the centroid of each variate within
each cluster. Following Mooi and Sarstedt (2011), data was aggregated to determine cluster
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centroids which were then used as seed points to begin the k-means process. This approach is
considered a superior method to the use of random seed points generated within statistical
software (Hair et al., 2010, Mooi and Satstadt, 2011). The four cluster derivation using Ward’s
method was used. (Table 23).
Table 21: Initial k-means Cluster Centroids
Initial Cluster Centers
Cluster
1

2

3

4

UseAdHocRMProcess

1.685

1.639

1.669

1.413

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

1.571

1.708

1.619

2.177

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt

1.519

1.610

1.645

1.722

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

1.677

1.585

1.661

1.104

RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan

1.499

1.784

1.790

2.177

BasicRiskGovisUsed

1.489

1.641

1.619

1.825

NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns

1.474

1.666

1.629

2.177

UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp

1.589

1.792

1.757

2.236

HaveBCPlans

1.343

1.557

1.492

2.177

EmployQuantRM

1.549

1.750

1.672

2.051

InvestinFlexibility

1.483

1.733

1.663

2.177

MovePresfromWeakPartners

1.544

1.690

1.678

2.236

RiskStrategyisSegmented

1.622

1.615

1.694

1.722

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

4.091

1.926

3.023

1.000

Following the application of the k-means technique a final cluster center solution was
provided. When compared with the initial cluster center points it provided an indication of the
stability of both the initial dual hierarchical clustering as well as the subsequent nonhierarchical
clustering. Table 24 describes the change in cluster centroids from those initially defined through
hierarchical analysis and indicates the desired strong stability of the hierarchical centroid
solution when compared to the k-means centroid solution.
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Table 22: Change in Cluster Centers from Hierarchical Solution
a

Iteration History

Change in Cluster Centers
Iteration

1

2

3

4

1

.000

.025

.000

.265

2

.000

.000

.000

.000

a. Convergence achieved due to no or small change in
cluster centers. The maximum absolute coordinate change
for any center is .000. The current iteration is 2. The
minimum distance between initial centers is 1.116.

Evaluation of final k-means cluster centroids (Table 25) indicated that minor changes
were applied to most of the fifty-six centroids and none exceeded a .2 change in coordinate,
indicating that moving objects between clusters did not significantly reduce variation within
clusters.
Table 23: Final k-means Cluster Centroids
Final Cluster Centers
Cluster
1

2

3

4

UseAdHocRMProcess

1.685

1.638

1.669

1.476

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

1.571

1.702

1.619

2.142

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt

1.519

1.608

1.645

1.724

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

1.677

1.588

1.661

1.166

RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan

1.499

1.791

1.790

2.024

BasicRiskGovisUsed

1.489

1.640

1.619

1.807

NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns

1.474

1.660

1.629

2.142

UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp

1.589

1.784

1.757

2.236

HaveBCPlans

1.343

1.559

1.492

2.024

EmployQuantRM

1.549

1.741

1.672

2.088

InvestinFlexibility

1.483

1.728

1.663

2.142

MovePresfromWeakPartners

1.544

1.690

1.678

2.135

RiskStrategyisSegmented

1.622

1.612

1.694

1.724

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

4.091

1.943

3.023

1.000
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Evaluation of the ANOVA Table indicated that all but two variables differed significantly
across at least three cluster solutions (Table 26) rejecting the null hypothesis (Sig. ≤ .05).
Table 24: k-means ANOVA Table
ANOVA
Cluster

Error

Mean
Square

Mean
df Square

df

F

Sig.

UseAdHocRMProcess

.083

3

.070 183

1.180 .319

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

.627

3

.078 183

8.037 .000

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt

.216

3

.071 183

3.042 .030

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

.465

3

.062 183

7.510 .000

1.495

3

.050 183

30.043 .000

BasicRiskGovisUsed

.395

3

.053 183

7.486 .000

NoVistoOutsideChangesandPatterns

.988

3

.072 183

13.769 .000

UseSensorsandPredictorstoPositResp

.993

3

.057 183

17.429 .000

1.100

3

.056 183

19.805 .000

EmployQuantRM

.756

3

.056 183

13.397 .000

InvestinFlexibility

1.210

3

.061 183

19.729 .000

MovePresfromWeakPartners

.726

3

.052 183

14.035 .000

RiskStrategyisSegmented

.079

3

.059 183

1.324 .268

58.157

3

.057 183 1020.785 .000

RedundBasedXfuncCommonPlan

HaveBCPlans

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

The final grouping solution indicated the following number of cases present in each
cluster (Table 27). Descriptive Statistics are found in Appendix G.
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Table 25: Final Number of Cases by Cluster
Number of Cases in each
Cluster
Cluster

Valid
Missing

1

83

2

53

3

46

4

5
187
0

Table 28 summarizes the final cluster variate members as compared to the reference
model for this research (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Bold values indicate actual cluster
membership when compared to cluster taxonomy from the reference model. This differs from the
clustering of risk management maturity levels, as based on previous literature (Simchi-Levi et al,
2013, IACCM, 2003, Hillson, 1997) (Table 28). This unanticipated clustering was used as the
dependent variable for subsequent Multinomial Linear Regression to determine if the research
hypotheses were supported, although the underlying structure of the maturity level constructs as
they pertain to healthcare supply chain managers differs significantly from those of previous
multi-industry studies. Final results in Table 29 indicate overall maturity levels to be very low.
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Flexible

Proactive

Buffer Planning

Ad Hoc

Table 26: Cluster Membership Comparison
Variable

Simchi-Levi et al.,
2013

Four Cluster
Healthcare

Ad-hoc risk management
processes

1

1

No visibility into changes outside
the functional domain

1

2

No planning of redundancy buffers
towards potential disruptions

1

2

1

1

2

3

Basic risk governance processes

2

3

No visibility into emerging changes
and patterns outside the company
domain

2

3

Use of sensors and predictors to
proactively position response
mechanisms

3

4

Business continuity plans

3

3

Partner resilience monitoring

3

4

Quantitative risk management

3

3

Investment in flexibility
(processes, products, plants,
capacity)

4

3

Management of pressure away
from weak partners in the value
chain

4

4

Risk strategy segmentation

4

3

Can only absorb limited volatility
around standard functional input
parameters
Positioning of redundancy buffers
based on a common, crossfunctional plan
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Table 27: Healthcare Supply Chain Risk Management Cluster Membership
Variable

Four Cluster
Healthcare

Ad-hoc risk management
processes

1

Can only absorb limited volatility
around standard functional input
parameters

1

No visibility into changes outside
the functional domain

2

No planning of redundancy buffers
towards potential disruptions

2

Positioning of redundancy buffers
based on a common, crossfunctional plan

3

Basic risk governance processes

3

No visibility into emerging changes
and patterns outside the company
domain

3

Business continuity plans

3

Quantitative risk management

3

Investment in flexibility
(processes, products, plants,
capacity)

3

Risk strategy segmentation

3

Use of sensors and predictors to
proactively position response
mechanisms

4

Partner resilience monitoring

4

Management of pressure away
from weak partners in the value
chain

4

n

%

83

44.3

53

28.3

46

24.6

5

2.7

RM Maturity Level and Cluster Differences
Canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was used to determine if there is a significant
difference between the RM Maturity levels as provided by Simchi-Levi et al., (2012) and those
developed through the cluster analysis in this research. Canonical correlation analysis is a
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technique that determines interrelations between groups of variables and has been used to assess
both statistical as well as practical significance (Hair et al., 2010). Although the sets of variables
are commonly referred to as independent and dependent variables, no causal relationship is
implied (Hair et al., 2010, Thompson, 1984). The Independent Variables consisted of the
groupings formed by the RM Maturity Levels described by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) and the
Dependent Variables consisted of Healthcare SC RM Clusters developed in this study. Each set
of variables forms a canonical variate composed of the variables within the respective set. This
analysis examined the variate pairs of RM Maturity Level I variate and the corresponding Cluster
1 variate, and the process was repeated for the remaining three variate pairings of levels and
clusters. The procedures discussed by Nimon et al., (2010) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2006)
were followed.
Tabachnick and Fidell (2006) further note a function of canonical correlation as a
descriptive or screening procedure to determine the strength of any correlation between the
variate pairs, which is the purpose it serves in this research, Analysis was conducted with SPSS
22 (SPSS, 2014).
The key statistics for examination in CCA include the squared canonical correlation (R2c)
and the standardized canonical coefficients or equations. R2c “represents the amount of shared
variance between the two sets of canonical variate scores produced from a canonical function”
(Nimon et al., 2010, p. 709). Canonical correlation produces functions that are equal to the
number of variables in the smallest set to be examined. Each variate represents the redistributed
variance of the variables.
The first function incorporates values of the full model (all functions) while subsequent
functions represent the functions by themselves, with the previous functions removed. A
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summary of the findings is found in Table 28. The R2 value for each function captures the effect
size of the relationship between the variates and Function 1 represents the “linear combinations
of the study’s variables that yield the largest squared correlation R2c possible” (Nimon et al.,
2010, p. 705). Canonical functions for Levels I, III and IV R2c were all very large (.994, .994 and
.997) and statistically significant at the .01 level in each of the Function 1 scores. Additionally,
the models indicated that 100% of the shared variance explained in each of the three
comparisons is present in the full Function 1 model. In contrast, Level II R2c was .472,
significant at the .01 level and indicated that Function 1 explained 50.1% of the shared variances
between the two variates. Due to the unusually large indications of shared variance in the Level
I, III and IV scores, additional examination of the data was conducted.
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Table 28: Full Canonical Model, Correlations and Cumulative Effects
RM Maturity Level I/ HC
Cluster 1

RM Maturity Level II/ HC
Cluster 2

RM Maturity Level III/ HC Cluster 3

RM Maturity Level IV/ HC Cluster 4

Wilks's λ

Wilks's λ

Wilks's λ

Wilks's λ

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

Function 4

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

0.000

0.011

0.499

0.944

0.000

0.014

0.711

0.982

0.007

0.756

1.000

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

Function 4

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

1753.135

815.852

126.57

10.487

1682.515

765.13

61.289

3.266

902.395

51.145

0.013

χ2

χ2

df

χ2

df

χ2

df

df

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

Function 4

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

8.000

3.000

6.000

2.000

28.000

18.000

10.000

4.000

9.000

4.000

1.000

Rc
Function 1
0.997
2

R

Rc
Function 2

Function 1

0.994

0.687
2

R

c

Rc
Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

0.237

0.997

0.99
2

R

c

Rc
Function 3

Function 4

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

0.525

0.134

0.687

0.237

0.687

2

R

c

c

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

Function 4

Function 1

Function 2

Function 3

0.994

0.988

0.472

0.056

0.994

0.98

0.276

0.018

0.997

0.99

0.525

Var. explained

Var. explained

Var. explained

Var. explained

100%

98.90%

50.1%

5.6%

100.0%

98.6%

28.9%

1.8%

100.0%

98.6%

28.9%

p<.001

p<.001

p<.001

p<.005

p<.001

p<.001

p<.001

p>.05

p<.001

p<.001

p<.001
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Redundancy scores were analyzed to determine across the variates the amount of
variance explained by the opposite variate within Function 1 (Table 29). The low to moderate
levels of redundancy indicate a moderate degree of shared variance across the variates. Similar in
function to R2, the redundancy value indicates predictive capability from one variate to another
(Hair et al., 2010).
Table 29: Redundancy of Dependent and Independent Variates
Proportion of Var. Explained by Opposite Variate (Redundancy)
IV

DV

Level I Function 1

0.222

0.434

Level II Function 1

0.208

0.290

Level III Function 1

0.381

0.261

Level IV Function 1

0.359

0.397

Nimon et al., (2010) suggests that CCA interpretation begins with understanding both
practical and statistical significance of the model. Hair et al., (2010) recommends first examining
canonical weights and loadings as part of interpretation. Canonical weights are of most use when
collinearity between variables is minimal. Due to the presence of the same variable in both the
dependent and independent variates for Levels I, III and IV, interpretation may be biased due to
unstable weightings and is not recommended (Hair et al., 2010). Canonical weights for Levels I,
III and IV were next examined to understand the extent of intercorrelation. Level 1 IV and DV
included the shared variables ARHMP, AOLV and AHRMP2, AOLV2. The squared crossloadings “indicate the percentage of the variance for each of the variables explained by Function
1” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 257). For instance, 55.2% of AHRP is explained by the DV of Function 1
and 53.6% of AHRP2 is explained by the IV of Function 1.
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Table 30: Canonical Weights, Loadings and Cross-Loadings for the Canonical Function
Level I - Cluster 1

Level II - Cluster 2

Canonical
Weights

Canonical
Loadings

Canonical
CrossLoadings

CrossLoading
sq.

Independent Variables
AHRMP
NVD

Canonical
CrossLoadings

CrossLoading
sq.

-0.824

-0.754

-0.743

0.552

RDXCP

-0.315

-0.553

-0.38

0.144

0.007

-0.086

-0.086

0.007

BRGU

0.035

-0.32

-0.22

0.048

NVCP

-0.874

-0.955

-0.565

0.319

0.002

-0.03

-0.03

0.001

AOLV

0.674

0.574

0.572

0.327

Dependent Variables
AOLV2

Canonical
Loadings

Independent Variables

NPRD

AHRMP2

Canonical
Weights

Dependent Variables
0.822

0.734

0.732

0.536

NVD2

-0.782

-0.897

-0.616

0.379

-0.685

-0.579

-0.578

0.334

NPRD2

-0.457

-0.654

-0.449

0.202

Canonical
Weights

Canonical
Loadings

Canonical
CrossLoadings

CrossLoading
sq.

0.003

-0.289

-0.288

0.083

Level III - Cluster 3

Level IV-Cluster 4

Canonical
Weights

Canonical
Loadings

Canonical
CrossLoadings

CrossLoading
sq.

USPPR

0.003

0.440

0.438

0.192

Iflex

HBCP

0.092

0.410

0.409

0.167

MPWP

-1.001

-1.000

-0.995

0.990

MPSCRes

0.002

0.422

0.421

0.177

RSSeg

0.005

0.051

0.05

0.003

EQRM

0.964

0.996

0.993

0.986

Independent Variables

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

Dependent Variables

RDXCP2

-0.005

-0.494

-0.493

0.243

USPPR2

BRGU2

0.001

-0.419

-0.418

0.175

MPSCRes2

NVCP2

0.012

0.329

0.329

0.108

MPWP2

HBCP2

-0.088

-0.395

-0.394

0.155

EQRM2

-0.961

-0.996

-0.993

0.986

IFlex2

-0.005

-0.397

-0.396

0.157

RSSeg2

-0.002

0.045

0.045

0.002

0.015

0.268

0.267

0.071

-0.005

-0.362

-0.36

0.130

0.994

1.000

0.995

0.990

The cross-loadings in both Levels III and IV display unusually strong influence from
their cross-loaded variate (Table 30). These influences are found in the shared variables of
EQRM and EQRM2 in Level III and MPWP and MPWP2 in Level IV. Over 98.5% of each of
these variable’s variance is explained by the cross loaded Function 1. Given the caution by Hair
et al., (2010) regarding the bias that may be present with multicollinearity between variates the
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results of Levels III and IV may be viewed with extreme caution, especially given the
overwhelming weight of individual variables that is present. Level I displays similar weightings
across common variables, however the effect appears to be reduced as two variables are shared
in that case. Only Level II does not share any variables across the variates.
Overall, the statistical significance of the relationship between the RM Maturity levels of
Simchi-Levi et al (2012) and the Clusters developed in this research should be used with caution
due to several factors. The first is the relatively moderate redundancy index and the
understanding that the collinearity of several variables account for most of the cross-loading
weight (see Table 30). The second is the very small Wilks’s Lambda (Table 28) which is a
measure of variance not accounted for by the model. Given the heuristic understanding of the
variables and the presence of differing variables in variates of Levels I-IV it would be
impractical to conclude understand that the model captured all of the variance. Again, the weight
of similar variables in each variate of Levels I, III and IV must be considered. The practical
significance “(i.e., variance shared between canonical variates” (Nimon et al., 2010, p. 706) is
likewise low, as expressed by the redundancy values in Table 29. A reasonable, yet cautious,
conclusion is that there is limited practical relationship between RM Maturity groupings of
Simchi-Levi et al., (2012) and the healthcare RM Maturity clusters developed through this
research and they measure different levels of maturity.
Multinomial Logistic Regression
Multinomial logistic regression was used as the means to ascertain if traits present in the
construct of Executive Style could predict a corresponding risk management maturity cluster
membership as derived in the k-means clustering. The independent variables (IVs) were
Uncertainty and Delegation Preference, the two constructs that form Executive Style (Hakonsson
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et al., 2006, 2012), and the dependent variable (DV) was the four cluster risk management
maturity cluster classification. They were checked for normality and the Shapiro-Wilk test
indicated both variables were non-normally distributed (Table 31). Remedies were applied as
suggested by Moutinho and Hutcheson (2011) but failed to improve skew significance (Table
32).
Table 31: Independent Variables Normality Test
Tests of Normality
a

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic

df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

Uncertainty Avoidence

.419

187

.000

.602

187

.000

Delegation Preference

.515

187

.000

.418

187

.000

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction

Table 32: Independent Variables Descriptives
Shape Descriptors
Skewness

Kurtosis

Normality Tests
KolmogorovSmirnov
Shapiro-Wilk

Variable

Statistic

z value

Statistic

z value

Statistic

Sig.

Statistic

Sig

Uncertainty
Avoidance

-0.645

-3.631

-1.601

-4.257

0419

0.000

0.602

0.000

Delegation
Preference

0.515

11.429

2.185

6.178

0.515

0.000

0.418

0.000

Applicable Remedies
Distribution
Description
Slight
negative
skew
Positive
skew

Transform
ation

Sig. After
Remedy

Reflect and
square root

-3.631

Square root

11.429

Multicollinearity of the predictor variables of Uncertainty and Delegation Preference
were checked and the correlation analysis indicated that the variables independently measured
different constructs and are not related conceptually (Table 33). Table 34 provides an overview
of beginning observed cases and their quantity for both predictor variables of Delegation
Preference and Uncertainty Preference and the Dependent Variable of risk management maturity
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classifications. One concern noted was the n for High Delegation Preference below the suggested
sample size of 50 cases that may affect the results of chi-square analysis (Hair et al., 2010).
Results were tested twice using both Executive Style as a single variable IV as well as bivariate
measures for Uncertainty Preference and Uncertainty Avoidance.
Table 33: Dependent Variable Correlations
Correlations
Delegation
Delegation

Pearson Correlation

1

Sig. (2-tailed)
N
UncertaintyAvoid

Pearson Correlation

UncertaintyAvoid
-.137
.061

187

187

-.137

1

Sig. (2-tailed)

.061

N

187

187
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Table 34: Multinomial Logistic Regression Case Processing Summary
Case Processing Summary
Marginal
N
RM Cluster

Executive Style

Uncertainty
Avoidance
Delegation
Preference

Valid
Missing
Total
Subpopulation

Percentage

1

83

44.4%

2

54

28.9%

3

46

24.6%

4

4

2.1%

Manager

108

57.8%

Maestro

52

27.8%

Producer

14

7.5%

Leader

13

7.0%

65

34.8%

High

122

65.2%

Low

160

85.6%

High

27

14.4%

187

100.0%

Low

0
187
4

Tests of Fit
The model failed to meet the criteria for model fitting (Table 35). The -2 Log Likelihood
decreased from the intercept or null value of 47.016 to the model value of 34.068, a small portion
of the initial variability (Field, 2009). Importantly, the results failed to reach a Significance level
of <.05. That is, the independent variables are not “significant in improving model estimation fit”
(Hair et al., 2010, p. 420). Goodness of fit measures were examined next. Both Pearson and
deviance measures were unavailable for Executive Style and failed the null hypothesis (Table
36) for Delegation/ Uncertainty, indicating the data fits that model well and the predicted values
“are not significantly different from the observed values” (Field, 2009, p. 308).
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Table 35: Model Fitting Information
Model Fitting Information
Model Fitting Criteria

Likelihood Ratio Tests

-2 Log
Model

AIC

BIC

Likelihood

Chi-Square

df

Sig.

Intercept Only

53.016

62.709

47.016

Final (ExStyle)

58.068

96.841

34.068

12.948

9

.165

Final (Del/

56.921

85.371

39.291

8.725

6

.190

Uncert)

Table 36: Goodness-of-Fit Measures
Goodness-of-Fit Executive Style
Chi-Square

df

Sig.

Pearson

.000

0

.

Deviance

.000

0

.

Goodness-of-Fit (Del/ Uncert)
Chi-Square

df

Sig.

Pearson

4.032

3

.258

Deviance

4.224

3

.238

The effect size is indicated by the Pseudo R-Square values (Table 37). Pseudo R-Square
is similar to the coefficient of determination (R2) in regression analysis with both values ranging
from 0.0, indicating poor fit, to 1.0, indicating a perfect fit (Hair et al., 2010). Reported Pseudo
R-Square values for both models indicate a poor fit (Table 37). Likelihood Ratio Tests (Table
38) were examined and determined to have failed tests of significance. Likelihood Ratio Tests
are designed to identify the predictor variables that significantly determine the outcome variable
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(Field, 2009). These ratios provide a summary of all of the predictor variables whereas individual
parameter estimates provide details of each component of a variable.
Table 37: Pseudo R-Square Values
Pseudo R-Square
(Executive Style)
Cox and Snell

.067

Nagelkerke

.074

McFadden

.030

Pseudo R-Square (Del/
Uncert)
Cox and Snell

.046

Nagelkerke

.051

McFadden

.020

Table 38: Likelihood Ratio Tests
Likelihood Ratio Tests (Executive Style)
Model Fitting Criteria

Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log

Effect

AIC of Reduced

BIC of Reduced

Likelihood of

Model

Model

Reduced Model

df

Sig.

.000

0

.

Intercept

58.068

96.841

ExStyle

53.016

62.709

47.016

12.948

9

.165

56.291

85.371

a

.000

0

.

54.320

73.707

42.320

4.029

3

.258

55.295

74.681

43.285

5.003

3

.172

Intercept
Unert
Avoid
Del Pref

34.068

Chi-Square

a

38.291

The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model.
The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all
parameters of that effect are 0.
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the
degrees of freedom.
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Individual parameter estimates (Table 39) were examined to determine if any
components of the variables were significant in determining the outcome variables. Examination
of all of the significance levels for each cluster indicates that no component was able to
significantly predict membership in one of the four target clusters.

Table 39: Individual Parameter Estimates
Parameter Estimates (Executive Style)
95% Confidence Interval
for Exp(B)
Std.
RM Cluster
1

2

3

a

Intercept

B

Error

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

4.043

1.433

7.965

1

.005

[UncertAvoid_H_L=3]

-1.938

1.188

2.660

1

.103

.144

.014

1.479

[UncertAvoid_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

[DelPref_H_L=3]

.020

1.211

.000

1

.987

1.020

.095

10.946

[DelPref_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

3.043

1.460

4.344

1

.037

[UncertAvoid_H_L=3]

-1.573

1.197

1.725

1

.189

.207

.020

2.169

[UncertAvoid_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

[DelPref_H_L=3]

.554

1.241

.199

1

.655

1.740

.153

19.792

[DelPref_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

2.171

1.524

2.030

1

.154

[UncertAvoid_H_L=3]

-1.527

1.204

1.609

1

.205

.217

.021

2.299

[UncertAvoid_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

[DelPref_H_L=3]

1.320

1.315

1.008

1

.315

3.744

.284

49.275

[DelPref_H_L=4]

b

.

.

0

.

.

.

.

Intercept

Intercept

0

0

0

0

0

0

a. The reference category is: 4.
b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Actual and predicted classification are described in Table 40. These tables indicate that
the model using only Executive Style as a predictor correctly identifies 44.4% of the overall
classifications of the variables. This model fails to accurately predict placement into clusters 2-4,
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which is a serious weakness. The model that uses Uncertainty Avoidance and Delegation
Preference provides a marginally improved overall percentage correct, however, the absence of
predicted membership in clusters three and four continues to be a weakness. Interest in the
classification ability of the model includes the ability to identify the managerial attributes of
executives who manage more risk mature supply chains as this greater level of maturity has
indicated improved financial performance of firms (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Observed
frequencies are listed in Table 41.
Table 40: Classifications
Classification (Executive Style)
Predicted
Observed

1

2

3

4

Percent Correct

1

83

0

0

0

100.0%

2

54

0

0

0

0.0%

3

46

0

0

0

0.0%

4

4

0

0

0

0.0%

100.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

44.4%

Overall Percentage

Classification (Del/ Uncert)
Predicted
Observed

1

2

3

4

Percent Correct

1

67

16

0

0

80.7%

2

36

18

0

0

33.3%

3

30

16

0

0

0.0%

4

2

2

0

0

0.0%

72.2%

27.8%

0.0%

0.0%

45.5%

Overall Percentage
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Table 41: Observed Executive Style Frequencies by Cluster
Observed Frequencies

Delegation Preference

Uncertainty Avoidance

Low Delegation Preference Low Uncert Avoid

High Uncert Avoid

High Delegation Preference Low Uncert Avoid

High Uncert Avoid

Executive Style RM Cluster
Maestro

Manager

Leader

Producer

Frequency

Percentage

Observed

Observed

1

16

30.8%

2

18

34.6%

3

16

30.8%

4

2

3.8%

1

51

47.2%

2

29

26.9%

3

27

25.0%

4

1

0.9%

1

9

69.2%

2

2

15.4%

3

1

7.7%

4

1

7.7%

1

7

50.0%

2

5

35.7%

3

2

14.3%

4

0

0.0%

The percentages are based on total observed frequencies in each subpopulation.

Based on the findings, the multinomial logistic regression model is not valid to support
initial hypotheses or predictions of cluster membership (Table 42) and additional research may
be required to understand the relationship between managers, risk management maturity levels
and the appropriate managerial attributes that may impact the relationship that is statistically
significant.
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Table 42: Hypothesis Findings
Hypothesis

Prediction

Finding

H1

Maestro style is
a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity
b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity
c) positively associated with Level III RM maturity
d) positively associated with Level IV RM maturity

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Leader style is
a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity
b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity
c) positively associated with Level III RM maturity
d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Manager style is
a) negatively associated with Level I RM maturity
b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity
c) negatively associated with Level III RM maturity
d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

Producer style is
a) positively associated with Level I RM maturity
b) positively associated with Level II RM maturity
c) negatively associated with Level III RM maturity
d) negatively associated with Level IV RM maturity

Not supported
Not supported
Not supported
Not supported

H2

H3

H4

The second questioned examined by the quantitative study concerned the Executive Style
attributes of healthcare supply chain managers. Several self-reported attributes were examined
using SPSS Crosstabs as related to the study respondents. Table 43 summarizes the response
values by case for each area examined. Of note, not all respondents indicated whether or not they
had experienced a disruption to their supply chain. Further, only military respondents were
queried regarding their Branch of Service, resulting in lower total cases for both variables.
Additional Crosstab results are located in Appendix H.
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Table 43: Case Processing Summary
Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid
N
Executive Style * YrsSCExp
Executive Style *
YrsHCSCExp
Executive Style *
CurrentPosition
Executive Style *
DisruptionExperience
Executive Style *
FacilityBedSize
Executive Style *
BranchofService
Executive Style * RM
Cluster

Missing

Percent

N

Total

Percent

N

Percent

177

94.7%

10

5.3%

187

100.0%

177

94.7%

10

5.3%

187

100.0%

177

94.7%

10

5.3%

187

100.0%

120

64.2%

67

35.8%

187

100.0%

177

94.7%

10

5.3%

187

100.0%

57

30.5%

130

69.5%

187

100.0%

187

100.0%

0

0.0%

187

100.0%

When examining the respondents Executive Style compared to their years of healthcare
supply chain experience the Manager style was most represented with 58.2% of respondents.
Over 50% of Manager identified respondents indicated over 17 years of Healthcare supply chain
experience. These managers have been characterized as having a short term focus, a preference
for executing tasks themselves and avoiding uncertainty (Table 44). To ensure the proper level of
supply chain responsibility and potential influence was present in the respondent pool, the survey
requested the current position held (Table 45). Only 2.3% identified as a front line supervisor or
manager, indicating the respondents carried a large share of responsibility for supply chain
operations in their facility.
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Table 44: Executive Style and Years of Healthcare Supply Chain Experience Comparison
Crosstab
YrsHCSCExp
<1

2-4

5-8

9-12

13-16

17-20

>20

Total

Executive Manager Count

1

6

18

12

13

11

42

103

Style

.6

6.4

18.0

16.3

13.4

10.5

37.8

103.0

1.0%

5.8%

17.5%

11.7%

12.6%

10.7%

40.8% 100.0%

100.0%

54.5%

58.1%

42.9%

56.5%

61.1%

64.6%

58.2%

0.6%

3.4%

10.2%

6.8%

7.3%

6.2%

23.7%

58.2%

Count

0

2

10

9

7

6

14

48

Expected Count

.3

3.0

8.4

7.6

6.2

4.9

17.6

48.0

0.0%

4.2%

20.8%

18.8%

14.6%

12.5%

29.2% 100.0%

0.0%

18.2%

32.3%

32.1%

30.4%

33.3%

21.5%

27.1%

0.0%

1.1%

5.6%

5.1%

4.0%

3.4%

7.9%

27.1%

0

2

2

3

2

0

4

13

.1

.8

2.3

2.1

1.7

1.3

4.8

13.0

0.0%

15.4%

15.4%

23.1%

15.4%

0.0%

0.0%

18.2%

6.5%

10.7%

8.7%

0.0%

6.2%

7.3%

0.0%

1.1%

1.1%

1.7%

1.1%

0.0%

2.3%

7.3%

Count

0

1

1

4

1

1

5

13

Expected Count

.1

.8

2.3

2.1

1.7

1.3

4.8

13.0

0.0%

7.7%

7.7%

30.8%

7.7%

7.7%

0.0%

9.1%

3.2%

14.3%

4.3%

5.6%

7.7%

7.3%

0.0%

0.6%

0.6%

2.3%

0.6%

0.6%

2.8%

7.3%

1

11

31

28

23

18

65

177

1.0

11.0

31.0

28.0

23.0

18.0

65.0

177.0

0.6%

6.2%

17.5%

15.8%

13.0%

10.2%

Expected Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
YrsHCSCExp
% of Total
Maestro

% within
Executive Style
% within
YrsHCSCExp
% of Total
Producer Count
Expected Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
YrsHCSCExp
% of Total
Leader

% within
Executive Style
% within
YrsHCSCExp
% of Total
Total

Count
Expected Count
% within
Executive Style

30.8% 100.0%

38.5% 100.0%

36.7% 100.0%
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% within
YrsHCSCExp
% of Total

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
0.6%

6.2%

17.5%

15.8%

13.0%

10.2%

36.7% 100.0%

Table 45: Executive Style and Current Position Comparison
Crosstab
CurrentPosition
Front Line

Executive Style Manager

Count

Dept Mgr

level

Total
103

2.3

57.6

43.1

103.0

% within Executive Style

2.9%

56.3%

40.8%

100.0%

% within CurrentPosition

75.0%

58.6%

56.8%

58.2%

1.7%

32.8%

23.7%

58.2%

0

24

24

48

1.1

26.8

20.1

48.0

% within Executive Style

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

100.0%

% within CurrentPosition

0.0%

24.2%

32.4%

27.1%

% of Total

0.0%

13.6%

13.6%

27.1%

Count

0

8

5

13

Expected Count

.3

7.3

5.4

13.0

% within Executive Style

0.0%

61.5%

38.5%

100.0%

% within CurrentPosition

0.0%

8.1%

6.8%

7.3%

% of Total

0.0%

4.5%

2.8%

7.3%

Count

1

9

3

13

Expected Count

.3

7.3

5.4

13.0

% within Executive Style

7.7%

69.2%

23.1%

100.0%

% within CurrentPosition

25.0%

9.1%

4.1%

7.3%

0.6%

5.1%

1.7%

7.3%

4

99

74

177

4.0

99.0

74.0

177.0

% within Executive Style

2.3%

55.9%

41.8%

100.0%

% within CurrentPosition

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

2.3%

55.9%

41.8%

100.0%

Count

% of Total
Total

Supervisor

42

Expected Count

Leader

Senior Mgr/ C-

58

% of Total

Producer

Mid-Lvl Mgr/

3

Expected Count

Maestro

Mgr/

Count
Expected Count

% of Total
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Further delineation of the scope of responsibility was examined by comparing Executive
Style classifications against the size of facility they were responsible to furnish with supplies.
The categorizations are a standard taxonomy utilized by the American Hospital Association
(Table 46). Managers, Maestros and Leaders were most prevalent in hospitals or hospital
systems in excess of 500 beds, representing in all cases over 26% of the respondents in that
Executive Style.
Overall, Managers tend to be the most numerous style of respondents and those with over
13 years of healthcare supply chain experience represent over 35% of total respondents.
Managers with greater tenure and serving in larger facilities may exert a great deal of influence
on operational choices.
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Table 46: Executive Style and Facility Size Comparison
Crosstab
FacilityBedSize

6-24
Executive Manager Count
Style

Expected
Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
FacilityBedSize
% of Total
Maestro

Count
Expected
Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
FacilityBedSize
% of Total

Producer Count
Expected
Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
FacilityBedSize
% of Total
Leader

Count
Expected
Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
FacilityBedSize
% of Total

25-49

50-99

100-

200-

300-

400-

199

299

399

499

>500

n/a

Total

2

7

10

18

9

11

5

27

14

103

3.5

8.7

9.3

13.4

9.9

8.7

5.2

27.9

16.3

103.0

1.9%

6.8%

9.7%

17.5%

8.7%

10.7%
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26.2%
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6.2%

2.8%

15.3%

7.9%

58.2%

2

8

3

4

5

3

3
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6
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6.2
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1.7%
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1

0

3

1

2

1

1

2

2
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1

0

0

0

1

0

0

5

6
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1.7
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1.1
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7.7%
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0.6%
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Total

Count
Expected
Count
% within
Executive Style
% within
FacilityBedSize
% of Total

6

15

16

23

17

15

9

48

28

177

6.0

15.0

16.0

23.0

17.0

15.0

9.0

48.0

28.0

177.0

3.4%

8.5%

9.0%

13.0%

9.6%

8.5%

5.1%

27.1%

15.8% 100.0%

100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
3.4%

8.5%

9.0%

13.0%

9.6%

8.5%

5.1%

27.1%

15.8% 100.0%

Discussion of Quantitative Study One Results
Quantitative Study One was designed to explore two questions. The preliminary question
concerned the impact that a healthcare supply chain manager’s Executive Style has on risk
management maturity as examined through the lens of Contingency Theory. The second question
was designed to gain understanding as to whether healthcare supply chain managers possess
similar styles. Contingency Theory suggests that within specific industries and contexts certain
characteristics of managers, in this research defined as Executive Style, may be best overall to
address certain contingencies, described here as supply chain risk management maturities
(Fiedler, 1965, Singhal and Singhal, 2012). Contrary to expectations, a healthcare supply chain
manager’s classification within Executive Style taxonomy failed to predict a firm’s supply chain
risk management maturity level when risk management levels were clustered.
Hypothesis 1 suggested that a manager’s preference for executing activities themselves,
characterized by low preference for delegation and the acceptance of greater uncertainty, often
needed when developing the long term relationships required for stronger relationships
(Ganesan, 1994) and classified in this research as Maestro style, would be more likely to predict
membership in the highest level of risk management maturity. Interestingly, there were far
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greater members of the Maestro classification (52) than Cluster 4 members (4). However some
researchers (Ganesan, 1994) have found that some types of uncertainty have opposite effects on
relationships. Others have noted that increased periods of transactional relations increase trust
and reduce risk (Ring and van de Ven, 1992). This interactional data and longitudinal
information was not obtained in this study and could not be tested. This pattern was found to
repeat across the remaining hypotheses, H2-H4.
H2 tested the relationship between Leader style and a higher level of risk management
maturity. Leaders are characterized also by their willingness to accept uncertainty but prefer to
delegate. This was the smallest group with a total of 13 respondents. As with H1 no relationship
to higher levels of risk management maturity could be established.
H3 suggested the Manager style would be closely related to lower maturity levels. While
overall lower maturity levels were indicated by the research, Managers represented the largest
group of respondents (n=108) and no statistically significant relation was indicated. Maestro and
Producer styles populated Cluster 2 with higher percentages of respondents.
H4 examined the Producer style and as with previous hypotheses no significant
relationship was indicated. Interestingly, both Producer and Leader styles were represented with
approximately 85 percent of respondents in this maturity level and all styles reported at least 65
percent of respondents clustered into the two lowest levels of maturity.

These results suggest an important implication noted by Hakonsson et al., (2012) in the
discovery that misalignment between Executive Styles and firm strategy resulted in opportunity
losses and poor financial performance. While this study was not longitudinal and did not explore
the financial impact on operation costs from supply chain management activities, it was noted
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that the majority, seventy three percent, of respondents classified in the lowest two clusters,
indicating immaturity in their operations, characterized by qualities previous researches have
classified as ‘ad-hoc’ (Simchi-Levi et al., 2012), ‘novice’ (IACCM, 2003) or ‘naive’ (Hillson,
1997). This may be characteristic of the failure to align found by Hakonsson et al., (2012).
However in that longitudinal research, more broad dependent variables of strategy and firm
performance were examined. Additionally, there may be influences beyond the ability of the
supply chain manager to impact due to their power in the organizational structure. Some of these
issues are explored in the Study two results discussion.
Of particular interest is the difference discovered between the more broad based risk
management maturity levels defined by multiple researchers (Simchi-Levi et al, 2013, IACCM,
2003, Hillson, 1997) which are used to classify firms and provide benchmarks and the selfreported supply chain risk management maturity clusters described by hospital supply chain
managers.
Previous research (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) indicated risk management maturity levels
that numbered fewer members at the highest and lowest levels and near equal membership in the
second and third levels. However, Executive Style was still unable to predict membership. Study
Two explored simultaneously the complex influences that impact risk management choices in the
healthcare supply chain and the impact on supply chain manager choices.

Study 2 Qualitative Research Findings
Sample
Respondents were drawn from the current roster of US Military medical logistics
specialists in the Army and membership rolls of AHRMM. The respondents were selected to
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ensure representation across most all sizes of hospitals, as defined by the American Hospital
Association taxonomy (AHA, 2014). The Names provided are pseudonyms, although the gender
matches the gender of the respondent. The Facility label indicates if the facility serves mainly a
civilian or military population. The Manager label indicates if the manager is in the US
uniformed services or a civilian. The indication of Rural or Urban focus is a self-identified
attribute for each respective facility. The Bed Range indicates the size of each facility according
to the AHA standard classification. A range of bed sizes is used to protect the anonymity of
respondent facilities who provided a specific bed size to the interviewer and which was validated
through public records (Table 47). Interviews were conducted during a ten month period and
were conducted both telephonically and in person where geographically feasible.
Table 47: Interview Participant Demographics
“Name”

Facility
(Military/Civilian)

Manager
Military/Civilian

Rural/
Urban

Linda
Ken
Ron
Pamela
Laurie
Stan
Brenda
Donald

Civilian
Military
Military
Military
Civilian
Civilian
Military
Civilian

Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural
Rural

Norman
Nancy

Civilian
Civilian

Civilian
Military
Military
Military
Civilian
Civilian
Military
Civilian (Former
Military)
Civilian
Civilian

Patricia
Evan

Military
Civilian

Tony

Civilian

Nate
Edith

Civilian
Civilian

Civilian
Civilian (Former
Military)
Civilian (Former
Military)
Civilian
Civilian (Former
Military)

Rural
Urban/
Regional
Urban
Rural

AHA Range

Bed Size
US
Hospitals
% by size

% of
Respondents

25-49

22

20

50-99

21

20

100-199

21

7

200-299

11

7

300-399

6

13

400-499

3

7

500+

5

27

Urban
Urban
Urban

Data Collection
Data collection was directed by a semi-structured interview guide that allowed for a
degree of latitude for respondents to elaborate on key topics pertaining to risk in their supply
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chain and the thought processes they used to identify risks as important. Prompts were used to
elicit further details and actual experiences were obtained when practical and their inclusion
progressed naturally from the interview topic and content.
The interview guide can be found at Appendix A. Each interview lasted between 30 and
60 minutes. After receiving permission and recording the interview, post-interview verbatim
transcripts were created by the lead researcher, yielding 155 pages for analysis.
Purposive sampling (Maxwell, 1996) allowed the researcher to access a broad range of
respondents, taking into account facility size (based on bed count, an industry standard for
stratification of facilities) and type, whether military or civilian. Further, as recommended by
Manuj and Pohlen (2012), participants were selected who “fit the context, had visibility over part
or the entire phenomenon, were knowledgeable, willing to participate, and experienced with, and
engaged in the phenomenon being studied” (p. 793). Grounded theory tenets propose that data
collection continues until theoretical saturation is obtained (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Various
authors have indicated possible stopping points, such as McCracken (1988), who suggested eight
interviews may be appropriate. To obtain saturation a total of fifteen interviews were conducted
for this research, although saturation was indicated after twelve interviews. Saturation
determination was made when at least one common theme emerged as significantly present
among most respondents.

Data Coding and Analysis
Coding followed the guidelines of Glaser (1978, 1988, 2002) in that the codes developed
naturally from the text . A Glaserian approach allowed the formation of codes and
conceptualizations to develop without pre-ordained categorizations used to order responses. Each
transcript was examined line-by-line and by paragraph to identify relevant responses to the
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interview questions and explore themes. When a relevant response was identified, it was
assigned a descriptive code to briefly summarize the concept contained in the respondent’s
words. When appropriate, due to the complexity of a response, researcher memos were
developed to clarify the reason for assignment of a code. During the transcript reviews and
during subsequent case analyses, codes continued to be developed and assigned in an iterative
manner. Where applicable, codes were grouped together under a more general umbrella concept
as iterative analysis continued. When individual case analysis was complete, textual analysis of
coded passages across cases was conducted to identify similarities and generate a higher level of
contextualization.
Constant comparison between codes developed in discussions of Low-Probability HighImpact discussions was conducted until multiple themes emerged that added understanding to
risk management approaches of the managers. Although constant comparison was conducted
from the initial coding iteration, identifiable themes did not appear until approximately the
twelfth interview. Additional interviews continued to support the initial findings as the constant
comparison technique continued to identify other cross case similarities.

Research Trustworthiness
A goal of trustworthiness is to allow the reader to ultimately form similar conclusions as
the researcher through examination of the evidence presented (Randall and Mello, 2012). This is
accomplished when the researcher ensures multiple criteria are met that confirm the validity of
the research findings. The criteria used in this research and how they were applied to this study
are provided in Table 48.
Table 48: Qualitative Trustworthiness Criteria
Trustworthiness

Definition*

Applied in this Study
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Criteria*
Credibility

Extent to which results appear
to be acceptable
representations of the findings

Transferability

Extent to which the findings
may transfer to other contexts

Dependability

Extent to which findings are
unique to time and place; the
stability of the explanations

Confirmability

Extent to which interpretations
are the result of the
participants and phenomenon
and not to researcher bias
Extent to which findings are
the result of misinterpretation
or evasion by the participants

Integrity

Understanding

Extent to which theory makes
sense to participants

Generality

Comprehensiveness of
construct development

Feedback was solicited from respondents based
on preliminary findings. Interviews were
conducted over a ten month period with small,
medium and large facilities.
Participants were selected based on purposive
sampling across US based civilian and military
facilities and represented diversity in size and
service region (urban and rural).
Respondents were able to provide answers and
examples encompassing both current and
historical perspectives. Responses possessed
surety of tone and content.
Confirmatory textual analysis was conducted to
verify interpretations. Extensive quotes were
identified to support conclusions.
Interviewees were assured of anonymity and
exclusion from analysis of identified passages. A
professional atmosphere and interviewee
preparation were utilized from initial contact
through interview completion
Interviewees were provided an initial summary of
findings and confirmed that results matched their
experiences.
Interviews were easily conducted within the
allotted time and allowed ample time for
respondents to elaborate extensively without
time pressure to formulate responses.

* Based on Thomas 2012. Criteria and definitions adapted from Flint et al. 2002, p.106; Flint and Mentzer 2000; Strauss and Corbin
1990; Hirschman 1986; and Lincoln and Guba 1985

Study 2 Qualitative Findings
There has been little research with a focus on risk management in healthcare supply
chains although general risk management in business (Mehr and Hedges, 1963, Bettis, 1982,
Omenn et al., 1997) and supply chain (Smelzer and Siford, 1998, Juttner et al., 2003, Talluri et
al., 2013) has received attention in the recent past. The lack of field specific information in
healthcare supply chain provides an opportunity for exploratory research to understand aspects of
how healthcare supply chain managers approach risk and if there are factors that are unique to
the field. As an exploratory study, no theoretical foundation was used as a framework during the
development of the research protocol (Glaser, 1992, 2002) in order to reduce potential researcher
bias based on preconceptions derived from a specific theoretical lens. Study 2 explored the
causes and motivations that impact healthcare supply chain manager choices regarding risk
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management at their facilities.
Prior to the interview, managers were asked to provide responses on a 2x2 risk map,
indicating their four to six most critical supply chain risks (Figure 14). The semi-structured
interview focused on those risks on the bottom right quadrant, generally regarded as Low
Probability, High Impact risks. Respondents were not made aware of this focus prior to
completion of the risk map or the semi-structured interview, nor were they provided guidance
regarding the scope of High Impact. Rather the goal was to understand these concepts as
understood individually by each respondent in their unique circumstance. The following analysis
discusses the main results of the interviews, based upon the flow of the interview protocol.

Figure 14: Supply Chain Risk Map

Patients not customers as a cultural focus
Only one respondent, Nancy, mentioned culture specifically as having a focus on patient
care, “Our culture tends to be very collaborative and patient centered, very safety oriented and
so I think that relationship management is maybe more important.” However, patientcenteredness was a recurring theme across most all respondents and although not mentioned as a
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within case theme, can be considered as a cross-case theme that is shared among interviewees
and is ingrained into and guides their activities and choices. Organizational culture in healthcare
has been discussed by Scott et al., (2003) and encompasses “a combination of organizational
psychology, social psychology, and social anthropology” (p. 924) and this focus is evident with
the frequent mention of patient-centeredness. However, it must be noted that several managers
acknowledged that the patient is not the customer in the supply chain transaction, but their health
outcome is deemed intricately entwined with the activities of the supply chain manager. The
doctors, nurses and other health practitioners are the customers of the supply chain manager and
at times there can be a contentious relationship.
Ken indirectly described the patient-centered culture this way while discussing the effect
of improved operations on the staff:
“It allows them [clinical staff] to focus on other issues now, that they get to look at,
because ultimately at the end of the day it's not about what Ken does, it's not about what
the logistics team does, it's about patients. And it's about patient care. And ultimately,
and I share that at every newcomers orientation, ultimately at the end of the day it's not
about people walking about in lab coats and stethoscopes in their pockets, it's about
people walking in the front door pushing a baby carriage or stroller in the worst
moments of their lives needing care, and that's what were here to provide.”
This type of focus is described by Mentzer et al., (2001) as an extended supply chain,
where there is a focus on the customer’s customer, as part of the overall strategy. To achieve the
greatest value, all members of the healthcare supply chain should focus on optimization of the
“overall activities of firms working together to create bundles of goods and services” without
“maximizing the interests of one player” (Burns et al., 2002, p.9). However, there is often
friction between the supply chain manager and the customer, described as medical providers, as
well as enablers such as management. Examples of these were noted by respondents and the
subsequent results were noted as well and are described as appropriate below.
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The interview began with a general discussion of risks present in the manager’s daily
thoughts to gauge where the daily focus of their efforts may lie and the constant inputs they face
when also considering more extreme risks that are both low frequency but with potentially
serious to catastrophic consequence. They then provided an elaboration of the importance of
those risks, and what actions had been taken in mitigation.

Pressing Risks in Daily Thoughts
The variety of responses was reflective of the broad size and geographic dispersion of the
facilities and included risks that were perceived to emanate both internally and externally.
“The biggest risk to us though is really, I feel the greatest risk is just that change in the
reimbursement of healthcare. We’re seeing some very interesting changes in the way,
with the Affordable Care Act, you just dump 4 million more people into the system that
aren't paying for their care and they're putting the burden on the states, the states don't
really have any money, so we have to become very lean at what we do.” – Evan
“It’s just amazing being in the civilian sector compared to the military. There was just so
much money that was just being left on the table. They weren't billing for things that they
could if you know what I'm saying. He [the new CFO] has hardwired that. Obviously the
more money he brings in the better. It makes me look good when it comes to supply
expense ratios to net patient revenue. But, that being said, we are able to recapitalize the
organization, if you look at it from a Moody's or a bond level, you could have a great
checking account, you can have great expenses, but if your facilities are archaic and not
current in terms of construction and equipment and stuff, the bond guys are going to look
the other way – the bond guys will say "You guys aren't going to be around very long
because you're not perpetuating the future of your organization." – Tony
Daily concerns also include the use of time. In organizations that may have to contend
with becoming more lean, as mentioned by Evan, time is also an area where increasing demands
are placed upon management for supply chain performance as demands are simultaneously
placed upon management’s limited capacity to perform work. This was exemplified in a
comment by Nate who manages the supply chain for a large regional academic children’s
hospital. "I'm going to work on the capital budget today, I'm going to meet with this person to do
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that, then I hear there is a mandatory Ebola presentation and that all gets blown away. I'm
surprised I got into your conversation here.” Yet, not only do managers have more demands
placed upon their time, Nate also discussed the other requirements to be in the supply chain
position “In supply chain now you had better be flexible, you'd better have a wide breadth of
skills because you don't quite know who you're going to be talking to or what you're going to be
doing next.” Yet the pressing need for time-consuming, necessary tasks also extends to staff,
which is often limited. One of Nate’s few staff members has two roles. One is to manage the
bone and tissue bank and the other is recall management where:
“He spends about five hours of his eight hour day - So we subscribe to a recall service
called ECRI, we are also looking around for a more robust system than that - the number
of recalls have exponentially increased over the last five years. I've been here for nine
years and I used to get one or two recalls a month you know for the OR and the Cath
Lab. We probably get, I'm going to say, 5 to 10 recalls a week now.”
Although Nate understands the importance of managing recalls, he further comments on the
overall lack of influence he has, “because I think that's a huge risk and a disruption, if somebody
doesn't do something about it.”
Another area where managers have a lack of influence is the weather, as noted by both
Patricia, located in the US Southwest and Norman, located in the US Northeast. For Patricia, the
weather was noted as a particularly important seasonal disruption as the hospital runs on a very
strict just-in-time replenishment model where bad weather may impact both delivery of supplies
and the ability of staff to report for work “If we don't have supplies, we can't provide direct
patient care through our clinical staff. Not having staff to do the job, we have no one to push it
out.” Patricia’s hospital is currently mitigating this by establishing a restocking solution that both
reduces supplies on hand, “we stock a lot of inventory here, which is not the best way to have
velocity management” and enables faster replenishment of the wards should there be delays by
“implementing the low unit of measure . . . under our prime vendor contract . . . so that
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even if you have delays, we've taken out the element, or the procedure of having to
process everything and having to break it down and segregating and getting it out. Those
are already palletized and segregated. Which even if it came in at nine, we could still get
it out. Even as fast as we did before.”
Norman’s challenge in the Northeast includes more seasonally predictable events such as
flooding, ice storms and high winds. They remain daily worries between October and March
when those events affect transportation routes between the hospital and the vendor depot. What
is routinely a two hour drive can be greatly disrupted.
“All my stuff gets to me through those major interstates. We get some really bad winter
ice storms. So they shut-they close the interstates. Like the . . . Turnpike is usually the
first one that closes. My warehouse for supplies - I have a small one on campus for my
pandemic now, that's just something I've added in the last year because of the problem
we've had over the last 10 years. So Cardinal has a distribution center - it's a two-hour
drive on a pretty day but, you know, we get hammered with hurricanes on the east coast
and, depending on winds, they've closed parts of the Turnpike because it has these raised
bridges and stuff. Really bad winds and rain can cause it. But, then by January February is ice storms, they close it too. . . Ice storms I really don't worry about them too
much in November. I start worrying about them in December and by March I stop
worrying about them.”
Yet as Edith’s facility in the North Central US has developed their risk management
plans, they have separated their supply planning between imminent and predictable risks with the
goal of placing the right supplies in proximity to where they will be needed if there is time to
communicate the need:
“So we developed stocking plans against the individual risk events. Snow storms,
tornadoes, dam bursting, all the different risk events that we identified, and we correlated
those back to a specific supply list. So that when we looked at tornadoes we said what
would we expect our community hospitals to do? For the most part they're going to triage
and transport. They're going to stabilize the patient, do basic, basic stabilization of the
patient, and they're going to transport to our main hospital. So, that's how we went about
creating our supply list.”
Communication was cited as both a daily concern as well as a daily means to mitigate
concerns. On the positive side, communication regarding finance helps to recover previously
unavailable revenue and removes pressure caused by falling reimbursements as described by
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Tony’s relationship with the Chief Financial Officer regarding approaches to routine contract
servicing,
“I would say from a finance perspective, this organization has never been in as great of
shape. But, the collaboration with the CFO and my team is just amazing. Just in the, what
I call the purchased services market, in negotiating and renegotiating contracts and
having him ask questions and or sign the contract, we easily pocketed half a million to
three quarters of a million in savings in the last twenty four months as an example.”
Tony also mentioned the benefit of working and communicating together in an incident
control center as key and exemplified when real-world concerns entered into a crisis drill.
“We just did a mass casualty drill. We've done two or three since I've been here. I would
say the last one that we did was the more efficiently, effectively, commanded and
controlled - because of communication. We had verbal-everybody was in the same room.
When I think of communication it's like the whole package. Communication up and down
the chain as it relates to whatever the issue is that's going on. It doesn't matter whether
it's a mass casualty drill, or a power outage which, actually, during the mass casualty
drill, a construction worker on the sixth floor in the East wing managed to shut off the
water to the sprinkler system which in turn shut off the air handlers to the entire hospital.
Yet, we were still able to work through that because of good communication and keep the
drill going and get the air handlers back online.”
Yet poor communication frustrates efforts of supply chain managers such as Pamela, who
expressed frustration with departments working around centrally mandated standardizations to
procure physician preference items that become dead stock when the provider fails to use the
standardized and procured item and instead arranges an alternate procurement method.
“The shops will do a special order around it and get what they wanted originally
anyway. . . I think, we tend to waste funds on these mandated, standardized items that no
one uses. Either they expire, or I think it's just a fund waste . . . because we get stuck with
these items and then they expire or we have to figure out some way to get dispersed
across the region.”
Ken further points out that standardizations add another level of complications when
vendors subsequently change catalogs and remove items,
“It is typical healthcare supply chain management, so as new products are introduced
into prime vendor catalogs, we may, we may not know about those changes to the catalog
at the time their changed, or worse yet the biggest risk we see is that we find out about it
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when we try to submit an order for an item that we already know is there and the product
number has changed. So, that's a significant risk for us.”

Mapping Risks of Low Probability – High Impact
To focus risk management thought, respondents were asked to complete a two
dimensional risk management matrix based on the probability of an event occurring to impact
their supply chain and the subsequent business impact. This approach allowed for self-selection
of topics that would be discussed based upon each individual hospital’s circumstances.
Additionally, this approach removed any potential bias introduced by a researcher suggested risk
topic that may be perceived differently by various hospitals. The topic of discussion therefore
was standardized by probability and impact due to its placement in a specific quadrant.
Drivers that caused supply chain managers to consider risks in this quadrant included, for
Linda, requirements of the Joint Commission. The Joint Commission is the major accrediting
body for healthcare facilities in the US. Laurie, who works in a geographically isolated facility
where attracting providers is difficult, placed purchase of major equipment and subsequent nonutilization due to lack of staff as a risk as it ties up capital with no subsequent return. Ron, who
works in a military facility based his response on previous training and considered the question
this way:
“What I was thinking? - What’s the absolute worst case scenario? Having participated in
NORTHCOM - US Army North - exercises, I know what they prepare for. They prepare
for these 10 kiloton nuclear detonations in major population nodes. So, that's the
scenario that ran through my head, because that's the scenario that we kind of walk
through when we do these exercises.
Nate couples previous experience preparing for a pandemic threat with his perception of
the weakness of the current healthcare supply chain:
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“We found ourselves in a backorder situation pretty quick and having to bring in special
supplies. So since then we now keep three months of supplies for PPE [personal
protective equipment] items at our local warehouse, just in case we do have another bad
flu season. You get an outbreak, you get a pandemic, and you can go through whatever
supplies that that pandemic-whatever you need to address that pandemic with - you can
run out pretty quick. Because whatever hits you, it's hitting at least the local if not the
regional hospitals as well, and as I mentioned before, the supply chain is so thin, any
significant hiccup or spike in demand just wipes it out.”
Nancy extended the daily patient focus onto the critical issue driving her thoughts
relating to high impact – low probability risks “The thing that's in front of you is “How are we
going to meet our patient demand?” Everybody's got their eye on that ball.” Laurie provided
more specific guidance regarding the importance of the patient in driving risk in this quadrant,
“It wasn't catastrophic because it wasn't loss of life. So, catastrophic to me is loss of life, serious
or medium [impacts] are more financial and business concerns.” Donald, Ron, Nancy, Tony and
Nate all expressed the importance of managing risk, as failure would negatively impact patient
care. “We would not be able to provide care here. We would have to shut patient care facilities
after we exhausted the stock on hand.” stated Ron.
Others were driven by historical experiences. Evan referred to a ‘once every ten years’
ice storm that happened a mere three years after the first one he experienced and it made quite an
impact on his thinking as
“Our kitchen was running out of food. We were trying to feed the patients, but I've got
750 employees that were stuck at the hospital that we had to feed three meals a day and
find places for them to sleep. Just all of the logistics of that was a very high risk and
something that you want to be able to deal with but, I don't know that you're ever
completely prepared.”
Donald, who works in a medium sized rural hospital has weathered a snowstorm but noted
“The snowstorms - we had a double snowstorm and it so happened we were six days
without a supply delivery out here. It took a lot of - I have some great buyers who have
years and years of experience - we got by because we figured out what we could use
instead of what was being requested and we found - we took places where our par levels
may not have been set exactly right, where we had an excess we just redistributed
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throughout the hospital. We got by with what we needed. It was a tough six days, the last
day was pretty tough but we did get by. So we did experience that.”
Nate expressed concerns about hurricanes as “being in Florida, every year it's a constant,
real scenario, where we can get hit by a hurricane.”
Nate also noted impacts in this quadrant will be tied to operational capability, ability to
attract business and customer perception, especially in high profile contagion-centered
disruptions. Overall though,
“Like more or less with Katrina. We'd be recovering from that for a long time. A
pandemic, only because of the seriousness, one, of the supplies, but also, if we look at
what's happening with the Texas hospital where they treated the Ebola patient, it's almost
a ghost town there now. They lost 70% of their business. So, depending on how the
pandemic plays out, it could actually scare away business. All of your elective
procedures are going to get canceled and, if people have a choice of where they want to
go, they're going to avoid your hospital if they feel like it's a central place for treating a
serious illness.”
Tony, who manages the supply chain for a large, 500+ bed hospital, with a yearly
Emergency Department throughput of over 200,000 patients felt the risk was tied to the volume
of business and
“The technology aspect, the higher risk I put on there, was more than that we're so tied,
whether it be communications, ordering, to some EDI transactions, to everything else
that if our information systems, our payroll systems, everything else takes a hit we are in
a much worse situation, believe it or not, then a hurricane.”

External Influences
A final factor mentioned when discussing why a manager felt risk was present in the
supply chain was external influences. Some reasons included trying to prevent items from ending
up in the local black market according to Ken who works in a small rural military facility,
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“Every one of these little widgets that we use in a healthcare environment is worth
something on the street. And, whether it's a syringe or a vacutainers, somebody wants
that somewhere because they can be used to do anything. One of the problems that we
have here in […] is drug use. So you can imagine that there is a high demand for things
like syringes and vacutainers. You see where I'm going with that. I believe tubing even
for example.”
The pressing external factor was manmade disaster preparedness for Norman who works in a
midsized rural academic facility.
“We have a huge emergency preparedness effort because we're so close to [the nuclear
power plant]. Because we’re the - that's not true there's a couple of hospitals that are
closer but we’re the trauma center that's the closest big trauma center to it. So to me, I'm
going to tell you that the probability is, I think, very low, smaller than the sabotage.”
While Edith, who manages the supply chain for a large multi-hospital system was aware of the
requirements of accreditation.
“There’s a requirement by the Joint Commission to do a risk management assessment.
So we've taken that risk management assessment and we've put it into a quad matrix, kind
of like what you've done, and we developed a series of questions that were specific to
supply chain and we correlated the risk event with the supply chain’s ability to respond.”

Barriers and enablers
Moderators to activities and their outcomes have been recognized in some circumstances
as the negative effect of supervisors on performance outcomes (Escrig-Tena et al., 2005; Samson
and Terziovski, 1999). Several respondents expressed frustration with their ability to attain
higher levels of risk management maturity due to these influences. Linda works in a small
hospital that is collocated with an extended care facility of 100+ beds in a rural location.
Although she would like to improve, her time is often limited by other pressing needs and she
realizes the limitations of her supervisor as well.
“I report to the CEO who may not know all of the various figures that are in front of me
and they may not understand supply chain. They know enough about it, but they don't
understand cause and effect when it comes to ordering, etc. I think that's, that is kind of a
barrier for me.”
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Evan has the good fortune of having worked with an exceptional CEO, however he also
recognizes that there are other senior leaders with different goals.
“But, everybody needs to understand that we all have the same goal. And that's to make
sure that you take care of that person laying in that bed and sometimes even the C-suites
are the stumbling blocks. They're more concerned about keeping everybody else happy,
and they still view the supply chain as just "Hopefully what I want you just go buy it" and
that's not the case anymore. They've got to be willing to listen and participate.”
Other managers felt it was the unwillingness of employees in general to change. Patricia, who
works for a large military hospital near an urban area notes:
“People are creatures of habit and it's hard to get them to be receptive to change. When
you start looking at new options and new programs and things that would save time,
money, personnel, paper all these different things, you usually get some feedback on them
or resistance on them that says "we been doing it this way all the time, why do we need to
change?"
This was echoed more colorfully by Tony who works at a large urban hospital “I think that we've
got to get past some of the old guard. Again, we still have some old ways of thinking, if you want
to call it stinking thinking. I think we need to move forward.” Tony further recognized that some
of the effective change can also happen at lower levels of administration as well:
“I think we're getting the right players to the right seat at the table and subsequently
getting these types of issues and topics put together. We’re at the point where people with
the C’s in front of their name really don't need to be at the table because you've got really
qualified and capable leaders at the AVP, director and manager level.”
Tony’s facility recently hired a new Head of Security and a new Chief of Public Health and both
have brought change and innovation that Tony feels is beneficial to removing the ‘stinking
thinking’ barriers that were noted.
Stan, however, faces a different problem as the will to improve is present, but, being in a
medium sized hospital facing revenue reductions, the means are unavailable:
“When you lack resources in the supply chain it is the same way, it limits what you can
do. We could be better automated, EDI and some of those options that are available
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maybe to a larger facility aren't to us because the cost - it's too cost prohibitive. We can't
afford it, we just don't have those kind of resources. We’re looking at hits to our bottom
line and reduced reimbursement and everything is being looked at to try to control cost.
Some of these things are having adverse effects.”
His view seemed to echo that of a recent conference presentation he attended.
“One of the presentations was from one of the AHRMM presenters, actually a chief
operating officer for a healthcare company, who said you're looking at whatever you're
getting paid today you're looking at between 14 to 20% less within five years or so. It's
hard to drive that much money out of the supply chain, which has been working for a
long time to keep costs down through GPO's and all of the things that we do. My view on
it is that the last big pot of money that someone is looking for out there in the healthcare
sector is with the manufacturers.”
Respondents described numerous barriers to attaining higher levels of risk management
maturity while other respondents described the same items as enablers. Some of these, such as
managerial support or financial resources were highly variable and ranged from full support of
senior management to senior hospital managers who are unsure of supply chain’s function.
Likewise, where hospitals exceeded financial performance goals there were opportunities to
invest in supply chain enablers while financially troubled facilities were unable to obtain
resources perceived as beneficial due to economic constraints.

Summary of Qualitative Study Two Results

To date there is little known research designed to understand the complex influences
encountered by healthcare supply chain managers as they determine their risk management
approach, although risk management as a field has been examined globally from a financial and
economic perspective for many years. This study produced some interesting perspectives of the
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healthcare supply chain manager and the motivation for improvement of supply chain risk
performance. The first theme is of the managerial focus on the extended downstream supply
chain, with the main focus on the customer’s customer; in the case of hospitals this is the patient
of the healthcare provider. The healthcare provider, while understood as a critical component of
patient care and the customer of the supply chain manager, is less often seen as a collaborative
partner and often seen as a barrier. While physicians have long held a position of great stature
and influence in a healthcare supply chain, the ability to provide to these customers any ordered
supply or equipment has been moderated due to recent reductions in operating margins and a
renewed focus on overall hospital financial performance (Burns, 2001, McKone-Sweet, 2005).
The second theme is communication between levels of the supply chain. Respondents
described active communication both one level higher, to their supplier/ distributor and one level
lower, to the providers, with influences from management regarding financial issues and
dedicated patient-care concerns as a self-imposed moderator. In facilities where communication
seemed improved there was greater satisfaction with the current risk management level of the
supply chain. In facilities where there were financial, communication and staffing challenges the
supply chain managers overall expressed greater frustration with the level of risk management
maturity. The theme implied a lack of effective integration and communication within the
hospital-customer relationship, which has similarly been described by Chen et al., (2013) as
knowledge exchange in their examination of supplier-hospital relationships. A recent report also
noted that 14% of hospital C-suite and material managers felt lack of integration throughout the
continuum of care had the second highest impact on the supply chain, behind cost saving goals
of the facility (Premier, 2013). Clinical integration misalignment with the supply chain was
expressed as a source of much frustration. Problematic is that the clinicians are the next
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downstream customer who often are less inclined to collaboration when that collaboration is seen
as contravalent to improved patient outcomes. These relational aspects of trust, understanding,
collaboration and unity of effort occur at all sizes of facilities that were examined and may serve
as moderators to achieving desired levels of risk management maturity. These aspects and an
integrated discussion of Study 1 and Study 2 results will be presented in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
Chapter Outline
This chapter reviews the findings from this research. The first section describes the
overall contributions from Study One and Study Two in light of Chapter 1 contributions. The
next section discusses the contributions from Study One and discusses the implications from
non-support of the hypotheses as well as the findings regarding similarities among healthcare
supply chain managers in regards to their Executive Style and theoretical and managerial
implicatons. The third section discusses findings from the exploratory qualitative Study Two as
well as a discussion of the relevant theoretical and managerial implications. Finally, implications
from a combined review of both studies is presented as well as limitations of the study and future
research opportunities. Table 49 provides an overview of all results.

Table 49: Recap of Results
Research Objective

Hypotheses
H1a: The Maestro style is negatively associated
with Level I SCRM maturity
H1b: The Maestro style is positively associated
with Level II SCRM maturity
H1c: The Maestro style is positively associated
with Level III SCRM maturity
H1d: The Maestro style is positively associated
with Level IV SCRM maturity.

Investigate how a
healthcare supply chain
manager’s Executive
Style impacts their
approach to risk
management.

Hypothesis
Supported?
No

Implication

No
No
No

H2a: The Leader style is negatively associated
with Level I SCRM maturity.
H2b: The Leader style is positively associated
with Level II SCRM maturity.
H2c: The Leader style is positively associated
with Level III SCRM maturity.
H2d: The Leader style is negatively associated
with Level IV SCRM maturity.

No

H3a: The Manager style is negatively
associated with Level I SCRM maturity.
H3b: The Manager style is positively associated
with Level II SCRM maturity.
H3c: The Manager style is negatively associated

No

No
No
No

No
No

The overall lack of support for this objective
indicates that although managers and firms
may desire an increased level of risk
management maturity, there may either be
no linkage found through the foundational
ES attributes or moderators may exert a
greater influence, masking any managerial
influence. In part, the overall low maturity
levels in healthcare supply chain risk
management may indicate a larger systemic
effect from an unidentified source. A large
percentage of managers who expressed
greater acceptance of uncertainty, which
supports long-term relationship building,
seems at odds with internal, transactional
maturity level attainment.
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with Level III SCRM maturity.
H3d: The Manager style is negatively
associated with Level IV SCRM maturity.
H4a: The Producer style is positively associated
with Level I SCRM maturity.
H4b: The Producer style is positively associated
with Level II SCRM maturity.
H4c: The Producer style is negatively
associated with Level III SCRM maturity.
H4d: The Producer style is negatively
associated with Level IVSCRM maturity.

Examine and discover
the complex influences
encountered by supply
chain managers as they
determine their risk
management approach.

Exploratory Study

Investigate if healthcare
supply chain managers
possess similar or
dissimilar Executive
Styles.

Exploratory

No

No
No
No
No

Healthcare supply chain managers face a
myriad set of challenges when faced with
understanding and reacting to risks. Often
these are related to specific conditions
within their hospital. However, a consistent
focus on the patient is identified as a
continued and robust motivation for
decision-making, although moderating
influences are recognized as well. These
moderating influences may be a factor that
leads to overall reduction in maturity levels
among all hospitals.
Although no linkage was recognized
between ES and RM maturity levels, large
populations of both executive styles and
maturity level clusters were identified.
Knowledge of these managerial and risk
attributes allows for further investigation as
to potential causes.

Overall Dissertation Contributions

This research sought to contribute to the understanding of Executive Style impact in
healthcare supply chain risk management as well as risk management maturity clustering within
US based hospital supply chains (Table 50). Chapter 1 discussed multiple contributions this
research was designed to achieve. The first was to deepen the understanding and boundaries of
the relationship between Executive Style and risk management, as there is limited research where
behavioral attributes are linked to operations (Davis and Golicic, 2012; Fawcett and Waller,
2012) under the umbrella of Contingency Theory. The second was to explore the relationship
between management styles and healthcare supply chain risk management through an
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understanding of decision making, as managers are key to implementing a hospital’s risk
management strategy. The third contribution was to develop themes and topics to foster future
behavioral, operational or integrative research in support of interdisciplinary theory building
including taxonomy or typology development A fourth contribution was to demonstrate the value
of multiple method research as a means to provide a more broad and deep understanding of
managerial behavior and outcomes.
One additional area where a contribution may be made is in the study of misalignment.
As Hakonsson et al., (2012) noted “misalignment leads to opportunity losses for the firm”
(p.196). Collective results from Study One and Study Two may indicate potential misalignment
and open opportunities to understand how managerial attributes may be best aligned to support
increased achievement of risk management maturity levels in support of firm strategy.
Table 50: Contributions
Contribution
1. Adds to limited research focused on
behavior and operations
2. Explores the relationship between
management style and risk management
decision making
3. Develops themes and topics to support
future research in behavioral supply chain
management
4. Demonstrates the value of multiple
method studies, not commonly used in
supply chain research
5. Highlights the challenge of misalignment
between managerial traits and operational
performance

Study
Study One
Study Two
Study Two

Study Two

Study One (Survey)
Study Two (Semi-structured interview)
Study One

Study One Research Contribution and Implications
A review of behavioral and operational literature from a variety of disciplines indicated
that managerial behavior traits have an impact on firm operations. As many firms are unique,
often there are multiple types of individuals who may lead within the organization. However,
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Fiedler (1965) noted that understanding a manager’s style and type may help place a manager in
the best position to capitalize on those attributes and noted there is a relationship between certain
traits and business conditions. Burton and Obel (2004) conducted research using Contingency
Theory that supported this concept and developed an extensive contingency model of
organizations that analyzed multiple facets of strategic influence, including leadership or
managerial style. Hakonsson et al., (2012) built upon Burton and Obel to identify opportunities
between fit and firm strategy that led to improved financial performance in their longitudinal
study. Hakonsson found misfits produced worse financial results over time while manager/
strategy combinations that fit well produced improved financial performance over time.
Study One may have identified some of the challenges facing healthcare operations that
desire to achieve greater levels of risk management maturity in that while some organizations
were members of the higher levels of maturity the majority of hospital supply chains experience
clustering indicating immaturity as indicated by the cluster variables.

Risk Management Maturity Clusters in Healthcare
Risk management maturity levels have been previously identified (Hillson, 1997,
IACCM, 2003, Simchi-Levi et al., 2013) across broad industry categories and indicate a firm’s
attainment of levels of RM competency across seven key areas. These include risk governance,
flexibility and redundancy, between-partner alignment, upstream and downstream integration,
internal business function alignment and integration, complexity management and data,
modeling and analytics capabilities (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Greater levels of maturity, which
support increased post-disruption resilience and improved financial performance (Simchi-Levi et
al., 2013) must build upon lower levels to be most effective (Oliveira et al., 2012).
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Internal consistency of the variable groupings were examined with Cronbach’s alpha
score, a measure of overall scale reliability. Only Level III/ Cluster 3 achieved an acceptable
score of >.70, when all respondents were examined. Cluster 4 as measured across all
respondents, as well Clusters 2 and 3 as measured by Cluster respondents, achieved marginal
scores of >.6, considered potentially acceptable for exploratory studies (Robinson et al., 1991).
These score differences may be indicative of the role that these variables have in defining
groupings based on similarities of response (as measured by Euclidean distances during the
cluster analysis), rather than a measure of an underlying concept. The differences between the
groupings of the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) levels and the healthcare SC clusters indicates that
across professional fields there are differences in how SC managers approach risk management
and group their activities. Of note was the difference in Cronbach alpha strength of the Cluster 4
respondents when compared to the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) scores. This was unexpected as the
first three Level/ Cluster comparison scores were similar and increased from Level I/ Cluster 1 to
Level III/Cluster 3 with a subsequent reduction in alpha for level IV. Although not grouped
initially as a conceptual scale, as the variables were grouped by the cluster process, they may
warrant additional research to understand if they actually possess additional scale qualities.
Overall statistical significance between the Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) RM maturity levels
and the healthcare RM Maturity clusters, as assessed during the canonical correlation analysis
and developed in this research, was assessed as strong, however this significance may have been
influenced by the presence of collinearity of variables that were present in each matching
canonical variate. The practical significance, therefor, between the variates developed from the
groups of variables that formed each grouping was assessed as weak, given the strength of
certain individual variables to drive the scores higher. This weakness indicates a difference in the
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variate measures at each of the four levels that were compared. This distinction is important as it
indicates a general difference in the attributes measured by each variate across both the base RM
maturity model and the clusters from this study. Of note is the disproportional grouping of
healthcare supply chain respondents at the lowest maturity levels where the base RM maturity
model possessed a more normal distribution among the four levels.
Two healthcare supply chain risk management clusters were disproportionately aligned
with the lowest single risk management level identified in the literature. In healthcare, RM
Cluster one grouped 44.3% respondents on the variables where respondents employed ‘ad-hoc
risk management processes’ and possessed the ability to ‘absorb limited volatility around
standard functional input parameters’. Cluster two grouped 28.3% of respondents around the
variables of having ‘no visibility into changes outside their functional domain’ and ‘no planning
of redundancy buffers towards potential disruptions’. While individual respondents may employ
characteristics found in higher levels of maturity, these cluster variables were found to be the
most closely aligned when all respondents were analyzed. Cluster three respondents, 24.6%,
were the most varied across multiple maturity levels, possessing qualities from buffer planning
and redundancy as well as flexibility, as defined by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013). Cluster three
respondents noted the use of ‘basic risk governance processes’ as well as ‘segmenting their risk
strategies’ and ‘investing in flexibility of processes, products, plants and capacity’, considered
among the higher maturity characteristics.
Cluster four was the smallest of the clusters with 2.7% (n=5) of respondents. These cases
clustered around three variables, ‘the use of sensors and predictors to proactively position
response mechanisms’, ‘partner resilience monitoring’ and ‘ managing pressure away from weak
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partners in the value chain’, the last two variables beginning to extend RM practices into a more
complex relationship with a partner.
The unexpected result of the cluster analysis of risk management maturity levels in
hospital supply chains may be indicative of challenges being faced within healthcare supply
chains. The majority of respondents, 72.6%, clustered in the lowest tier identified by several
researchers. This may indicate an ongoing and embedded fragility of an ability to recover from a
severe disruption event, although routine operations may mask this from being apparent. This
lack of recovery predisposition is understandable as severe disruptions which may test a supply
chain’s resiliency are less likely to occur and the threat may be less recognizable.

Executive Styles in Healthcare Supply Chains
Described by Hakonsson et al., (2012), executives may be classified into one of four
styles based upon their level of uncertainty avoidance and their preference for delegation.
Maestro style respondents represented 27.8% of respondents. The minority of respondents, 7%,
identified as Leader style managers who are more accepting of risk and simultaneously prefer to
delegate. Previous research has indicated that greater acceptance of risks provides the
opportunity to develop long term relationships, which have been identified as necessary when
achieving higher levels of maturity (Simchi-Levi et al., 2013). Overall, 34.8% of respondents
indicated a preference to accept greater risk, and potentially support long-term relationships with
supply chain partners. However, attainment of expected increased levels of RM maturity were
not found. Hakonsson et al., (2012) noted in their study that executive style alignment with firm
strategy improved longitudinal financial performance. Hospital strategy data was not collected
for this study, however future research may wish to explore this relationship and how outcomes
derive when there is a fit as well as when there is a mis-fit between ES and hospital strategy. The
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largest group of respondents identified as the Manager style, indicating a preference to avoid
uncertainty in favor of short term stability. The second largest group, again the Maestro style
indicated a strong preference among most SC managers to not delegate tasks.

Executive Style and Risk Management Maturity Levels
In general, the numbers of managers who support lower levels of delegation stands in
contrast to the achievement of greater levels of risk management maturity as indicated by the
reduced number of respondents in both clusters three and four. This lack of alignment may
provide insight into the challenges faced by managers in achieving higher maturity levels in the
face of their strong attribute for uncertainty avoidance.

Theoretical Implications
Contingency Theory notes that best fits between leadership styles and organizational
processes and procedures may be identifiable within certain industries. To that end, in healthcare
supply chain management, there seems to be a preponderance of a managerial style that prefers
greater acceptance of risk. This was described by Singhal and Singhal (2012) as a within industry
fit and echoes earlier work of Fiedler (1965) who identified managerial fit within a firm as an
identifiable trait. This fit may be identified as providing a link between the internal operations of
the firm and external influences as well (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985). The failure to identify a
predictable fit between Executive Style and risk management maturity level may require
additional investigation to confirm or refute as the attribute of high acceptance of risk is present
yet the overwhelming low level of maturity clustering may indicate systemic barriers are present
or a different measurement protocol may be warranted.
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Additionally, lack of support for the hypotheses may indicate that there is not a direct
relationship between these managerial traits and risk management maturity levels. While certain
traits will be present in all managers at a measurable level, operationalization of a complex
function, as risk management can be described, may require other inputs to aid in prediction.

Managerial Implications
Hospitals that wish to attain greater levels of risk management maturity may already have
a key component hired and in the correct position of responsibility based in part on the high level
of delegation avoidance. However, there may be barriers to be removed to allow supply chain
managers to implement the necessary processes and procedures to reach those higher levels of
maturity, such as an ability to accept greater levels of risk and become more Maestro like.
Gattorna (1998) asserted that understanding a manager’s style serves as an aid to determine gaps
in managerial capabilities (i.e. risk management). The misalignment evident as so many
healthcare supply chains cluster at the lowest levels of risk management maturity may serve as
an indicator worth noting prior to a severe disruption. Additionally, the moderation effect of
other influences may affect the overall low RM maturity level in spite of the individual
manager’s willingness to accept risk. Hospitals may wish to explore what these barriers are to
mitigate their influence and attain greater resilience to supply chain shocks and disruptions.

Study Two Research Contribution and Implications
A stated goal of Study Two was to understand if there are specific factors and
interactions that impact a healthcare supply chain manager’s ability to implement risk
management processes and procedures. Qualitative studies have the ability to provide increased
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nuance and depth where quantitative research cannot (McGrath, 1982). Specifically, the study
uncovered complex influences encountered by healthcare supply chain managers as they
determined their risk management approach and allowed the opportunity to explore respondent
provided stories in more detail.

Theoretical Implications
Study Two began with no set theoretical foundation as a reference point. As little
qualitative research has been published regarding healthcare supply chain management, there has
been little opportunity for theory to emerge from previous research. As a result, the use of
grounded theory methodology provided the opportunity to develop categories of responses based
on case interviews. A goal is to understand the foundational underpinnings for supply chain risk
management activities of healthcare supply chain managers. Results offered some insight into
the barriers that supply chain managers face in hospitals. Further, it identified the patient as a
strong core customer focal point that underpins supply chain management thought, located two
tiers downstream. This relationship and the influences surrounding it are recognized in
practitioner literature, however academic research has conducted scant testing of this relationship
and has not developed it further.

Managerial Implications
There are several important implications for managers that wish to consider RM and RM
improvement that stem from Study Two. Managers across all sized facilities faced minor
disruptions from frequent short-term re-taskings during their day. These were often described as
disruptive and in a more strategic context may be an indirect barrier to developing longer termed
relationships, both internally and externally, that may support greater levels of risk management
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maturity. Communication was noted as both an enabler and barrier, yet the common thread was
the interdepartmental nature of the relationship. When the relationship was favorable, benefits
were recognized. When the relationship was strained, improvement efforts were frustrated and
led to poor performance and perceived increased waste.
Another realization is that the presence of personnel in key positions may be a barrier, in
line with Forrester’s (1965) assertion that personnel matter. Several respondents expressed
frustration in interaction with intrafirm personality misalignments that produced suboptimal risk
management outcomes.
Combined Research Implications
The appropriateness of paired methods to explore the questions of Executive Style and
healthcare supply chain risk management are shown as appropriate as they sought “to examine
different, but complementary, aspects of the same phenomenon” (Davis, et al. 2011, p. 469).
Support for inclusion of quantitative research as part of the mixed methodology approach is
shown by the unique structure of risk management clustering found in Study One. This
uniqueness is an area which has not been observed in prior research, nor has research sought to
understand the differences between risk management maturity levels in healthcare supply chains
compared to risk management maturity levels found in multi-industrial global supply chains,
although the healthcare supply chain has been acknowledged for its uniqueness (Schneller and
Smeltzer, 2006; Chang And Wittemore, 2008; McFadden et al, 2009). Study Two allowed the
researcher the opportunity, through qualitative means, to understand the complex interactions
facing supply chain managers who occupy multiple levels of maturity and develop the
foundation for understanding the foundations of maturity clusters. Additionally, discussions of
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barriers and enablers from Study Two may direct practitioners and academics to explore
solutions with greater focus which may be an interesting implication for management.
Each Study was designed to be independent of the other, with neither one informing nor
driving decision making in the other method. Of note from Study One is the prevalence of very
low maturity level clusters where respondents operate their risk management procedures very
rudimentarily. Analyzed in conjunction with Study Two’s interviews there seems to be
significant desire for movement to greater levels of maturity; supply chain managers were
readily able to identify, define, and articulate the most severe threats they faced, as self-defined
by catastrophic impact, yet also recognized the multiple barriers they also faced. The Study Two
finding that managers were generally willing to advance their supply chain to greater risk
management capabilities is supported by the Study One Executive Style attribute reflected in the
majority of respondents as a willingness to accept uncertainty. However, the barrier or barriers
were briefly discussed in Study Two, yet there may be additional influences that affect
managerial risk management decision making.
Future discussion may benefit from consideration of where optimal healthcare supply
chain maturity may be positioned within the four clusters developed here. Ultimately, each
facility will make a determination as to the appropriate level of risk it is both willing to accept
and manage as the hospital executes its strategy. Most hospitals cluster predominately at the
lowest levels of maturity. However, during several interviews, respondents indicated both an
understanding and a desire to improve their maturity level while simultaneously acknowledging
barriers.
The US Department of Health and Human Services notes in a recent policy bulletin that
“health centers must have risk management policies and procedures in place that proactively and
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continually identify and plan for potential and actual risks to the health center in terms of its
facilities, staff, clients/patients, financial, clinical, and organizational well-being” (HHS, 2007, p.
5). Proactive planning is a quality present in higher levels of RM maturity in both the SimchiLevi et al. (2013) model as well as clusters developed in this research. However, ROI for
activities that lead to an avoided disruptive event are difficult to assess and may be areas where
additional education of senior policy makers would be beneficial to reduce the financial and
execution barriers mentioned during the interview portion.
Several activities found in Cluster 3 are common in many business portfolios and may
provide an initial first step toward obtaining higher levels of maturity and avoiding or mitigating
the effects of disruptive events. Specifically these include the presence of a) basic risk
governance plans, b) business continuity planning, c) segmentation of risk strategies among
various risk pools and d) investing in flexibility, such as flexible processes, products and
capacity. Other variables in Cluster 3 may require additional capital and strategic investment in
staff, equipment or expertise, however, given the strength of the reliability score (.701) these
attributes may be indicative of a stronger RM position for a healthcare firm.
Healthcare firms may have varying levels of risk acceptance based on multiple factors to
include geography, historical prevalence of disruptive events and insurance exposure factors.
Where possible, these firms should seek to incorporate proactive risk management measures
found in Cluster 3. The activities in Clusters 1 and 2 are mostly indicative of an absence of effort
(i.e. ‘no planning’, ‘no visibility’) or limited capability (‘ad-hoc processes’, ‘can only absorb
limited volatility’). Incorporation of Cluster 3 activities that require little additional expense may
serve to overcome financial hurdles mentioned by some interview respondents, and are often
recognized as positive businesses practices. As noted by Simchi-Levi et al., (2013) increased RM
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maturity allows for increased post-disruption financial and operational resilience and this
capability of RM should be recognized throughout healthcare firm.
Research Limitations
There are several limitations to this research, although use of a multiple method design
sought to minimize these weaknesses. The three-horned dilemma proposed by McGrath (1982)
states that within any research design choices must be made that will maximize realism,
precision or generalizability, but choices made to strengthen one aspect will incur weakness in
other aspects. Through selection of multiple methods to concurrently explore the research
questions this dissertation has sought to address precision through the use of a survey
methodology and realism through the use of a semi-structured interview methodology.
The first limitation is the research was conducted in a single field of study within the
United States. Although it built upon work of Hakonsson et al., (2012), Burton and Obel, (1998,
2004), and Fiedler, (1965), the generalizability to other organizations is limited. However, the
findings may lead other organizations to use similar methods to increase perception of risk
management maturity within their own firm or industry through cluster analyses.
Through focus on the healthcare supply chain manager as the main subject of interest,
research may have only provided a single facet to the complex combinations of relationships,
resources and motivations in both multiple upstream and downstream supply chain partners that
may affect overall risk management maturity. Understanding these forces will allow for a more
complete understanding of dyadic and multiple relationships that exist in the supply chain.
Additionally, risk management maturity of partners was not examined. As supply chains by
design span two or more firms and several variables in Study One implicitly involve other firms,
understanding partner status and impact may be appropriate.
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Another limitation is the sample size in Study One, particularly following cluster
formation, where risk management cluster four members were few (n=5). This small sample size
may be of concern regarding actual cluster membership of variables. A larger sample size may
increase the power of any clustering solution to determine appropriate cases for cluster
membership as any cluster methodology will form clusters, a known limitation of the method.
Future Research Directions
One potential area for future research includes developing an understanding of the
barriers that stand between a supply chain manager’s willingness to accept uncertainty in their
interactions, desire to achieve greater levels of risk management maturity and potential
moderators. While some success was described through the cooperation with the CFO as Tony
described in Study Two, the opportunities to partner with external partners beyond the hospital,
either upstream or downstream present opportunities for improvement in comprehensive supply
chain operations.
Future research may also compare respondent cluster membership based on bed size,
military/ civilian status as well as years of experience as they impact maturity. Understanding the
influences of upstream and downstream supply chain partners on a firm’s risk management
maturity level may yield insight into how a hospital attains a particular level. Additionally, it
allows for comparisons of barriers and enablers of partners and may yield insight to areas where
collaborative efforts may provide improved risk management benefit across two or more supply
chain partners. This future research may include both behavioral attributes of the key supply
chain partner employees but also barriers, enablers and opportunities for partnering that lead to
improved risk management maturity for the subject firms.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Protocol
Opening
Introductions of interviewer and interview participant.
Overview of purpose of the study.
Confidentiality assurance.
Permission to audiotape.
Demographic data
Title of interview participants.
Job history.
Organizational structure.
Background on organization, industry.
How many employees are direct reports?
Lines of inquiry
1) What do you see as some of the most pressing risks to your supply chain that you deal
with regularly?
a. Why are these the most important?
b. What, if any, action been taken to address them?
2) What do you see as some of the most pressing factors that influence the way you
think about (Identified High Impact-Low Probability Risk)?
a. What are some of the factors that impact that (High Impact-Low Probability)
risk?
i. What makes it risky?
b. If the item/ capability/ resource was totally unavailable, what would be the
result?
i. How would you mitigate the impact?
c. Can you talk a little bit about how you think about this risk in this category?
d. What occurs in your thought process to arrive at this risk in this category?
3) What do you see as some of the most pressing factors that influence the way you
think about (Identified Low Impact-High Probability Risk)?
a. What are some of the factors that impact that (Low Impact-High Probability)
risk?
i. What makes it risky?
b. If the item/ capability/ resource was totally unavailable, what would be the
result?
i. How would you mitigate the impact?
c. Can you talk a little bit about how you think about this risk in this category?
d. What occurs in your thought process to arrive at this risk in this category?
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4) Thinking about your experiences with risk, what are some of the barriers that keep
you from becoming more mature in risk management capabilities?
5) Would you like to be at a different level of risk management maturity? If so, what are
some of the barriers you feel you face?
6) How would you describe your management style? (ES)
7) Do you feel your managerial style changed when/since you began working here? (ES)
Please explain.
Can I follow up with you if I have a further questions or if there is a serious disruption to your
supply chain? With the information I’ve gathered from you, knowing what actually happens in a
serious disruption would provide important data for myself and other researchers. Finally, do you
have anything you want to bring up or ask about before we finish the interview?
Adapted from Manuj and Mentzer (2008); McCracken (1988); Kvale (1999)
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APPENDIX B
Initial survey cover letter

Good Morning,
I am an AHRMM member and US Army Medical Service Corps Officer who has begun the
challenging task of data collection for my dissertation and I would like to ask for your assistance.
My research pertains to managerial styles of healthcare supply chain managers and how these
managers approach risk in their supply chain. As you know, risk management is currently an
active topic in the healthcare supply chain field and therefore particularly relevant. The study
involves a brief online survey lasting about 15-20 minutes.
I would be more than happy to discuss the research topic or the methodology if you have
questions. My number is 912-678-5478. Participants who wish to receive a copy of the results
later this summer can provide their e-mail information at the end of the survey.
Thank you for your careful consideration of my request and I hope you choose to participate.

Follow this link to the Survey:
Take the Survey
Or copy and paste the URL below into your internet browser:
https://georgiasouthern.co1.qualtrics.com/SE/?Q_SS=bjwImwvQDgJnSzb_2fLnOEmRwUtwDu
5&_=1

Major Stephen R. Spulick
Doctoral Candidate
US Army Medical Department
Department of Logistics and Supply Chain Management
College of Business Administration
Georgia Southern University
Statesboro, GA 30458
Phone: 912-678-5478
ss06232@georgiasouthern.edu
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APPENDIX C
Follow up survey cover letter (Wave 2)

Good Afternoon,
I reached out previously this summer to help with my dissertation research. The survey period
is coming to a close and I would like to appeal for 10-15 minutes of your time once again, for
those who have not previously participated. Briefly, I am a 70K US Army Medical Service
Corps Officer currently participating in a Long Term Health Education and Training program for
the US Army and this research is designed to better understand the relationship between
managers and supply chain risk management.
My research pertains to leadership styles of healthcare supply chain managers and how these
managers approach risk in their supply chain. As you know, risk management is currently an
active topic in the healthcare supply chain field and therefore particularly relevant. The study
involves a brief online survey that you can complete at your convenience.
I would be more than happy to discuss the research topic or the methodology if you have any
questions or concerns. My number is 912-678-5478. Participants who wish to receive a copy of
the results later this summer can provide their e-mail information at the end of the survey.
Thank you for your careful consideration of my request and I hope you choose to participate.
The research has received IRB approval from Georgia Southern University, # H14139. The lead
researcher has obtained NIH Certificate # 934468 'Protecting Human Research Participants'.

272
APPENDIX D
Normality Plots of Survey Variables
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Risk Management Maturity Normality Plots
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APPENDIX E
Descriptive Statistics of Survey variables

Descriptives
Statistic
Uncert Avoidance Burton

Mean

3.33213

Std. Error
.025418

Weight
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.28199

Mean

Upper Bound

3.38227

5% Trimmed Mean

3.32414

Median

3.27857

Variance

.121

Std. Deviation

.347585

Minimum

2.579

Maximum

4.414

Range

1.836

Interquartile Range

.446

Skewness

.500

.178

Kurtosis

.041

.354

3.00545

.022888

Mgr Pref Long-Term

Mean

Decisions Burton Weight

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.96030

Mean

Upper Bound

3.05060

5% Trimmed Mean

3.00138

Median

3.00000

Variance

.098

Std. Deviation

.312987

Minimum

2.250

Maximum

3.750

Range

1.500

Interquartile Range

.429

Skewness

.160

.178

-.025

.354

4.32

.052

Kurtosis
SolHumanProb

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

4.22

Mean

Upper Bound

4.42

5% Trimmed Mean

4.36
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StimulCoopDivisions

FormIdeasVisions

Median

4.00

Variance

.499

Std. Deviation

.706

Minimum

2

Maximum

5

Range

3

Interquartile Range

1

Skewness

-.640

.178

Kurtosis

-.415

.354

4.32

.048

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

4.23

Mean

Upper Bound

4.41

5% Trimmed Mean

4.36

Median

4.00

Variance

.423

Std. Deviation

.651

Minimum

3

Maximum

5

Range

2

Interquartile Range

1

Skewness

-.434

.178

Kurtosis

-.708

.354

4.32811

.04902

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

4.23140

Mean

Upper Bound

4.42482

5% Trimmed Mean

4.36867

Median

4.00000

Variance

.449

Std. Deviation

Daytodayguidance

.67035

Minimum

2.00000

Maximum

5.30937

Range

3.30937

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.589

.178

Kurtosis

-.200

.354

3.17

.064

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.05

Mean

Upper Bound

3.30
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5% Trimmed Mean

3.13

Median

3.00

Variance

.756

Std. Deviation

.869

Minimum

2

Maximum

5

Range

3

Interquartile Range

1

Skewness
Kurtosis
DevNewRoutMethods

Mean

-.599

.354

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.72342

Mean

Upper Bound

3.93593

5% Trimmed Mean

3.85145

Median

4.00000

.0538595822774
92

.542

Std. Deviation

.736518

Minimum

2.00000

Maximum

5.14990

Range

3.14990

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.286

.178

Kurtosis

-.054

.354

4.16579

.06015

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

4.04712

Mean

Upper Bound

4.28448

5% Trimmed Mean

4.23764

Median

4.00000

Variance
Std. Deviation

.677
.82259

Minimum

2.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

3.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

CertaintRulesFollowed

.178

3.82967

Variance

GovEconDecisions

.306

-.844

.178

Kurtosis

.291

.354

Mean

3.91

.058
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DecisionBasedDetailInfo

WaitSeebeforeaction

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.80

Mean

Upper Bound

4.03

5% Trimmed Mean

3.95

Median

4.00

Variance

.638

Std. Deviation

.799

Minimum

2

Maximum

5

Range

3

Interquartile Range

1

Skewness

-.357

.178

Kurtosis

-.328

.354

4.09

.044

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

4.00

Mean

Upper Bound

4.17

5% Trimmed Mean

4.10

Median

4.00

Variance

.369

Std. Deviation

.607

Minimum

3

Maximum

5

Range

2

Interquartile Range

0

Skewness

-.042

.178

Kurtosis

-.293

.354

3.04

.047

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.94

Mean

Upper Bound

3.13

5% Trimmed Mean

3.03

Median

3.00

Variance

.413

Std. Deviation

.642

Minimum

2

Maximum

5

Range

3

Interquartile Range

0

Skewness

.213

.178

Kurtosis

.174

.354

282

MinimizeBizRiskStandardise Mean
d

3.59

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.45

Mean

Upper Bound

3.73

5% Trimmed Mean

3.58

Median

3.00

Variance

.964

Std. Deviation

.982

Minimum

1

Maximum

5

Range

4

Interquartile Range

2

Skewness
Kurtosis
Mgmnt Pref to Motiv through Mean
Control Burton Weight

.491

.178

-.778

.354

2.94397

.032599

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.87966

Mean

Upper Bound

3.00828

5% Trimmed Mean

2.96044

Median

3.00000

Variance

.072

.199

Std. Deviation

.44578

Minimum

1.000

Maximum

3.750

Range

2.750

Interquartile Range

.625

Skewness

-.659

.178

Kurtosis

1.209

.354

3.85677

.07043

MgmntControlsLeadEmpFol

Mean

Rules

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.71781

Mean

Upper Bound

3.99573

5% Trimmed Mean

3.92018

Median

4.00000

Variance

.928

Std. Deviation

.963232

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness

-.765

.178
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Kurtosis
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp Mean
FolRules

3.85819

.06877

Lower Bound

3.72258

Mean

Upper Bound

3.99386

5% Trimmed Mean

3.91581

Median

4.00000
.884

Std. Deviation

.940453

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
MgmntControlsLeadEmpRch Mean

-.690

.178

.218

.354

3.97167

.07252

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.82858

Mean

Upper Bound

4.11476

5% Trimmed Mean

4.04190

Median

4.00000

Variance

.984

Std. Deviation

.991825

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp Mean
RchExpect

.354

95% Confidence Interval for

Variance

Expect

.353

-.838

.178

.152

.354

3.87143

.069462

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.73440

Mean

Upper Bound

4.00847

5% Trimmed Mean

3.92459

Median

4.00000

Variance

.902

Std. Deviation

.949880

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000
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Skewness

-.690

.178

Kurtosis

-.010

.354

4.10606

.059206

MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivat Mean
ionLeadEmp

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.98926

Mean

Upper Bound

4.22286

5% Trimmed Mean

4.18528

Median

4.00000

Variance

.656

Std. Deviation

.809632

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotivat Mean
ionNonLeadEmp

.178

2.179

.354

3.88762

.066708

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.75602

Mean

Upper Bound

4.01922

5% Trimmed Mean

3.94851

Median

4.00000

Variance

.832

Std. Deviation

.912222

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

.000000

Skewness
Kurtosis
UseAdHomRMProcess

-1.178

Mean

-.935

.178

.820

.354

3.16835

.065590

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.03896

Mean

Upper Bound

3.29775

5% Trimmed Mean

3.20500

Median

3.00000

Variance

.805

Std. Deviation

.896940

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000
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Interquartile Range

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

1.00000

Skewness

-.485

.178

Kurtosis

-.460

.354

2.76015

.07079

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.62048

Mean

Upper Bound

2.89981

5% Trimmed Mean

2.75340

Median

3.00000

Variance

.937

Std. Deviation

.96812

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt Mean

.178

-.687

.354

2.57068

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.44416

Mean

Upper Bound

2.69719

5% Trimmed Mean

2.56071

Median

2.00000

Variance

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
Mean

.616

.178

-.233

.354

3.26125

.06300

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.13695

Mean

Upper Bound

3.38555

5% Trimmed Mean

3.27326

Median

3.00000

Std. Deviation
Minimum

87

.87697

Minimum

Variance

.0641304110097

.769

Std. Deviation

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

.350

.742
.86160
1.00000
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Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.388

.178

Kurtosis

-.538

.354

3.14722

.06829

RedundBasedXfuncCommon Mean
Plan

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.01249

Mean

Upper Bound

3.28194

5% Trimmed Mean

3.21116

Median

3.00000

Variance

.872

Std. Deviation

BasicRskGovisUsed

.93386

Minimum

-.00893

Maximum

5.00000

Range

5.00893

Interquartile Range

1.46040

Skewness

-.698

.178

Kurtosis

-.133

.354

3.47005

.05890

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.35384

Mean

Upper Bound

3.58626

5% Trimmed Mean

3.52822

Median

4.00000

Variance

.649

Std. Deviation

.805533

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
NoVistoOutsideChangesand Mean
Patterns

-1.119

.178

.950

.354

2.59051

.06906

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.45426

Mean

Upper Bound

2.72677

5% Trimmed Mean

2.58196

Median

2.00000

Variance
Std. Deviation

.892
.94449
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Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis
UseSensorsandPredictorstoP Mean
ositResp

.178

-.604

.354

3.02900

.06773

95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.89537

Mean

Upper Bound

3.16262

5% Trimmed Mean

3.07589

Median

3.00000

Variance

HaveBCPlans

.466

.858

Std. Deviation

.926261

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness

-.392

.178

Kurtosis

-.712

.354

3.79929

.06022

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.68047

Mean

Upper Bound

3.91811

5% Trimmed Mean

3.85080

Median

4.00000

Variance

.678

Std. Deviation

.82362

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

.00000

Skewness

-1.076

.178

1.632

.354

3.13701

.072910

Kurtosis
MonitorPartnersSCResilience Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

2.99317

Mean

Upper Bound

3.28085

5% Trimmed Mean

3.15491

Median

3.00000

Variance

.994
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Std. Deviation

EmployQuantRM

.99703

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

2.00000

Skewness

-.300

.178

Kurtosis

-.909

.354

3.21632

.06480

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.08848

Mean

Upper Bound

3.34416

5% Trimmed Mean

3.26523

Median

3.00000

Variance

.785

Std. Deviation

InvestinFlexibility

.88615

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.633

.178

Kurtosis

-.529

.354

3.31444

.06881

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.17868

Mean

Upper Bound

3.45020

5% Trimmed Mean

3.34344

Median

4.00000

Variance

.886

Std. Deviation

.94102

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.628

.178

Kurtosis

-.496

.354

3.26717

.06066

MovePresfromWeakPartners Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.14749

Mean

Upper Bound

3.38685

5% Trimmed Mean

3.29452

Median

3.00000
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Variance

.688

Std. Deviation

RiskStrategyisSegmented

.82958

Minimum

1.00000

Maximum

5.00000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness

-.507

.178

Kurtosis

-.134

.354

3.25176

.06063

Mean
95% Confidence Interval for

Lower Bound

3.13213

Mean

Upper Bound

3.37139

5% Trimmed Mean

3.31063

Median

3.00000

Variance

.688

Std. Deviation

.82923

Minimum

1.0000

Maximum

5.0000

Range

4.00000

Interquartile Range

1.00000

Skewness
Kurtosis

-.802

.178

.498

.354
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APPENDIX F
Tests of Normality of Survey Variables
Tests of Normality
a

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Statistic
Uncert Avoidance Burton

df

Shapiro-Wilk

Sig.

Statistic

df

Sig.

.077

187

.009

.977

187

.004

.090

187

.001

.981

187

.012

SolHumanProb

.286

187

.000

.779

187

.000

StimulCoopDivisions

.274

187

.000

.768

187

.000

FormIdeasVisions

.275

187

.000

.782

187

.000

Daytodayguidance

.241

187

.000

.865

187

.000

DevNewRoutMethods

.297

187

.000

.838

187

.000

GovEconDecisions

.249

187

.000

.806

187

.000

CertaintRulesFollowed

.265

187

.000

.849

187

.000

DecisionBasedDetailInfo

.326

187

.000

.768

187

.000

WaitSeebeforeaction

.320

187

.000

.792

187

.000

.415

187

.000

.645

187

.000

.112

187

.000

.965

187

.000

.254

187

.000

.862

187

.000

.255

187

.000

.863

187

.000

.239

187

.000

.844

187

.000

.265

187

.000

.859

187

.000

.304

187

.000

.779

187

.000

.308

187

.000

.828

187

.000

UseAdHomRMProcess

.240

187

.000

.863

187

.000

NoVisOutsideOurDomain

.254

187

.000

.877

187

.000

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt

.309

187

.000

.837

187

.000

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

.254

187

.000

.861

187

.000

Weight
Mgr Pref Long-Term
Decisions Burton Weight

MinimizeBizRiskStandardise
d
Mgmnt Pref to Motiv through
Control Burton Weight
MgmntControlsLeadEmpFol
Rules
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
FolRules
MgmntControlsLeadEmpRch
Expect
MgmntControlsNonLeadEmp
RchExpect
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotiva
tionLeadEmp
MgmntUsesRsltBasedMotiva
tionNonLeadEmp
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RedundBasedXfuncCommon

.258

187

.000

.843

187

.000

.344

187

.000

.768

187

.000

.296

187

.000

.857

187

.000

.216

187

.000

.866

187

.000

.356

187

.000

.789

187

.000

.256

187

.000

.868

187

.000

EmployQuantRM

.277

187

.000

.827

187

.000

InvestinFlexibility

.307

187

.000

.831

187

.000

MovePresfromWeakPartners

.245

187

.000

.857

187

.000

RiskStrategyisSegmented

.244

187

.000

.828

187

.000

Plan
BasicRskGovisUsed
NoVistoOutsideChangesand
Patterns
UseSensorsandPredictorsto
PositResp
HaveBCPlans
MonitorPartnersSCResilienc
e

a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
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APPENDIX G
Descriptive Statistics Four Cluster Hierarchical Solution
Descriptive Statistics
Ward Method
1

reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref

3

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

46

.00

2.24

1.4344

.31103

46

1.41

2.24

1.8477

.25655

reflsqrtMat_No_Redund

46

1.00

2.24

1.6691

.29265

reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt

46

1.00

1.73

1.4659

.21854

refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan

46

.30

.70

.5259

.13140

refllogBasic_Risk

46

.30

.70

.4422

.13887

refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out

46

.00

.70

.4869

.15199

reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp

46

1.41

2.24

1.9195

.23615

refllogHave_BCPlans

46

.00

.70

.4187

.15096

reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil

46

1.41

2.24

1.9169

.20972

refllogQuant_RM

46

.30

.70

.5059

.13303

refllogFlx_Process

46

.30

.70

.5021

.13637

reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak

46

1.41

2.24

1.6945

.25501

refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat

46

.00

.70

.4117

.14079

Valid N (listwise)

46

reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref

27

1.73

2.24

1.9270

.16885

reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis

27

1.41

2.24

1.7062

.23230

reflsqrtMat_No_Redund

27

1.00

2.00

1.6034

.24716

reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt

27

1.00

2.24

1.6202

.28584

refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan

27

.30

.70

.4830

.13673

refllogBasic_Risk

27

.30

.70

.4431

.14316

refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out

27

.30

.60

.4247

.12983

reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp

27

1.41

2.24

1.8128

.22117

refllogHave_BCPlans

27

.00

.60

.3067

.15668

reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil

27

1.41

2.24

1.8959

.19134

refllogQuant_RM

27

.30

.70

.4450

.13723

refllogFlx_Process

27

.30

.70

.4311

.14556

reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak

27

1.41

2.00

1.8673

.18155

refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat

27

.30

.70

.4487

.12444

Valid N (listwise)

27

reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref

43

1.41

2.00

1.6870

.19685

reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis

2

N
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4

reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis

43

1.41

2.24

1.7435

.23366

reflsqrtMat_No_Redund

43

1.41

2.00

1.7442

.22792

reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt

43

1.00

2.00

1.6353

.21864

refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan

43

.30

.60

.4203

.09810

refllogBasic_Risk

43

.00

.48

.3526

.11580

refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out

43

.00

.60

.4167

.14545

reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp

43

1.41

2.00

1.6648

.20836

refllogHave_BCPlans

43

.00

.60

.3268

.14258

reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil

43

1.00

1.73

1.5228

.17461

refllogQuant_RM

43

.30

.60

.4045

.11431

refllogFlx_Process

43

.00

.70

.3623

.15214

reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak

43

1.41

2.00

1.5535

.17088

refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat

43

.30

.60

.4121

.10039

Valid N (listwise)

43

reflsqrtAdHoc_Pref

68

1.41

2.24

1.6778

.26114

reflsqrttNo_Outsid_Vis

68

1.00

1.73

1.3954

.19702

reflsqrtMat_No_Redund

68

1.00

1.73

1.3968

.18655

reflsqrtOnly_Std_Disrpt

68

1.41

2.24

1.7472

.25652

refllogRedund_XFunc_Plan

68

.00

.60

.3532

.11684

refllogBasic_Risk

68

.00

.60

.3399

.10402

refllogNo_Vis_Change_Out

68

.00

.60

.2679

.13872

reflsqrtMat_Sensors_Resp

68

1.00

2.00

1.5292

.21081

refllogHave_BCPlans

68

.00

.48

.2291

.14313

reflsqrtKnow_Supp_Resil

68

1.00

2.24

1.4886

.28196

refllogQuant_RM

68

.00

.60

.3679

.12276

refllogFlx_Process

68

.00

.60

.3487

.13475

reflsqrtMov_Pres_Weak

68

1.00

2.00

1.5591

.23505

refllog_Segment_Rsk_Strat

68

.00

.70

.4221

.13172

Valid N (listwise)

68
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APPENDIX H
Cross-tabulation of Demographic Variables for Missing Value Analysis

YrsSCExp
Missing
Total
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent

YrsHCSCExp

6

21

9-12 13-16 17-20 >20 SysMis
22

26

94.7 100.0 100.0 95.5 95.7

96.3

18

73

10

85.7 94.8

100.0

.0

.0

4.5

4.3

3.7

14.3

5.2

.0

Present Count

177

1

6

22

23

27

21

77

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

Present Count

177

1

6

22

23

27

21

77

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis
DisruptionExperience Present Count
Percent

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

122

0

6

16

16

19

15

50

0

65.2

.0 100.0 72.7 69.6

70.4

71.4 64.9

.0

29.6

28.6 35.1

100.0

Missing % SysMis 34.8 100.0

.0

Present Count

6

Percent

BranchofService

1

5-8

5.3

Percent

FacilityBedSize

177

1-4

Missing % SysMis

Percent

CurrentPosition

<1

177

1

27.3 30.4
22

23

27

21

77

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

Present Count

58

0

5

12

11

15

10

5

0

31.0

.0

83.3 54.5 47.8

55.6

47.6

6.5

.0

Missing % SysMis 69.0 100.0

16.7 45.5 52.2

44.4

52.4 93.5

100.0

Percent

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.

YrsHCSCExp
Missing
Total
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent

YrsSCExp

177

<1

1-4
1

11

5-8
31

9-12 13-16 17-20 >20 SysMis
26

22

94.7 100.0 100.0 93.9 92.9

95.7

15

61

10

83.3 96.8

100.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

6.1

7.1

4.3

16.7

3.2

.0

Present Count

177

1

11

33

28

23

18

63

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Percent
Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0
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CurrentPosition

Present Count

177

Percent
Missing % SysMis

33

28

23

18

63

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

122

0

7

24

23

14

14

40

0

65.2

.0

63.6 72.7 82.1

60.9

77.8 63.5

.0

Missing % SysMis 34.8 100.0

36.4 27.3 17.9

39.1

22.2 36.5

100.0

Percent

Present Count

177

Percent

BranchofService

11

5.3

DisruptionExperience Present Count

FacilityBedSize

1

1

11

33

28

23

18

63

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

Present Count

58

0

6

14

14

12

8

4

0

31.0

.0

54.5 42.4 50.0

52.2

44.4

6.3

.0

Missing % SysMis 69.0 100.0

45.5 57.6 50.0

47.8

55.6 93.7

100.0

Percent

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.

Current Position

Total
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis

YrsSCExp

Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis

YrsHCSCExp

Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis

DisruptionExperience Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis
FacilityBedSize

Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis

Front Line Manager/

Mid-Level Mgr/

Senior Mgr/ C-

Missing

Supervisor

Department Mgr

Suite

SysMis

177

4

96

67

10

94.7

100.0

94.1

94.4

100.0

5.3

.0

5.9

5.6

.0

177

4

102

71

0

94.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

.0

5.3

.0

.0

.0

100.0

177

4

102

71

0

94.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

.0

5.3

.0

.0

.0

100.0

122

4

71

47

0

65.2

100.0

69.6

66.2

.0

34.8

.0

30.4

33.8

100.0

177

4

102

71

0

94.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

.0

5.3

.0

.0

.0

100.0
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BranchofService

Present Count
Percent
Missing %
SysMis

58

2

34

22

0

31.0

50.0

33.3

31.0

.0

69.0

50.0

66.7

69.0

100.0

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.

DisruptionExperience
Missing
Total Yes
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent

YrsSCExp

25

SysMis

87

65

94.7 86.2 93.5

100.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3 13.8

6.5

.0

Present Count

177

93

55

94.7 100.0 100.0

84.6

Percent

YrsHCSCExp

177

No

29

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

15.4

Present Count

177

29

93

55

94.7 100.0 100.0

84.6

Percent
Missing % SysMis
CurrentPosition Present Count
Percent
Missing % SysMis
FacilityBedSize Present Count
Percent
Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

15.4

177

29

93

55

94.7 100.0 100.0

84.6

5.3

.0

.0

15.4

177

29

93

55

94.7 100.0 100.0

84.6

5.3

.0

.0

15.4

58

17

41

0

31.0 58.6 44.1

.0

Missing % SysMis 69.0 41.4 55.9

100.0

BranchofService Present Count
Percent

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.
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FacilityBedSize
Missing
Total 6-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 >500 N/A
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent

YrsSCExp

15

22

17

14

9

71.4 100.0

93.8

95.7

100.0

87.5

100.0

43

27

10

93.5 96.4

100.0

28.6

.0

6.3

4.3

.0

12.5

.0

6.5

3.6

.0

Present Count

177

7

15

16

23

17

16

9

46

28

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

Present Count

177

7

15

16

23

17

16

9

46

28

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

Present Count

177

7

15

16

23

17

16

9

46

28

0

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0 100.0 100.0

.0

Percent
Missing % SysMis
DisruptionExperience Present Count
Percent
Missing % SysMis
BranchofService

15

5.3

Percent

CurrentPosition

94.7

5

Missing % SysMis

Percent

YrsHCSCExp

177

SysMis

Present Count
Percent
Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

.0

100.0

122

6

11

13

16

8

11

4

27

26

0

65.2

85.7

73.3

81.3

69.6

47.1

68.8

44.4

58.7 92.9

.0

34.8

14.3

26.7

18.8

30.4

52.9

31.3

55.6

41.3

7.1

100.0

58

6

6

7

7

3

2

0

2

25

0

31.0

85.7

40.0

43.8

30.4

17.6

12.5

.0

4.3 89.3

.0

69.0

14.3

60.0

56.3

69.6

82.4

87.5

100.0

95.7 10.7

100.0

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.
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BranchofService
Missing
Total USAF USA USN SysMis
DelegUncert

Present Count
Percent

YrsSCExp

8

123

93.8 88.9

95.3

.0

6.3 11.1

4.7

Present Count

177

1

48

9

119

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

92.2

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

7.8

Present Count

177

1

48

9

119

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

92.2

Missing % SysMis

5.3

.0

.0

.0

7.8

Present Count

177

1

48

9

119

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

92.2

Percent
Missing % SysMis
DisruptionExperience Present Count
Percent

FacilityBedSize

94.7 100.0

45

5.3

Percent

CurrentPosition

1

Missing % SysMis

Percent

YrsHCSCExp

177

5.3

.0

.0

.0

7.8

122

1

48

9

64

65.2 100.0 100.0 100.0

49.6

Missing % SysMis 34.8

.0

.0

.0

50.4

Present Count

1

48

9

119

94.7 100.0 100.0 100.0

92.2

Percent
Missing % SysMis

177

5.3

.0

.0

Indicator variables with less than 5% missing are not displayed.

.0

7.8
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APPENDIX I
ITEM-TO-TOTAL CORRELATIONS OF RM MATURITY LEVELS AND CLUSTERS

RM Level I

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

UseAdHomRMProcess

.194

.398

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

.276

.256

NoVisOutsideOurDomain_Sqrt

.278

.340

.371

.309

NoPlannedRedundforDisrupt_S
qrt

RM Level II
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPl
an
BasicRskGovisUsed
RevCodeNoVisOutsideChgPatt
ern

RM Level III
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPosi

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

.406

.406

.400

.427

.319

.549

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

.494

.662

HaveBCPlans

.480

.670

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

.557

.622

EmployQuantRM

.493

.662

tResp

RM Level IV

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

InvestinFlexibility

.212

-.096a

MovePresfromWeakPartners

.188

.002

-.026

.449

RiskStrategyisSegmented
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a. The value is negative due to a negative average covariance
among items. This violates reliability model assumptions. You
may want to check item codings.

HC Cluster 1

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

UseAdHomRMProcess

.149

.

OnlyAbsorbLimitVolatility

.149

.

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

HC Cluster 2
RecodeNoVisOutsideChgPatter
n
ReCodeNoVisOutsideDomain

HC Cluster 3
RedundBasedXfuncCommonPl

.439

.

.439

.

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

.458

.605

BasicRskGovisUsed

.601

.562

HaveBCPlans

.182

.676

EmployQuantRM

.576

.569

InvestinFlexibility

.336

.644

RiskStrategyisSegmented

.247

.666

ReCodeNoVisOutsideDomain

.261

.660

an

HC Cluster 4
UseSensorsandPredictorstoPosi

Corrected Item-

Cronbach's Alpha

Total Correlation

if Item Deleted

.423

.525

MonitorPartnersSCResilience

.481

.437

MovePresfromWeakPartners

.385

.577

tResp

